Wonderful question. In Ancient Greco-Roman philosophy there was debate and disagreement about such a matter: some philosophers thought moderation in terms of appetites should be strict and without exception, whereas others thought the occasional immoderate indulgence was reasonable (for some, a person might on occasion over consume wine while still having living a life dedicated to the love of wisdom). One way to address the paradox you raise is to distinguish levels of moderation, thus restricting the "everything" in the injunction "Everything in moderation." So, if one alters the original claim to (for example) 'a person who loves wisdom should exercise moderation in satisfying their appetites and first-order desires (e.g. avoiding gluttony),' one avoids the idea that one should only be moderate in following this dictum. The kind of paradox you raise comes up in other areas. For example, if we consider a dictum that 'persons should be tolerant,' does this dictum require persons to be tolerant...

My own view is that there is nothing wrong, per se (in itself) with the inheritance of wealth. Assuming that a person has gained wealth through just means (or no injustice) it seems that it should be within that person's (moral / legal) rights to make another person (a child, for example) the benefactor of such wealth. This right seems to me to be part of the right of persons to give gifts to those they choose. Cases in which the giving and receiving of inherited wealth seem to involve special factors such as: the giver acquired the wealth unjustly; the receiver of the wealth did something unjust (such as murder his gift-giving aunt in order to benefit from her will); the state may have an interest in limiting the amount of inheritance a person or family may control in order to prevent a harmful oligarchy or in order to not allow a handful of families to have monopolizing, dynastic power. You might look at Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia on the transfer of property.

Philosophers do, indeed, reflect on the nature of institutions on all sorts of levels. We ask questions about the very status of institutions themselves --what are institutions and are they just or unjust, grounded upon conventions or grounded in natural law? Some philosophers treat the idea of an institution very broadly to include language and any number of rule governed practices (in some contexts one may think of friendship as an institution insofar as it involves a broad array of expectations). In a broad sense, a huge number of the entries in the free online Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy will give you an overview of philosophical work on institutions from examining different accounts of property ownership to the criminal justice system.

Interesting. I suppose that if "spiritually" is understood very broadly to mean something like having reverence, care, respect, an appreciation for some things being sacred like promise-keeping, honesty or respecting the integrity of others, then perhaps spirituality of this general sort might be essential (by definition) for trusting and respectful relationships. On religion: some religious traditions (or traditions within the traditions, e.g. orthodox Judaism as opposed to liberal or reform Judaism) discourage practitioners / "believers" to marry outside "the faith" or the practice or the tradition, but "mixed marriages" (and thus relationships) seem more common. On atheism: "Atheism" may be variously defined; minimally it might mean either someone who makes the positive judgement that there is no God or someone who simply does not believe there is a God. The difference is subtle and may make no practical difference, but the former "atheist" goes on record (so to speak) in affirming there is no...

These days, there are very few substantial claims (God exists, there are objectively true ethical values, utilitarianism is superior to Kantian ethics, everything is physical, etc) that philosophers would claim to be able to prove (or disprove). We instead refer to there being good or bad reasons or arguments for various positions, sometimes ranking these reasons and arguments as persuasive / cogent / even compelling versus unpersuasive / weak/ confused, etc.... It would be very hard to come up with a percentage of philosophers living today (or throughout history) who have thought that there are strong reasons for recognizing the reality of God; such a task would also need to take seriously the different concepts of God that philosophers have explored and affirmed. I am a theist (believe God exists) and believe that there are good grounds for theism, while at the same time recognizing that there are good reasons for atheism, agnosticism, and embracing different concepts of the divine. For a good...

Greetings. I have been to Iran and practiced philosophy there at a conference and two of your universities. I am not clear, however, about the limits on free speech and protected (or prohibited) research projects, if any. If you are a student, I suggest you work up a proposed project in applied ethics --this might involve medical ethics, environmental ethics, military ethics, professional ethics or investigating some area of moral and social life involving the economy (looking into business ethics or into the adequacy of market systems --contrasting free markets with socialist societies, for example), religious practices, matters of gender, family structures, and so on. I would then suggest you contact a professional philosopher at the nearest university to ask her or him about resources and the direction of your work. The American Philosophical Association (of which I am a member) strongly supports uncensored, free inquiry in all parts of the world. Even though the APA would probably be...

I am not entirely clear about the question, exactly. If "philosophical ethics"means ethics (either ethical theories or specific ethical positions) that are supported by philosophical theories or reasons, then many such theories and reasons may be consistent with different religious beliefs and practices. For example, Christian philosophers have adopted or worked with utilitarianism (some of the first utilitarians in modern philosophy were theists, pre-dating Jeremy Bentham), Kantians; they have advocated natural law, intuitionism, moral particularism, and so on. You might have in mind, however, ethical positions that are advocated by particular kinds of philosophers such as those who are deeply committed to secularism. In such a case, a Christian philosopher like John Hare (currently at Yale University) who defends a divine command theory of ethics (defended also by C. Stephen Evans, Baylor University) is not at all going to be compatible with the moral theory of non-theists (atheists or agnostics),...

I suggest to you that corporations (as well as nations, colleges, etc) do exists, though they do so in the realm of law and markets in which they can be objects of praise and blame. They do not have "tangible physical existence" in the sense that they are like rocks and rivers, but then lots of things may be said to exist that lack such a status (languages, ideas, feelings). I do share the intuition that may fuel your skepticism, however, and that is that corporations derive their existence from individual human beings, our agreements and practices of recognition, restraint, and respect. One reason for thinking they exist as objects that there are truths about corporations that are not true of the individuals that make them up. My college (St. Olaf College), for example, was established in the 1870s and is in multiple places in the world at the same time (we have students studying around the globe) but no one of us was established in the 1870s or can be entirely in more than one place at once. ...

That depends on what one is studying philosophically. This term I am conducting a seminar with senior undergraduates in which we are reading the work of Cornel West and Iris Murdoch. They both compel us to think critically about matters of race and our individual responsibility to renounce narcissistic preoccupation and devote ourselves instead to the good, the true, and the beautiful (this is Iris Murdoch's central values as a Platonist), not merely as abstract, theoretical ideals, but as persons who are engaged in confronting racism and sexism. I am also offering two sections of a course, Environmental Ethics with about one hundred students; the goal of the class is to sharpen our understanding of our relationship with nonhuman animals, to live more fully in response to enormous human needs, including future generations. This is a scholarly and scientifically informed undertaking, but it is not intended to be of only academic interest, but to encourage each of us to be active in confronting...

Philosophers have differed on whether belief in an all good, just, powerful, loving God has an important role in living morally --Kant, famously, contended that a practical faith in a just, powerful God was essential in making sense of the moral law, but there are many philosophers who approach ethics without an appeal to a supernatural or overall cosmic vision of justice. In any case, let me offer a line of reasoning you and your girlfriend might consider. If she wants to marry a Christian man, it is probable she wants to marry someone who lives out a life of the virtues that are associated with (or are integral to) Christian values such as honesty, compassion, love of neighbor, fidelity... As an agnostic about theism (belief in God) perhaps you are not an agnostic about the central importance of love of neighbor and the world (what a Christian might think of as creation), and it may be that you might actually be more of a Christian (in terms of what you actually value) that someone who self...