If one is innocently unaware that one has a communicable medical condition, then this would be a plausible excuse (here by "innocently" I mean to exclude cases where one has recklessly ignored obvious symptoms). Another excuse might be that the communicable condition is very minor (which I believe herpes is not) -- a slight itch that disappears naturally and permanently after a few hours, for example. The fact that the other person hasn't asked might be an excuse in a social environment in which only very few are uninfected and in which everyone takes for granted that those they interact with already have the disease ("how could I possibly have known that you are one of the 0.1% of uninfected people; you should have told me this, at least if you wanted to remain uninfected!"). This is obviously not the environment we're in. Being romantically involved goes along with an expectation of love or at least care and concern for one's partner. Given this cultural context -- which may not exist...

Your well-articulated question brings out something interesting about how we moderns think about morality. When we consider whether a certain piece of conduct is morally acceptable or not, we tend to examine what complaints other people might plausibly raise against this conduct and how the agent might possibly answer these complaints. This is pretty clearly the approach of your female friend in the case of the man on the bench. Your friend thinks along the following lines, I believe: if the man's behavior is to be wrong, then this must be in virtue of some complaint one might raise on behalf of the girl (who else?). Her complaint must be that he is looking at a part of her body that he should not be looking at. But this is not a convincing complaint, because it is as a consequence of her own conduct that this part of her body has appeared in his visual field. His sitting where he is sitting is entirely innocent, and the viewing opportunity arose (unexpectably for him) through her choosing to wear...

Even if both parties benefit from the transaction (relative to the baseline where they do not interact), the transaction can still be immoral. An extreme example would be a mother in Cambodia who works as a prostitute to feed her children. She prefers serving the customer and receiving the money over not interacting with him. And he prefers the transaction over not interacting with her (it only costs him as much as he earns in 20 minutes back home). But it may still be immoral to take advantage of the woman's situation by paying her so little. Let's leave this sort of case aside and consider prostitution involving two people who are both well off and roughly equally well off -- perhaps a business person buying sex from a college student from an affluent family who is saving up to buy a flashier car. In this case, I'd agree that the transaction is not immoral, assuming free and informed consent on both sides ("informed" meaning among other things that neither has failed to disclose any infectious...

We might think of this on three levels. First, is it permissible for a liberal state to outlaw necrophilia? The argument for an affirmative answer could appeal to various public health reasons as well as to the fact that this practice may give considerable offense to others even while the cost of abstention is relatively small and borne only by a few. This argument might run roughly parallel to that justifying the permissibility of outlawing nudity or defecation in public places. The case of gay relationships is substantially different for two reasons: the cost to gay people of not having the opportunity of a romantically fulfilling and socially recognized relationship is enormous and, with roughly three percent of all people being gay, the number of people who would be (and have been) bearing this cost is substantial. Second, is there something ethically wrong with practicing necrophelia? Taking ethics in the broad sense, its concern is the good life for human beings. A good life centrally...

The predicate "morally wrong" seems to require a victim: someone who is morally wronged. This could by an animal or members of future generations. But, in your case, there's no one to whom a wrong is being done. The same seems true for any and all feelings we might have: Our feelings do not harm others, hence it cannot be morally wrong to feel this or that. To be sure, it can be wrong in certain circumstances to act on one's feelings, to lie about one's feelings, to conceal or to express one's feelings. But merely having them cannot be morally wrong. Another argument to the same conclusion would appeal to the premise that we do not choose our feelings, that you cannot avoid feeling flattered at the moment you have this feeling. While this may typically be true, it is also true that we do have the capacity to modify over time the way we feel. Someone who feels hostility toward members of a certain race or religion can make an effort to get to know good people from that race or religion and...

Even if the question suggests rationalization and some self-deception, there is still the more philosophical question of why this affair is wrong (if it is wrong). Contrary to what you suggest, the fact that the wife does not know is probably sufficient to make the affair wrong. She stuck to this man throughout his serious illness and thereafter, because she believed and still believes that they have a certain relationship with each other which she values highly. She does not in fact have such a relationship -- her husband feels no attraction for her and is in love with you. If she knew that her life in fact lacks what she values highly, that her husband describes her to his lover as abusive, that he stays with her only because she looked after him when he was ill -- if she knew all this, then she would very seriously consider leaving her husband to try to build a new relationship of the kind she values. The deception deprives her of this opportunity and leads to her life failing miserably in a...

Kant better not say this. If everyone remained childless, then there would be no new babies either. So, by the same token, Kant would be condemning his own decision to remain childless. A good way of showing how remaining childless can be seen as permissible on Kant's ground is to interpret the categorical imperative as asking whether one can will not the universal adoption , but rather the universal availability of one's maxim. In a world in which enough children are born by to those who want to have children, I can will my maxim of remaining childless to be universally available: Even if everyone who wants to adopt this maxim does so, humanity will still continue. Applying this interpretation of the categorical imperative to homosexuality, it turns out that homosexuality is likewise permissible. Even if I cannot will humankind to go extinct, I can will the universal availability of a homosexual life: There are enough heterosexuals who want to have children to propagate the human race...

Yes, you interpret correctly.

Do you want her to feel obliged to tell you (do you even really want to know) what she is thinking of in those moments? Chances are you are both happier together as things are now. And the two of you have surely no duties to anyone else to change your ways.

My response was composed for Steve B. But, with thanks for Jyl's intervention, let me try to rephrase in a way that Alan may find more congenial. Suppose you were indeed morally obligated to tell your sex partner when you fantasize about someone else whilst making love to her. This obligation would not be one owed to any third party. So it would have to be one you owe to her. But it is questionable that you owe her such disclosures. To see this, consider that, if you owed her such disclosures, then she would owe you such disclosures as well. Now ask yourself whether such disclosures from her would really be in your interest: Would you want to know what she fantasizes about when the two of you make love? Would you be happier if she gave you this information, or do you think she would be happier if she gave it to you? If the answers to these -- yes! -- empirical questions (see Q866 and answer) are negative, then it is hard to see how she could owe you such disclosures that you would not want and...

You seem to think that my earlier response commits me to affirmative answers to the three questions you pose. As far as I can see, this is not the case. So, to answer the new questions in sequence: 1. No, a person's obligations are not determined by this person's self-interest. Even when performing some action is not in one's self-interest, one can still have a moral obligation to perform it. And even when an action is in one's self-interest, one can still lack a moral obligation to perform it. This holds for obligations in general, and it also holds, as you suggest, for obligations to disclose information. In my previous answer, the connection I drew was not between an obligation and interests of the same person, but between an obligation and interests of another (the person to whom the obligation is owed, here: the person's partner). This is the target of your second question. 2. Again, I would say no . The obligations one person, A, has toward another, B, are not determined by B...