Most people, I'd guess, have racial preferences in dating. I don't think that this is morally problematic in itself, since there is surely no obligation to date anyone, or members of any particular group. Still it strikes me that many cases of racial preference in dating are likely rooted in racism. For instance, I have never been attracted to black women; and while I would insist that I have no duty to be anything like an equal opportunity dater, I strongly suspect that my preference in this case is at least partially the result of racial prejudice. (I imagine that I would more often find myself attracted to black women if I had not internalized various stereotypes, racially-based aesthetic norms, etc.) Is this a problem? Does it matter to our evaluation of a particular attitude if, though perhaps innocuous in itself, it has a causal origin in bigotry?

I doubt whether we should feel that we ought always to treat everyone entirely equally to avoid being called racist. We are allowed to have preferences and sometimes these will be on racial grounds, perhaps, provided that those preferences do not systematically discriminate against people in ways that do them harm. Unless we had some fairly fixed preferences, it would be very difficult to discriminate among different sorts of people in any way whatsoever, and dating is based on such discrimination. It is as well to be aware of one's prejudices and to consider whether it is worth trying to challenge them, but there is nothing wrong in acknowledging them and recognizing their role in defining a personality. Blind dates are fun because they force the individual to respond to partners with whom one might not otherwise consider going. On the other hand, if every date were to be a blind date, this would not be evidence of having an open mind but rather of a lack of character.

In Kazakhstan three per cent of the population own all the land. Seventy five per cent of the laws in this country concern property Therefore, in Kazakhstan, seventy five per cent of the laws are made for three per cent of the people. Am I right in feeling that this is very unjust country?

Not necessarily. It might after all be in the interests of the majority of the population that the land is owned by a small minority. Perhaps they also deserve to own it, since they acquired it through hard work and merit. On the other hand, as you imply, this is unlikely so we are probably in the presence here of an unjust system.

Many people find the idea of letting a species such as the wolf go extinct to be disconcerting. Many environmental policies are put in place to protect endangered species. Why should it really matter though whether a species goes extinct or not if in the end humans are not harmed? What is the underlying moral reasoning?

We are harmed if species disappear, even if they are rather disagreeable to us on occasion, since the variety that exists in the world is diminished. The reasoning is not moral but aesthetic. Is it not better to live in an environment with more difference in it as compared to something that is uniform?

I often hear certain individuals declaring it to be imperialistic to try and help improve women's status in countries where women's rights are in a bad state. They say that imposing Western values ideals of what a woman should be on Afghan or Congolese women is destructive. How can it be destructive, when women in these countries are confined to their homes, raped, considered minors, denied an education or denied the right to work? There is a lot of chatter about how Western women are oppressed by the patriarchy, but surely their experience pales in comparison to that of an Afghan girl who gets acid thrown in her face for daring to go to school. Sure, we can't just run in, emancipation guns blazing - when we intervene in any way, we need to take into account local cultures and values and views, and best adapt our aid and intervention so as to minimize harm to the women involved while still providing them with what they feel they need (since such help must obviously be on a voluntary basis). So what...

I think the point is that we should not expect people to behave exactly the same everywhere, so that in some countries women behave in ways which are culturally appropriate, and look oppressed from the perspective of other countries. Take the head scarf for example. Many interpret this as a sign of oppression, but many women in particular do not, and have no difficulty in both covering themselves to some degree and also believing in equal treatment with men. In Islam both men and women are supposed to dress modestly, and if that is taken to mean that women should cover their hair, and men also dress in certain ways, then there seems to be nothing unduly oppressive about that. Or at least no more oppressive than the feeling that women in any country will probably be expected to dress in a certain way. I think that is the logic that is operating here.

I have a question that was prompted by a recent discussion with a female friend. We both agreed that a certain kind of voyeurism is obviously wrong. For example, we both thought that it would be wrong for a man to climb a tree to watch a woman disrobe through a window. The disagreement, however, emerged when we discussed a second case. Suppose a man is sitting on a bench minding his own business when he notices a girl sit down across from him wearing a short skirt. She doesn’t realize it, but he can see up her skirt--and she isn’t wearing any underwear. Now, let’s suppose that this girl is no exhibitionist and would be extremely embarrassed if she found out this man could see up her skirt. Indeed, let’s say she would be just as embarrassed as the woman in the first case would be if she found out about the tree-climber. Moreover, let’s suppose this man gets the same thrill out of this experience as the tree-climber. Is the man on the bench morally obligated to look away, or is it permissible for...

I wonder if the issue here is less about morality and more about privacy. A whole variety of things gives people sexual pleasure, and provided they do not harm others we might well not be critical of them, however strange they might be or even sometimes illegal. After all, just looking at someone's face might do it, or their eyes, or just their actual presence. On the other hand, in the examples you provide there is definitely the sense of someone's privacy being invaded, in that we do not ordinarily expect to be viewed in the situations described. And someone looking at us when we do not expect to be looked at often produces a sense of violation. Here issues of privacy shade into issues of morality, since surely we are entitled to expect certain aspects of our lives to be under our control and not broadcast in public without our consent and knowledge. The primary issue here is not the pleasure that someone else takes at seeing us when we do not want or expect to be seen, but our reasonable...

Hi philosophers, i have a question about indecency. Social norms at the beginning of the 20th century would have considered women who showed any of their skin in public as indecent (and illegal). It would also have been (as one could imagine) indecent and illegal for couples to engage in explicitly sexual conduct in public (i.e. sexual intercourse) By 21st century social norms, it is socially and morally unobjectionable for women to show off their skin in public, but it is still a crime for couples to engage in acts of explicitly sexual conduct. Based on the two examples above, i would like to ask the following two questions: can you imagine some types of conduct that will ALWAYS be considered indecent irrespective of changing social norms? And if so, what properties would these conducts have that makes its indecency distinct from conducts whose indecency will change according to social norms?

I don't think one can define any apriori indecent actions, that is, any actions that would always be taken to be indecent. It is remarkable how standards change, and in fact explicitly sexual behaviour is not anymore regarded as indecent by many people, although it remains illegal in most countries. When it comes to public standards of acceptable behaviour which do not make an explicit link with morality, anything goes. The only way to define some general standards of indecency would be to establish some link between them and morality itself, and that of course is very difficult. Parents of young girls are often shocked at their fashion sense, in that the latter often want to dress in sexually provocative ways, entirely out of line with their ages. Yet the girls themselves despite their clothes often display no great interest in sex or proclivity for sexual misbehaviour, as socially defined for their age range. Unless we can show that the standards of decency mesh in some way with the rules of...

Some people seem to think that it is fundamentally impossible to understand another culture. For example, they say that no matter how we think about and conceptualize Chinese thought and philosophy, we will always be interpreting it as though it were Western, and that we will therefore never understand it. Can this really be true?

You do touch on a very important issue here which occurs to those of us who work in the philosophy of cultures that are not directly our own. How much do we miss since we are not the original audience, as it were, of the philosophers from that culture? On the other hand, it also seems to me that we are very far from the original audience that Plato and Aristotle had in mind, yet many of us think we can get some grasp of Greek philosophy. How far is philosophy all the same and how far is it culturally specific? It is remarkable how similar ideas crop up irrespective of culture, so most philosophers are interested in similar issues to do with truth, value, knowledge and so on, although it is certainly true that different cultures emphasize different issues in different ways. There was a debate on this topic over a thousand years ago in the court at Baghdad. One philosopher argued that Greek philosophy was irrelevant to Muslims since it is based on Greek culture, and that has nothing to do with Islam...

What distinguishes the "social" sciences from the "hard" sciences? Or is there no such distinction?

There is at least one difference. The hard sciences are capable of predicting what is going to happen before it does. The social sciences have great difficulty explaining why something happened in the way it did even after it happened, and very little success in predicting the future.

Recently in my Philosophy class during a lecture on abortion the argument came up that in one view stance abortion is not immoral if it is to save the life of the mother. This is was to be considered toward the end of the pregnancy as well. Why is it that the mother's life is more valuable than the unborn child? Often the early baby could be incubated and go on to live its life. Is the mother's life more valuable because she has grown into a moral entity? Contributes more to society? Should the baby be more valuable because its life is brand new, with infinite possibilities, and the mother has had some years to life, is already closer to old age and death than the baby anyway?

I don't think it is quite that easy to extract a baby from a mother and for it to survive as you suggest. Even if it were and if we were to regard the fetus as having the same rights to life as its mother, there are reasons to prioritize the life of the mother. She is already alive while we do not know if the fetus will make it to life outside the womb. We have the choice between keeping someone alive who is already alive or letting her die in order that she bear someone who might not live after all. Many people do not think it is acceptable to abort a fetus even if this is done to save the mother's life since they see this as doing evil in order that good may result, a principle they reject. Anyone who holds that view cannot carry out the sort of thinking just produced here. If we are able to make a decision about who lives and who dies there is something to be said in favor of allowing someone to live who is already alive. It is not like redistributive taxation, where we take some money from the...

Pages