Why are there so few women philosophers?

Comments

Really, this is a sociological question about the practice of philosophy rather than a philosophical question. But I think it's interesting and important for all that.

It's hard to say. The safest answer is that it hasn't been very long since women started being professional academics in large numbers in any field, and that we're steadily catching up. This is absolutely true, and important. But it also seems pretty clear that there are proportionally more women working at a high professional level in other disciplines, including closely related disciplines like linguistics, psychology, cognitive science, and law; thus, it seems that something more might be going on. Another relevant fact is that there appear to be proportionally more women in some areas of philosophy than others: for instance, in ethics and history of philosophy, as compared to metaphysics (although there are multiple notable women working at a very high level in all of these areas!). I've heard people suggest that women are 'steered', consciously or not, toward more 'people-oriented' topics; I haven't experienced this, although I suppose I do tend to be attracted to more 'people-oriented' topics within the broad fields I am interested in. Finally, we need to consider the possibility that women just aren't taken as seriously as men -- by men, other women, and themselves -- in the argumentative, combatative interactions that philosophy typically involves.

I suggest also that some women simply don't like the argumentative, combative interactions that philosophy typically involves. That might be one among several good reasons for philosophers to consider adopting different and more co-operative modes of interaction.

Very little gives me more pleasure than a good philosophical fight, andI suspect that the other women panelists on this site feel the sameway. Perhaps we are the exceptions that prove the rule of the womanlycooperative virtues. Yet I also know of many men who have no stomachfor a good philosophical argument, and I've never heard anyone suggestthat we should change our methods so that more men will feelmore "comfortable" in philosophy.

More to the point, I'm not sure that I understand the contrast between adversative and cooperative methods of doing philosophy. The most forceful defense of a philosophical position will often be given by a person who believes that it is true, and correspondingly the most telling criticisms of an argument will often be discovered by those who are skeptical of the truth of its conclusion. But such a give and take between philosophical adversaries seems to me to be the best cooperative means of gaining philosophical insight. As Socrates explained to his adversary Callicles, in Plato's Gorgias:

“ . . .I’m afraid to pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I’d be pleased to continue questioning you if you’re the same kind of man I am, otherwise I would drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say anything untrue; one who, however, would be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don’t suppose there’s anything quite so bad for a person as having false belief about the things we’re discussing right now” (G. 457e-458a).

It's certainly true that manyphilosophers, men and women alike, can be downright obnoxious when theyare arguing, and I don't doubt that some obnoxious behavior is causedby sexism in particular. But this problem seems to me to have little todo with the typical method of philosophy, and everything to do with thecharacter of some who make use of it.

Just to respond to afew of Jyl's points.

(1) We practice philosophy according to a sort of lawyers-in-courtmodel. This practice has its downside. It encourages aggression, whichoften impedes rather than promotes progress. And it leads people oftento defend views that they do not strongly believe in, and certainlywouldn't, if they reflected honestly and outside of the context ofthe good fight that they are enjoying. This also can impedeprogress.

Sometimes we'd do better to admit that none of us understands thesubject matter very well - because it is so extremely difficult, notbecause we are thick - and tried to muddle along together.

(2) The combative nature of the practice, and the aggression that thisencourages, have indeed caused very talented philosophers not to enterthe profession. Some of these are men. But I strongly suspect thatmore are women.

If that empirical suspicion of mine were correct, thenthat wouldprovide one among several good reasons for philosophers to consideradopting different and more co-operative modes of interaction.

(3) I think that women tend to favour co-operative modes ofinteraction to combative ones and that in that respect women aresuperior to men.

(4) But then this issue really is very difficult, and, hey, what do Iknow?

Read another response by Elisabeth Camp, Gabriel Segal, Jyl Gentzler

Read another response about Gender, Philosophy