Should business/corporations give to charity? Or should they return the profits to shareholders, and let them decide what to do with it?

In principle, the decisions made by corporate managers are, as a matter of contract and law, supposed to reflect and be answerable to the will of the shareholders. I can't think of any compelling reason to think that corporations should give to charity. But let's be clear what's at issue here. Is it nice when they do so? Of course it is. Those who benefit from that charity (or those charities) to which a corporation might donate are certainly benefited. Do corporations have responsibilities, as a result of the benefits they gain from society? Sure they do--that's why they either pay taxes or else make other agreements with cities, states, and nations that are supposed to exact a fair exchange of the goods that are enjoyed by the corporation and the goods returned back to the community. But I can't see how or why in addition to paying their fair share (in jobs, or taxes, or whatever) in exchange for receiving the goods they receive from society, they also have some responsibility to...

A friend of mine has an adult daughter who is mentally disabled. Roughly speaking, her daughter thinks and talks like a seven-year old child, and cannot take care of herself. The disabled daughter is sexually interested in men, but as far as I know she never had sex with anyone. When she was 20-something, the mother had the daughter medically sterilized. This brought her no suffering, and she behaves as she did before. The mother's fear was that she would get pregnant. For a few weeks every year, the daughter is away from her mother in a clinic for mentally disabled people. I wonder if it was morally acceptable for the mother to have her daughter sterilized.

This is the kind of case that makes reasonable people feel very squeamish, and over which reasonable people can disagree. But though I won't be surprised if others respond and reject what I am about to say, I'm inclined to side with the mother. Ethical theorists generally approach questions like these from one of three basic approaches. One of these is called the deontological approach, which tends to focus on our moral notions of basic obligations and responsibilities. If we think that everyone, no matter what their mental defects, has a fundamental right to autonomy, then the mother's actions obviously interfered with the daughter's autonomy with respect to having (her own biological) children. On the other hand, we may doubt that such a fundamental extends in an absolute or complete way to someone who is incapable of exercising that autonomy, which appears to be the fact about this case. The daughter could biologically have a child, but could not actually be responsible for the child she...

Most people oppose cruelty to animals. But, I have often heard people say things like 'killing is a part of life', or that our methods of killing are generally less cruel than in nature. Some have even asked whether we are obliged to mitigate such naturally occurring cruelty, if we are obliged to reduce our own. I don't think these 'arguments' are well-reasoned. My sense is that our capacity to understand the suffering that our actions cause, and consider alternatives, confers greater responsibility, making our indifference to cruelty and suffering more troublesome. Is there a more elegant and thorough way of addressing all this?

There is always a more elegant and thorough way to address any philosophical question--that's why we're all still at it here in the world's second-oldest profession! But granting this, it seems to me that your own assessment is precisely right--our epistemic advantages over (at least most) other animals also bring with them greater ethical responsibilities. The cat can't consider whether playing with the live mouse until it dies (and then some more afterwards) is something he or she should be doing, but for us to be cruel or cause needless and excessive suffering is blameworthy. A further point, however: Some of what constitutes our greater epistemic advantages can also yield a degree of epistemic dis advantage, which is why the exercise of epistemic modesty and an open-mindedness to relevant evidence is essential to good reasoning on questions like yours. Human beings, at their best, can indeed comprehend suffering and recognize it as having negative value. Part of the way in which we...

Was I right or wrong in marrying out of a sense of duty as opposed to marrying for love? Some years ago I fell in love with an unavailable woman. We did not have a relationship but while still in love with her I met, had a long term relationship with and married a woman I was fond of and needed. My wife believes that I love her and she loves me. I am aware that if I had not had a long relationship with my wife she might have met and married someone who truly loved her. However, I stayed with her in the hope that she would help me get over the unavailable woman and that I would eventually grow to love her. This did not happen. Had I told her after being with her for a few years that I did not love her and that I wanted to end our relationship it may have then been too late (we are both in our late thirties) for her to meet another man and have children with him. Also deep down I must have felt that I had used her and did not want to admit this to myself. I felt I was obligated to marry her. Was...

Sounds to me as if you have already answered your own question: You are right to say that you used her. How about considering what you would want if you were in her position? My guess is that you would want to know the truth. (And by the way, a woman in her late thirties can certainly still find a man, get married, and have children--sheesh!) So why not start by admitting to yourself what happened, and then-- as soon as possible --let your wife know.

Would it be morally wrong to start a relationship with someone, if you knew that they were going away? For example, would it be wrong for me to start a relationship with my friend who is moving away next year?

I can't imagine why you would think this is wrong. We're talking about consenting adults, right? If the relationship turns out to be very important to both of you, I would expect you would find ways to get back together again. Long distance relationships can be difficult, but they're not impossible!

Is it immoral to convince someone of some true proposition P, by exposing them to what you know to be an unsound or invalid argument? For example if I told my friend: "If it rains, the grass will be wet. The grass is wet, therefore, it rained." Now supposing it really did rain, would it be immoral to use this invalid argument to convince her? If we answer in the affirmative, it would seem to lead to some unpleasant conclusions. For instance, it would be immoral to put a sign in my yard that says "Candidate X for City Commission", because the sign might convince people without offering them a sound argument. But we answer negatively, it would seem to justify deception. Using unsound arguments to convince people would give them at best an unjustified true belief, not knowledge. Is there a middle ground here?

To begin with, I don't accept your example of the political sign. Putting an endorsing sign up in your yard is not an invalid argument--it is simply an expression of your opinion. If someone else is persuaded to vote for a candidate just because you have expressed your opinion in favor of that candidate, then so be it. It won't be the result of a bad or invalid argument--though perhaps their reasoning might be faulted as unsound: If S is going to vote for C, then I should vote for C. S is going to vote for C (I can tell from the sign in S's yard). Hence, I should vote for C. This isn't invalid, but at least the first premise (and perhaps the second, too, should be rejected.) On your main question, however, I do think there is somthing wrong with using invalid arguments (at least ones that we know are invalid) to persuade people, both because it might habituate them into bad reasoning habits more generally, and because it is a kind of seduction. Consider: suppose you really believe...

Can we differentiate, in ethics, between the morality/immorality of an action and that of a person? For example, it seems a lot of people would have trouble making up their minds about the following scenario: I help a friend study for her upcoming math exam. Unknowingly, and through no fault of my own, I teach her the wrong material, and she ends up failing. To solve the issue of whether my action was moral or not, can we not say that though my action itself was immoral, (assuming we're following utilitarianism here) I cannot myself be blamed, for my intentions were best and I was acting in a way that I believed would help her. Can I make this distinction? Is it common for philosophers to do this?

Yes, philosophers do make the distinction you are looking for here, but it gets a little complicated. On the one hand, even philosophers interested in consequences can talk about character traits in the way you want--because it is obviously arguable that some character traits are more likely to produce good consequences than other character traits. On the other hand, some philosophers (called "virtue theorists") think that the evaluation of actions and their consequences is really secondary (and parasitic upon) the evaluation of character traits. But most virtue theorists do not simply regard the virtues as having the right motivations. Consider a case I recently argued professionally--I call it the case of the kindly klutz. Someone wants to help an ailing person across the street, but so misjudges her own strength that she ends up breaking the arm of the person she sought to help. I think we might give her some credit for her motivations, but would fault her for her bad judgment, and thus say...

Does involving the word 'love' alongside sex in a relationship make it worse to cheat than if it involves just 'sex' alone? I recently discovered my husband had a 7-month affair while working away during the week and he claims it is forgivable because he did not love her and it was 'merely sex'.

I think the problem with cheating is the cheating part. You and your husband made an agreement, presumably in good faith, that you would not do the very thing he did. I doubt if at the time he stipulated that he might have "merely sex," but would abstain from sex + love. So...he violated your agreement, and this gives you a reason to regard him as in the wrong. Period. As to whether his violation is forgivable, I suppose it is. But that is entirely up to you--not up to him. He doesn't get to tell you that he deserves forgiveness--that adds presumption as an additional violation to the one he already committed. So the issue of forgiveness is yours to decide. He may ask for it; he may beg for it. But it is your decision entirely. I can see how loving the other woman might have added to the offense (though I don't see how the addition would convert a "forgivable" offense into one that is unforgivable--because even had he loved her, you might reasonably determine that it was...

Can self-regarding acts be unethical? I realize some seemingly self-regarding acts could well affect dependents (e.g. an alcoholic parent), so let's assume there are no dependents on the person. Thanks.

I think most ethical theorists would say that some acts whose effects are only on the agent can be unethical, but it will depend upon what you take "ethical" to consist in--on how you understand what it takes to be ethical. For example, the ancient Greeks (at least mostly) subscribed to an approach that was eudaimonistic (essentially, aiming at the overall well-being of the agent and those affected by the agent) . By this account, then, anything that one did that was not in one's overall interest (taking addictive drugs, for example, or drinking to excess, or becoming habituated to vices of any kind) would be a case of ethical wrong. Others (for example, Kant) would claim that goodness consists in treating those acted upon as ends in themselves. Any action that treated the agent herself as a means only, or which did not respect the agent's own autonomy (selling oneself into slavery, for example, or committing suicide) would be a moral wrong. Consequentialists (for example utilitarians...

I would like to forgive someone who is doing wrong to me. But is it asking for too much if I wanted to make sure that the person knows that I am forgiving them? In other words, they may not even know that they have offended me. I feel that if I just forgive and forget such incidents, since the other person does not know that a) something they did offended me b) I choose to forgive them, then I think it is meaningless to forgive. In reality, there is no forgiving taking place in such cases, if it is not "pre-announced". Am I thinking it right? Or is it taking a higher path to just forgive - never bother about whether the "forgivee" understands it or not? On the other hand, will it become a real forgiving if it is pre-announced and credit is taken while doing so?

I really found this a very interesting question, and in some ways, I am as much interested in asking other questions than in providing answers. So let me begin that way: You say you want to forgive someone who " is doing wrong " to you. I emphasize these words because they puzzle me--usually one forgives a wrong that was , not one that continues . So my question is, why do you want to forgive that person now ? Isn't it peerhaps a bit premature for forgiveness at this point? Perhaps you should be focused on getting them to stop wronging you , and then, if that works, you can think some more later about forgiving them. You seem to suspect that they are unaware of the offense. You need either to distance yourself, in that case, or make them aware of the wrong. So something other than forgiveness seems to have priority here. The second question I have is this: Just who is this supposed to be about? Are you forgiving them for their sake , or is this more about you ? Or...

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