As far as I am aware, according to virtue ethics, we are supposed to cultivate a virtuous character. Suppose a person with a non-virtuous character engaged in an activity that expressed, but did not cultivate, his problematic character. Would it nevertheless be preferable for him to suppress this expression of his character, even if that suppression didn't contribute to improving his character? Or is virtue ethics only concerned with behavior that leads to a change in one's character?

Virtue ethics is not just interested in the characterological states of the agent , but also on those acted upon. So bad behavior does not just express bad character, it also has effects on those who are acted upon, and in the worst cases, it has the effect of damaging the characters of those who are victimized by the bad behavior. For example, part of what is wrong with treating me badly is that it is likely that I will become more defensive, less trusting, less friendly, than I waas before I was treated badly. These bad--but quite natural--reactions can become habitual if someone is victimized enough. And as the gravity of the offense becomes greater, it seems there is also greater potential for the victim to be greatly damaged in their own character--victims, in other words, can be made less virtuous themselves, as a result of being victimized. Indeed, in a virtue theory, this may be the very worst aspect of bad behavior.

Imagine some activity in which all affected parties have given their free and informed consent to the activity. Is this activity now ethically neutral/permitted, no matter what it is, insofar as it only affects those who consented to it in the first place? Suppose a person joins a fraternity that advertises itself as being organized around (for instance) learning from older peers, sharing and helping one's fellow students, making friends and participating in extracurricular sports. After being initiated, though, the person finds that there is an informal tendency of older fraternity members to bully new initiates, to make constant unreasonable demands of them and ostracize them if they refuse, to take their things without returning them and to use the new initiates as a less experienced opposing team for easy victories in sports competitions. Does the person who joined the fraternity have any right to complain about how he is being treated? Or can he, since the behavior engaged in is all nominally...

It sounds to me as if the notion of "informed consent" is being stretched past reasonable limits in your case. If it is well-known among members of the fraternity that new initiates are bullied, etc., it does not seem to me as if consent can be informed adequately if this is not made known to the prospective initiates before they pledge. At most colleges and universities, moreover, there are clear rules about what is and is not appropriate in these affairs, and anything that goes outside these rules is clearly not made exempt of sanction simply because the initiate "gave consent." More broadly, society has a reasonable interest in ensuring that somethings don't happen to its citizens--even if those citizens were to give consent. Slavery is a good example. Maybe someone might actually think it was a great idea to become the chattel slave of another, and might give his or her consent to such an arrangement. Even so, the arrangement would still be illegal, and I think the same goes for whether...

Hi. Let's assume that there's no higher power that could establish objective norms of morality. Then let's think of a fictitious situation in which a certain individual could greatly benefit himself by killing several innocent civilians. Even though this potential murderer tends to comply with laws and widely accepted moral rules created within society, he's a hypocrite and thus is willing to make exceptions when it comes to striving for his own personal goals. Imagine that in this hypothetical scenario the same person committing a crime could know for sure that no one will ever catch him, he will never have to serve a prison sentence, and there will be no blame whatsoever to damage his reputation. Moreover, we make an assumption that this individual will not feel any remorse for this horrific act of violence. So, in this particular situation, taking into account the potential murderer's point of view, why shouldn't a crime be committed?

The question is quite complex, and so I will try to be careful about breaking down my answer into appropriate parts. (1) The question seems to presuppose that there can be no "objective norms of morality" unless these are established by "higher power." I really don't agree with this assumption. For one thing, there are good reasons for thinking that there are problems with thinking that "objective norms of morality" even could be established by "higher power." This is the so-called "Euthyphro problem" that derives from a puzzle originally given in Plato's Euthyphro . For the application of this problem in modern ethical theory (and why many have doubted the "divine command theory" of morality), see the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on-line: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/#EutPro (2) At any rate, plenty of other bases have been proposed for howw there could be "objective norms of morality." In Aristotle, "morality" would derive from what are...

If you have a loved one in the hospital with a terminal illness and this person no longer has a capacity to communicate, sustain thought, or make critical decisions, can it be considered ethical to pull the plug on them without their consent given their circumstances?

What can be considered ethical will, of course, depend on what conception of ethics (and also, perhaps, what metaphysical assumptions) one brings to bear on the question. So, for example, if one believes in the absolute sanctity of (human) life, then the fact that the loved one continues to be (biologically) human and alive will provide the answer. On the other hand, if you think that what makes something human (in the ethical sense) is the ability to make decisions (I think it can be argued that Aristotle, for example, believed this), then it would seem that it is ethically open to end the biological life of the loved one, since their human life had already ended, in your scenario. However, it would also follow from the Aristotelian view that there is nothing wrong with terminating the life of a fetus (or even infant!) until the time it is able to engage in decision-making. In other words, a proper answer to your question must flow from having, first, an adequate conception of what sort of...

Over the past few years, my wife has become a staunch antivaccinationist. (We have a son on the autism spectrum; she has bought into the discredited vaccine causation theory of autism.) She is unreachable on this topic; no facts or reason will move her from her position. Unfortunately, she has decided that our children are to have no further vaccinations. She will not compromise on this. I, of course, want our children to be protected from dangerous diseases and thus want them to be vaccinated. My question: What are my ethical obligations in this situation--to my wife, to my children, and to society? Going behind my wife's back and having the children vaccinated without her knowledge does not seem ethical. Agreeing to her demand that the children receive no further shots also seems unethical--this would put my kids at risk of disease, as well as other people. Telling my wife up front that I'm taking the children to get their shots, despite her objections, also seems problematic--they are her children...

Oh boy, I really feel for you. I also have a son with autism spectrum, and as we both know, it is difficult enough dealing with that, even without the additional problem of an unreasonable spouse. My advice is that you do a little homework and find some support in your area (and not among the nutbags who have bought into the antivaccinationist nonsense, because it has been medically proven that nonsense is absolutely what it is). Because your wife needs help , to put it rather bluntly. She is feeling victimized by something that is just terrible luck and that has nothing whatsoever to do with where she is pointing the finger of blame here. But the other thing is that you really, really have a serious ethical problem here, which your questions shows you are aware of. Because your wife's adamant views now affet your otheer children, which puts not only them at risk--it also puts at risk any other children who might be exposed to your own children's (preventable) diseases. This...

I was having a discussion with a friend about video games, and she said, "Just imagine what we could accomplish if people took the time they invested in video games and invested it in something meaningful!" Now, setting aside the question of what is meaningful, she makes an interesting point. Obviously, the point applies equally well to television, film, music, and entertainment in general - video games are just one kind of entertainment media among many. So my question is this: do we have the right to devote some of our time to entertaining ourselves, when we could instead be devoting that time to fighting global warming, AIDS, violence, poverty, depression, cancer, and any other number of ills? How can we justify entertainment for as long as suffering continues to exist?

This is a really important question, but it is also one that too many people think is self-answering--as if it is simply obvious that if we are not feeding the poor or curing the sick (or whatever) we are simply being selfish and immoral. There are a couple of ways to resist this extreme position. (1) Supererogation is what ethicists call it when something goes "above and beyond the call of duty"--what is more like heroic than morally required. A moral theory (or command) that requires supererogation is regarded as faulty, because by any such theory or command, it will turn out that perfectly decent human behavior (like me teaching a class on Socrates) is immoral, simply because I could be doing something more likely to cure the sick or feed the poor (or whatever). What's more, (2) A theory or command that mandates such high standards at all times would, in all likelihood, make us all miserable , because we could never take a break, never seek simple (and innocent)...

What does it mean to be "judgmental"? Is there a way to avoid being judgmental while also acknowledging that people sometimes engage in inexcusable evil?

I don't think there is any clear fixed meaning to "judgmental," as it is used for so many different kinds of cases. Generally, it is applied as a term of reproach; so perhaps we should understand it as applicable to those who pass judgment without good reasons, or in situations where the judgments (presumably negative ones--we don't normally characterize someone as "judgmental" if the judgments they pass are mostly favorable ones!) are made without sufficient social ground for making such judgments. Thosse who engage in "inexcusable evil" certainly merit our negative judgment. But decent and dignified people do not feel the need to pass judgment on each and every case of faux pas or clumsiness they happen to witness. Being "judgmental" seems to go along with failures of various other traits we regard as socially virtuous: modesty, forgiveness, grace, kindness, and generosity. My guess is that every case that really deserves to be called "judgmental" behavior will also be accompanied by some failure...

Is there a rational basis for deciding when I should sacrifice my life to save another person's life?

It seems to me that there might be any number of such bases, yes, but perhaps there is a single generic way to characterize most (if perhaps not all) of them. One way to think of your life (since, after all, you are going to die eventually anyway) is to regard it as a whole, and to evaluate that whole as a kind of multi-media creation (part historical narrative, part performance art, etc.). Viewed in this way, sacrificing whatever is left of your life to save another's might seem very reasonably to count as the perfect ending for this work of art that is your life.

Do you only do a good deed (or just about anything), because you're gaining something from it yourself? I have thought this with my friend and she thinks people are naturally "good". I just think that as we are animals, we are naturally finding ways to survive. Of course sometimes people make bad decisions, but they are still thinking that the choice is best for them. -Heikki

Looks to me as if you and your friend are having a debate in which the only options on the table are not the only ones available for consideration. Part of what it means to be a human animal is to live with others. This means that just at the level of fitness, we will do better if we have the resources (whether natural or socialized, as I suspect a good deal of both) to deal with others in positive ways. Precisely because there are many others around us who really matter to us, the distinction between "best for me" and "best for others" becomes both artificial and also distorting. What is "best for me" is often for me to sacrifice at least some degree of narrow self-interest in order to help others to flourish. This is the kind of thing that parents and friends do for each other all the time. But it is not limited simply to those close to us. Studies have shown that people who are given money and told to spend it on others report greater happiness thanm those who are given money and told to...

Is it wrong not to inform a friend's organization of a potentially bad hire--because I work with this person and want them to leave our organization? And yes, it's a bad hire, by the work ethic standards of everyone else I work with, it's not a personal issue!

I guess there are different angles to this one. Is it wrong in a business ethics sense not to tell your friend's organization about the person they may hire? Not unlesss you are one of the people contacted for a referencce, I suppose. You are not obligated to inform other businesses about the errors they may be about to make! But what has more traction for me in your question is where you identify the other organization as your friend's . As a friend, yes, I think you owe it to your friend to let him or her know about the problem--just because you would like to be rid of the bad colleague, you will sit back and allow your friend to inherit your problem? Not nice!

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