Ethics

Hi. Let's assume that there's no higher power that could establish objective norms of morality. Then let's think of a fictitious situation in which a certain individual could greatly benefit himself by killing several innocent civilians. Even though this potential murderer tends to comply with laws and widely accepted moral rules created within society, he's a hypocrite and thus is willing to make exceptions when it comes to striving for his own personal goals. Imagine that in this hypothetical scenario the same person committing a crime could know for sure that no one will ever catch him, he will never have to serve a prison sentence, and there will be no blame whatsoever to damage his reputation. Moreover, we make an assumption that this individual will not feel any remorse for this horrific act of violence. So, in this particular situation, taking into account the potential murderer's point of view, why shouldn't a crime be committed?

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The question is quite complex, and so I will try to be careful about breaking down my answer into appropriate parts.

(1) The question seems to presuppose that there can be no "objective norms of morality" unless these are established by "higher power." I really don't agree with this assumption. For one thing, there are good reasons for thinking that there are problems with thinking that "objective norms of morality" even could be established by "higher power." This is the so-called "Euthyphro problem" that derives from a puzzle originally given in Plato's Euthyphro. For the application of this problem in modern ethical theory (and why many have doubted the "divine command theory" of morality), see the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on-line: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/#EutPro

(2) At any rate, plenty of other bases have been proposed for howw there could be "objective norms of morality." In Aristotle, "morality" would derive from what are more generally counted as excellences (or virtues) of character, and these are understood in terms of our nature as human beings. (Various modern versions of Aristotle's view are now being explored in contemporary virtue theory and what is sometimes called "evolutionary ethics.") Kant famously thought that objective norms could be derived from rationality itself. Even ethical relativists provide "objective norms or morality" the derive from the social constructions of different cultures; these are relative to different cultures and are thus not absolute, but they are "objective" in the sense that seems to be required.

(3) So the answer to the final question will depend on (a) whether we think there are "objective norms of morality" (most philosophers do, but as (2) shows, there are significant disagreements about how to establish these or what their basis might be), and if so, then (b) what the answer to the so-called "ultimate question of morality" might be within the correct conception of ethical objectivity. The "ultimate question of morality" is the question, "why should I be moral?" I take it this is the main question being asked here.

(4) Because there are many different ways to ground objectivity in ethical theory, there will, as I say, be many ways of answering the "ultimate question." But I have indicated at least two approaches that provide samples.

In Aristotle's view, acting badly tends to create habits of character that are contrary to what is (objectively) good for human beings. Think of the vet at the zoo who says "there's something wrong with Boomer the elephant." What the vet has in mind seems to be a (quite objective) assessment of what behaviors and other observable traits of elephants qualify as indicators or doing well or not doing well for elephants. For Aristotle, there are symptoms and behaviors that are plausibly understood as indicators of whether a person is doing well or not doing well as a human being. The question, "why should I be moral?" thus reduces, in the Aristotelian conception, to the question "why should I want to do well, as a human being?" If you have a correct conception of what it really is to do well as a human being, then you either have to fail to be a human being, or else you will (naturally) want to do well as a human being--in which case the question is effectively self-answering. What? You don't want to do well??? (By the way, Aristotle's position here is a development on a theme that goes back at least to Socrates, who said that wrongdoing actually damages the soul of the wrongdoer. One doesn't have to take a very fancy or religious view of the soul to understand the claim as being a version of what Aristotle's view also holds: wrongdoing is bad for the wrongdoer, in terms of the kind of beings that we are and what is, as a result of being the kinds of beings that we are, objectively in our interest.

In the Kantian view, ethical correctness is understood in terms of rationality. To deliberately choose what is wrong, accordingly, is contrary to rationality. But that means the question, "why should I be moral" reduces in the Kantian account to "why should I be rational?" One might wonder what sort of question that is: give me a good reason to be rational! What? Do we suppose there is a good reason to be irrational? Again, the question seems to be self-answering if we are going to make any sense here...

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