This is a wonderful question, deserving of many responses, so let mine be brief. I would suggest that because a virtuous character is deemed to be the desired telos of human being, it is a type of consequentialism, but it is not utilitarianism. Utility, strictly defined, demands to maximize benefits and minimize harms, based on the reality of sentient beings' capacity to suffer. This foundational point is very different than Aristotle and more recent virtue approaches that focus on the goodness of the individual's character per se. This said, I cannot read Mill on the cultivation of higher pleasures without hearing echoes of Aristotle! Perhaps we seek ethical types to be more differentiated than they are. For the purpose of teaching, I draw bright lines between types, but when I read Kant's discussion of the only possible good in this world or beyond it is that of the good will - it is a matter of character that he is discussing! I think addressing violence from the standpoint of character...

Thank you Andrew, for this thoughtful response. I have been wanting to respond with notions of false dichotomies and the like, but yours is far more probing and engaging. In my thought world, however, when someone asks me if the glass is half-empty or half-full (as my academic dean did once!) I simply say it is neither - it is time for a refill! In Vino Veritas, and cheers, bjm

A bit more information would help me in answering your question. The "gap" you mention between what is and what ought to be the case seems to permeate practical philosophy down to the ancients. Are you citing a particular passage in Hume? As for hypothetical imperatives Kant comes to mind; he suggests that the term "ought" in this sense is not normative language at all but addresses our freedom to let desire have a role in choices (hence the hypothetical part). The moral sense of "ought" for Kant is categorical, and he is well aware of the gap between the is and the ought. So I guess I'm needing to have a text - or a Hume expert to reply - before I can get the gist of your question.

Ontology is always in the mind of the person contemplating the nature of being, so I applaud your agnostic stance. Beneath your question lies a very important question: what is the role of science in philosophy and morals? Our ability to visualize the tiniest gametes meet to form a zygote is a wondrous thing indeed. But science cannot provide ontological insight on the matter; it can only trace its trajectory toward becoming a fetus or not based on conditions in the uterine and hormonal environment. The fetus (9 weeks gestation and beyond) has overcome many obstacles, but again, its ontological status is elusive at best. I don't believe "potentiality" can be a claim of ontological status, but I'll defer to my colleagues who study Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas and Natural Law. But it seems to me there is a very risky step made by those who would accord person-hood status to the fetus. What is the presumption? Because science can observe the various stages of embryonic development, we suddenly "know...

It seems to me that there are many layers of meaning to your question: are we free to be moral? Is altruism possible? Can I shape my desires or am I just kidding myself?! In a sense you are in a pretty pickle here, because if I understand you correctly, you can neither prove nor disprove the nature of your choices. Psychological egoism asserts that all actions are done out of self-interest - and any attempt to deny this is simply not acknowledging that your wants might include pleasing your in-laws by picking them up. As a description of our human state, I find this to be a poor account of the complexity of our moral lives. As a theory, it is not open to revision or willing to entertain counter-factual evidence, so it is not even a great theory. Desire is so complex and the human heart so mysterious, I'm not sure we gain much by reducing every action to one (selfish) motive. Perhaps I'm going against Ockham's razor here, but the simplest answer, even if correct, doesn't get me to the airport!

It's been years since I've read Schopenhauer, so I cannot respond with his position as such. What I am noticing is that you seem to have excluded other possibilities by assuming that if the universe is not rational it must be irrational. What about non-rational, for example? No squared circles needed! If we posit that rationality is a capacity of human consciousness - and a mysterious thing consciousness is - what might it mean to call the universe "rational?" Are we saying it is conscious? Does the analogy to human consciousness hold sufficiently to apply to the vast universe? There might be human minds that see order and disorder and apply rational principles to their observations, but it is quite another thing to ascribe rationality to ... what? The universe is one of those concepts that is not a reality one can experience. Perhaps we can thank Schopenhauer (and his 19th century counterparts) for helping us see our anthropomorphizing for what it is. Does this help? -bjm

Perhaps examining the root meaning of "privilege" could help us unpack this question a bit. The term means "private-law" - or to put it another way - the laws that operate for most persons do not apply to some particular thing or person or group. For example, one might have "privileged information" which means it is not available to most others. When I teach a college class of students from a wide variety of socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, I am keenly aware of the disparity of their life circumstances. But the very fact that they are in college is a form of "privilege" insofar as the vast majority of human beings (across cultures and time) have not had access to higher education - and advantages that follow from this privilege may continue to accrue throughout life, regardless of race, gender or class. When we look at various and exceptional gains that appear to be generated by groups, we see real clusters of advantages in terms of race or whatever other category/social marker you...

Framed in the language of duty, as you have done, I cannot see how you can universalize this as a duty, find it in natural law or divine command. A rule consequentialist might weigh in and say what greater good was your aim or even, do brides, as a rule, betray their intended on the night before their wedding? Trust is the outcome of a relationship, not a duty or test of one. To my mind the question is best framed as one of character: "who am I" - am I suspicious, paranoid or simply love to mess with someone's head? Better yet, "who do I wish to become" within this relationship? I wish to be a trusting partner and do trust, until I have cause to revisit the wisdom of this way of being. More important is whether I wish to be trust-worthy than trusting. Personally, I'd rather be a foolish lover proved wrong than a cynic who cannot or will not trust my lover. Perhaps trust is not even a question of ethics - but the sting-operation really is!

I do not have the scientific or historical chops to answer you adequately, but the question made me smile - the dialectical thinker discovers the dialect everywhere - evidence be damned! I love Hegel and yet I am sad to report that as I look at the news, especially current political discourse, I am dismayed. Where is the Aufhebung in a filibuster? I look forward to other replies!

Let me begin by saying that any meaningful discourse requires reason,including feminist attempts to mount a critique of reason! Feminists differ significantly, so there is no one answer to your query, butthere seems to be a shared conviction that rationality alone is insufficient toshed light on many of the deeper problems humans seek to solve. One wayto ask the question could be: "Given its rightful role in any inquiry,does rationality exhaust all aspects of a given question?" or: “Howdoes one's experience, cultural identity, gender, along with many other socialmarkers shape the nature of the questions one raises and the answers one iswilling to consider ‘rational?’" Historically speaking, the raising and answering of significant humanquestions has been done in the context of educated, white, European maleacademics or clerics. Perhaps Descartes could sit by the fire and believehe is but une chose qui pense ( a thing that thinks), but is this theexperiential norm for most men...