Indeed, I think that one objection to necrophelia would, indeed, be that this might involve the violation of the wishes of the one who has died, but of course we can imagine a case in which a person's dying wish is that someone sexually use their body after they have died. I think the more primordial objection to necrophelia is that most of us see the good of sexual intimacy as the loving union of two persons. After death, most of us think that the dead body is a corpse and no longer a person. In the sexual act, the living person is not having intercourse with Pat (non-gender specific name) but with Pat's remains. A qualification may be in order: there are philosophers who are sometimes called animalists who entertain the view that at death you still exist as long as your body endures in tact. Personally, I think that reveals a problem with animalism. They wind up viewing death as a qualitative change, whereas (intuitively) most of us see death as a substantial change, e.g. in a funeral, you are not...

One of the philosophical roots for identifying divine attributes is the idea that God (if there is a God) is maximally excellent or (in language going back to St. Anselm) God is a being greater than which cannot be conceived. Advocates of this way of thinking are sometimes described as advancing perfect being theology. They ask: what would be more excellent a being that knows a great deal or an omniscient being? a being that is very powerful or one that is omnipotent? It is through this line of reasoning, that it is held that God (if God exists) exists necessarily (rather than contingently), God is maximally good (rather than sort of good) or worthy of worship (rather than worthy of admiration). Interesting disputes arise over different attributes. For example, some philosophers think that a maximally excellent being would be eternal in the sense of not being temporal (on this view, temporality may be a creation of God) versus everlasting (God is in time, but without a temporal beginning or end). A...

Perhaps you are very gifted and your mother was humorously commending humility. Maybe you won an award and she did not want you to think you were the best and could therefore retire. In any case, on the matter at hand: if your mother told every (to use your example) artist that there was always somebody better than that artist, then there would indeed have to be infinitely many artists --just as there cannot be a greatest possible number, there could not be a greatest possible artist. Going further, if we have reason to believe there are finitely many artists (which we do), it would be hard to argue that there must be a single best artist. There might be many equally talented artists. Also "if person A was the best person at art in the world" there might be many artists who can POSSIBLY be better at art than them, but they never try to be. PS: I suggest that you may be good at something and nobody could be better: being you.

This has been a major concern for many philosophers. Few think that "equality" as an abstract term is ipso facto (by itself) something good; it would not be good, for example, for all people to have the same sickness or ingest equal amounts of poison. But with respect to some domains like moral and legal rights, equality has often been seen as a virtue (you and I should have the same -or an equal-- right to vote, etc). Probably one of the most vexing issues of inequality today --globally but certainly in the USA and Europe-- is the inequality of pay due to gender. There is evidence that men are paid more than women, both in the sense that men have more high paying jobs than women, and in that men are paid more even when they do the same job as women. The American Philosophical Association strongly opposes such inequity and condemns discrimination on the basis of not just gender but sexual orientation, race / ethnicity, religion. Your focus on the inequality of persons with respect to factors that are...

While there are some philosophers today, known as "animalists," who identify the human person as their whole body (brain and all). many more philosophers hold that personal identity is a function of brain continuity. On this view, if your brain were transplanted into a different body, you would then be re-embodied in that new body. The way you phrase your question is interesting as you refer to "the body by its name" and refer to "the brain's name." This is rare, as (to take my own case) few would think that "Charles" refers to my brain or my body. I believe most would think "Charles" refers to me as a subject, a substantial individual being who thinks, acts, has feelings, has a past, and so on. It is a further question about what is essential (in bodily terms) for me, Charles, to endure over time. Would I survive if half my brain was removed? There is a recent book on such questions, Are we bodies or souls? by Richard Swinburne. Swinburne argues that reflection on personal identity should lead us to...

Great response. I would add that since the 17th century, theology as a discipline has largely been seen as distinct from philosophy. Theology, though, historically and today, has drawn from philosophy and philosophers (throughout its history) have addressed religiously significant themes. Philosophy of religion is a respected sub-field of philosophy (see the entry Philosophy of Religion in the free online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) just like philosophy of science, philosophy of art, and so on. There is also the practice of what is called philosophical theology --this is usually a matter of practicing philosophy within a tradition. In this sense a Christian philosopher might offer a philosophical analysis of the Trinity or Incarnation or Prayer.

Great questions. An initial observation: Fromm's view of love seems compelling, though I am uneasy about his claim that love is not a feeling. It seems that one might have discipline, patience, faith... and care for another person, but without FEELINGS (the emotions) of delight in the one you love and sorrowing when the beloved is injured, I am not sure you would have a case of love. So I think Fromm's claim that love is not a feeling, but a practice, is open to challenge. Maybe he might have made the point that love is not MERELY a feeling. Over to your first question: Because there seem to be very few evident perfect persons (even Gandhi had his faults), I think your (excellent) question would probably best be posed in the philosophy of religion. Classical Judaism, Christianity, Islam and theistic Hinduism believe in the divine (God, Allah, Brahman) as a perfect, maximally excellent reality. I suggest love of the divine in such practices would include the cultivation of awe (or praise or worship or...

Great questions and concerns. For most philosophical theists (those who affirm the existence of God) "good" and "evil" need to be used with the same sense / meaning in terms of humans and God. For you to be compassionate and God to be compassionate and to be called 'good' presumably we mean praise-worthy / desirable / it is better that there is such compassion rather than not. But value judgements are often contextual depending on those involved. For those in the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), God is understood to be the creator and sustainer of the cosmos, who is revealed in human history through prophets and (for Christians) in the incarnation. As such, God is not to be assessed as we would assess a human bi-stander. So, for you and I to not prevent a murder when we could do so is blameworthy. Does it follow that if God has created and sustained a cosmos in which there is murder, then God is blameworthy? Maybe, but so many factors enter into this. One has to do with what is called...

According to many (but perhaps not all) Christians and many secular philosophers (and persons of other faiths) marriage is fundamentally based on the vows that persons make to each other. So, for many Christians in the west, the church does not actually marry two persons; the church recognizes and proclaims (and blesses) the marriage. Insofar as "the married man" and his spouse have ended their vow (whether they think of this as breaking the vow or releasing each other from their vow), the marriage has ended, even if it is still a legal matter of divorce. One reason why the state has an interest in the legality of making and ending marriages is to protect persons from harm and insure fair benefits (e.g. see to it that there is proper child support and a fair distribution of property) that might not happen on a voluntary basis. Apart from such a legal matter, however, it sounds to me that the soul of his earlier marriage (so to speak) has been dissolved in virtue of the two of them releasing each other...

If by "philosophy" we mean something like having a view of reality and values then it is hard to imagine not having a philosophy. If we mean something more like "disciplined reflection on reality and values," then it also seems hard to imagine that doing more philosophy would be harmful. And if we go to the etymology of "philosophy" (from the Greek "philo," meaning "love" and "sophia" meaning "love") then it is (again) hard to imagine that doing philosophy would ever be bad. After all, if engaging in what we call philosophy was unwise, one should not do it. Coming at your question from a different angle: let's say we define philosophy in terms of this site: should more people engage in AskPhilosophers? I think so, but we need to balance our tasks and responsibilities in life. Should a single parent of 6 children who is also a physician and caring for parents in hospice care, spend lots of time on this site? Well, I would like to believe it might provide a bit of relief / distracting stimulation, but...