Ethics

Are moral theories subject to the principle of falsifiability? thanks Luca from Italy

Comments

Dear Luca from Italy- When the topic of a principle of falsifiability came into philosophy in the 20th century it was used principally in reference to empirical experiences or observations that involved the senses or were derived from the senses. So, the question of whether a moral theory was shown to be false or might be shown to be false was a question about whether we might be able to make the kinds of observations that would expose the falsehood of an empirical claim about the radioactivity of some material. In that sense, I suppose it needs to be appreciated that moral theories are in a different category, and yet there might be and I suggest that there are different kinds of observations and experiences that can expose problems with moral theories. Some, but not all, philosophers believe that we have experiences of what is truly valuable intrinsically valuable as opposed to experiencing what may be valuable but only with respect to passing interests and desires. Arguably, my enjoying a pasta dinner which I just did while reading your question was valuable, but its value is measured largely in terms of taste and, unless I was starving and it was the only food source available, its value pales in comparison with the recognizing the value of respecting the fundamental rights of other human beings and I think many non-human animals. So, one way to approach moral theories is with the set of experiences that many of us have of the importance of human life, our intuitive sense of when persons are being treated fairly and justly versus exploited and so on. Some philosophers think that we only get these intuitions because of our already assuming some moral theory, but I suggest we consider that this is not the case. Arguably, we have some settled, but perhaps revisable set of experiences we can bring to our study of moral theories and consider whether these theories are in radical conflict with what we seem to know in experience. A common charge -which may or may not be devastating to the theory is that utilitarianism conflicts with what we appear to know in our common sense moral experiences and practices. If that turns out to be true, that could be a good reason to think that utilitarianism is false --or unfitting or unsatisfying....

Stepping back a bit, your question seems to me to be very good one. It suggests you are not the sort of person who is content with thinking about moral theories only in the abstract or as theories. You may share with many of us the desire to test and use moral theories in experience and to find ways of identifying the theories that wind up blinding us to the values around us versus identifying the one or more theories that truly shed light on what we do and should believe and do. I will add another suggestion: a moral theory that does not itself include some kind of invitation for us to test it may be regrettable .... I am not saying that such a theory would necessarily be false, but it would be more helpful than not if theories in the realm of ethics and mind and religion and so on should be constructed and tested for truth or falsehood or tested for being fitting or unfitting in experience.

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