It seems today that in mainstream media and political discourse proponents of neoliberalism equate freedom with consumer choice. Many arguments about the restructuring of safety net programs, such as social security and medicare, along market logic of private competition and less government involvement, usually mention how this would bring about more "choice" for individuals and thus more freedom. Neoliberalism has brought a shift in discourse about freedom and liberty more inline with market type of discourse. The shift seems to be from having the freedom OF choice, to freedom IS choice. Much can be said about this from many different philosophical perspectives (an interesting one that comes to mind being Foucault and governmentality), but I want to go back to further, to Kant. My question is what would Kant say about this idea of freedom, that freedom is equated with choice - specifically- consumer/market choice? This type of questions plagues me because this neoliberal logic seems to reduce, and debase, the idea of freedom and liberty to something shallow and unsubstantial.

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Interesting! I am not acquainted with the term "neoliberalism," but I think you are correct that Kant's notion of freedom was not developed with an eye to consumer / market choices. However, his view of freedom, autonomy in general, and both versions of the categorical imperative would have implications for one's behavior in the market, e.g. one would not have a healthy market if there was no promise-keeping, for example. For Kant's views on politics and markets and freedom, you might look at his work on history from a cosmopolitan point of view. You will find something like the liberalism of Adam Smith at work, the idea being that if persons are rational in their pursuit of interests the good of the whole will be served.

FYI: Kant's work on history influenced President Wilson and his aim of spreading democracy throughout the world with the help of the League of Nations (a term that I believe was used by Kant).

Perhaps a good counter-point to what you are calling "neoliberalism" may be Hegel's view of freedom. You might find the free, online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy helpful for further investigations.

A fine question. Let us assume thatyour basic characterisation of of the conception of freedom withneoliberal thought is correct.

It seems to me that there are two basicissues behind Kant's account of freedom. The first (which he wouldcall 'theoretical') is that a free act liesoutside of the series of causes that act upon me. This corresponds roughly to what todaywe would call 'freedom from' constraint. This at least resembles thenotion of freedom that you are criticising. Any limitation upon therange of my free act could be construed as a limitation upon freedom.Thus, the more things around me to buy, sell, or trade, and the fewerrules telling me what I must or cannot do, the more I am free.Accordingly, 'Freedom is choice'. While Kant seems to think of this theoretical freedom as instrinsic, belonging to me as a potential even if not exercised in fact, some interpretations of 'freedom is choice' go further: freedom exists only in choosing. One implication of this is that the latter definition is compatible with absence of freedom in Kant's theoretical sense. It doesn't matter if my choices are predetermined or preconstrained (for example, by advertising that contains misinformation) so long as, within the narrow consumerist definition of choice, there is choice.

Second, however, Kant sees this theoreticalconception of freedom as only a preparation for a practical – ormoral – conception. The moral conception corresponds roughly tobeing 'free for' something. I am free for the formulation andfollowing of maxims that accord with rational, moral law. This is adifferent ball game. There is little about the situation of havingseventeen kinds of toothpaste to choose from that has any moral valuein and of itself. Such a situation has no direct moral worth to me,to others or to the world at large. Accordingly, Kant distinguishesbetween the ability to make choices, on the one hand, and the abilityto be free for moral acts, on the other. Indirectly, though,there might be value to the situation. For example, suppose havingthis variety of choices is part of a system that creates wealth,thereby raising many people from poverty or bringing them healthcare,education and so forth, then that is a good thing. It's just thathaving the choices, or doing the choosing, are not in themselvesvaluable; they are not a sense of freedom that is, say, worth makingsacrifices for. Freedom (in a moral sense) is NOT choice, then, butit might still be the case that the freedom to create and defend sucha system would be a moral freedom. (This is related to what Kant has in mind with the notion of being able to 'consistently' will a moral maxim.)

This is the best defence I can give. Ithink you are right, the narrow focus on 'freedom is choice' is rather insubstantial; but the wider focus on a system that happens tooperate by way of such choice may not be. However, this then raises afurther issue: if it is not the immediate freedoms that matter, butwhat they are part of, then limitations on the former in theinterests of the latter are entirely reasonable. For example, iflimitations on the freedom to make individual health care choices help the widersystem to better perform its moral services, then that is a goodthing. This argument is a broadly Rawlsian one, more 'old' liberal than 'neo' liberal.

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