The ancient Greeks are among those who are often said to claim that happiness is the "ultimate aim" of human life, but one reason scholars have insisted that this is misleading is indicated to some degree in the question here. The actual word in Greek that is usually translated as "happiness" is eudaimonia , and scholars now argue that we should understand this not as a subjective experience, but as an objective state of the person--scholars have suggested "well-being" or "human flourishing" as more accurate translations. In other words, for the Greeks, the ultimate aim is something more like being healthy than like feeling happy. Just as the experience of pain may sometimes be required for a healthy life, it may also be required for one to live a eudaim Ç n life, so we should not suppose that what these philosophers endorse is the opposite of pain, or the (mere) pursuit of pleasure or subjective satisfaction. Of course, one would expect that a human being living in a way we...

Pudner explains the rationale for the general rule, but it seems to me the questioner mentions several factors that are morally relevant, which the general rule handles rather poorly in the case given. It is not at all obvious to me that in this case, the student needs the teacher more than the teacher needs the student, because the student makes clear that she is not in a degree program and is taking the course only "for fun and personal enrichment." Of course, the other students in the class may need complete impartiality and fairness from the teacher, for the reasons given, but it is not obvious to me why the teacher cannot provide all these to the other students in the class. At any rate, it is unclear to what degree they are actually competing with this particular student and could suffer from the professor becoming biased. Given the particular individuals in question, requiring that they either wait until she complete the three more courses she intends to take, or else force her to...

First, I would advise you to let go of the shame you feel for what you thought or said when you were younger. We can all look back and wince at such things, but this is part of growing up and (we hope) gaining some wisdom along the way. I, for one, do not admire what you call "the child's purity." I think I understand what it is in children that you refer to here. But I do not find such "purity" (AKA innocence or ignorance) admirable --after all, it is not something they have achieved with effort, and the older they get, the less charming it will be, if they don't "lose" this "purity." It is just part of what it means to be an immature child--and we can understand how this can be spoiled, in a way that is damaging both to the child and to the adult the child will become, if this "purity" is taken from them too soon or too harshly. So we value it as an important part of what it is to be a child. But that is not the same as admiring it. What is good for a child, then, is not the same...

For Aristotle, actions were indicative of virtue (or vice), but not right or wrong in themselves. That is why, as most sscholars say these days, Aristotle's was a virtue theory rather than a theory of ethical (or moral) action. So I think the answer to your question is that Aristotle would not count torturing babes as evil in itself. It is difficult to imagine any cases in which such an action would be compatible with a just soul, and so would certainly count as a reliable indicator of vice in the agent performing such actions. Aristotle also recognizes that not all good behavior flows from the virtuous condition of the soul, where the virtue is learned. There is also what he calls "natural virtue," which means something like the right sort of dispositions one has innately. Moreover, there are other conditions of humanity that would be regular and normal that would generall exclude things like torturning babies. Certainly refraining from torturing babies hardly counts as a virtue, and...

I am not aware of a scholarly argument of the sort you are seeking. In my view, Socrates got this from the inscription of the same words at the Shrine at Delphi. Another of these inscriptions at Delphi was also quite "Socratic": "Nothing in Excess."

The idea of a "soul mate" probably has its origins in the speech Plato gives to Aristophanes in the Symposium , where originally human beings were combined, but then later separated by Zeus. This is a mythical explanation of how we look for our "other half." My huncch is that much of what counts for someone as an indication of being a "soul mate" will have to do with shared interests and other common points of view, and given how culture-bound much of this sort of thing is, it seems unlikely that a search of the whole world would be very helpful. This is not to say that two people of different cultures cannot fall in love and have strong and lasting relationships (my own marriage of of this sort, in fact). But I think the idea that two people will be just perfect for one another, before they even meet, so that if they do meet, they can recognize this perfection forever after, is certainly a myth. It may be that most people "settle for what is within their reach," as you put it, but this does...

I think so. Just because one has unlimited ability to serve one's desires does not mean that one has no desires to serve. Moreover, omnipotence alone would not make one able to discern how best to go about what pursuing what one wants. Here's another way to think about it: Surely an omnipotent being can do whatever is logically possible, and that obviously includes at least what you or I can do. You and I can experience wanting, desire. Hence, an omnipotent being can also do this--and a great deal more in addition!

One makes career choices on the basis of many reasons (or, in some cases, rationalizations!), but surely it cannot be required that one be able to forecast the degree to which one's own activity within the profession will succeed or fail in reaching some particular goal. Of course, when I decided to become a professional philosopher, I hoped that in some ways, my own work and thought would make a contribution to the field--but I could hardly be assured of that or take it for granted. So, it seems plain to me that one pursues a valuable activity because the activity itself is valuable--and not because one can anticipate that one's own participation in the activity will be valuable, or add value to the activity itself. The sort of justification you seem to have in mind is retrospective: Can one really justify a life choice on the basis of the value of what is chosen, or is a life choice only justified (retrospectively) if one can show that his or her choice had produced real value within the...

The following are really just very rough sketches, but I hope they will give you some indication of how your question would be answered by different philosophers. Some philosophers conceive of the morality of an action in terms of whether we are willing to universalize the action in question over all agents and all examples of the relevant sorts of actions, so the answer to your question in this view would be given by whether we should universalize as: "Always reveal the truth!" or "Always refrain from revealing the truth!" I think if we take this approach, the former is plainly the preferable maxim. I know that if the question concerned telling the truth versus telling lies, this sort of approach might seem more plausible. But your question is about exposing truths--in which the failure to expose some truth may involve no dishonesty or manipulation of any kind. Imagine a case in which you know that a friend's husband commited a minor crime. It may be one thing to lie, if your friend asks you...

Have a look at: http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=398104 The attribution to Socrates is spurious.