What's the philosophical response to Nietzsche's contention that all morality is merely a trick that the weak play upon the strong to get the strong to rein in their strength?

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I think it would be tough to identify "the" philosophical response --as there have been many. Probably the most effective reply (in my view) is Max Scheler's (1874-1928) book Ressentiment in which he argues for the positive content of an ethic of compassion for the vulnerable and exposes some of the troubling consequences of Nietzsche's more aristocratic valorization of strength. When I began this reply by questioning whether there is "the" (singular) response to Nietzsche I may have been a little hasty. What I mean is that there are many alternative ethical systems (ranging from utilitarianism and Kantianism to the Christian ethic Nietzsche attacks in Beyond Good and Evil and elsewhere), but there is a general philosophical tendency not to discount a theory because of its origin. Imagine Nietzsche published his will to power philosophy, not because he believed it, but to win a bet with Wagner or Mary Wollstoncraft was actually into patriarchal governance --even so, we would have to assess N's work on its own merit, and consider the arguments that MW so compellingly presented in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman ((1792). So, even if some moral code was advanced as a trick, the morality itself might not be a trick but expressive of authentic values.

Small point: I don't think Nietzsche was a nihilist: he was committed to reversing his culture's values, but not doing away with all value. So while he might write derisively of "all morality" he actually has one or more moral systems in mind (he not only loathed Christian compassion, he was quite unimpressed with British utilitarianism) and wants to replace them with a code or morality based on strength and vitality.

Nietzsche's analysis of the 'genealogy' of cultural forms (ofwhich moral ideas is the most obvious) is directed not to the past,but to the future. That is, what is key is what happens to subsequenthuman beings because of that origin. So, the fact that moralityoriginated in a lie, a misunderstanding, a violence, an act ofrevenge, etc. -- this matters for two reasons. First, insofar as anotherphilosophy might have justified morality based upon its historicalorigin (e.g. the law of God) or its foundation (e.g. the possibleautonomy of practical reason). But, as asprofessor Taliaferro points out, this argument only really works if there is an absence of any otherjustification provided for the moral system. Second, and I think more importantly, the origin matters because of whatfuture possibilities of human life get lost as a consequence of that origin.So, if the origin is that a group of the weak find a way to recastthe existing cultural values system so that the strong are relabeledas 'evil', then Nietzsche is quite admiring of this move as anunparalleled stroke of creative genius. However, from a futural pointof view, this is a formula for generating homogeneous, staticsocieties and weak, unadventurous individuals. So, a philosophical response has two questions to work on: Is the story about origin correct? and are the consequences of that origin what N believes them to be?

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