If a person fails to feel pain or suffering for events which usually bring such things about - if they don't miss their family or home while away, or if they don't grieve for dead relatives or pets, or if they don't get upset when they fail an exam or lose their job - is it sensible to hold them somehow for flawed, or to claim that they are inhuman? Is emotional numbness or indifference a moral wrong?

Great question! You have definitely (in my view) described a disturbing emotional indifference or numbness, but this may not be due to any moral wrong. People might be in such a condition because they have suffered some great trauma or brain injury through no fault of their own. Philosophers have differed in terms of their view of how natural it is for us to empathetic or have sympathy for one another --Aristotle and Locke think we are desposed to care for one another whereas Hobbes almost sees friendship as something we are drawn to for reasons of prudence and self-concern (caring for others is a kind of strategy for us to avoid premature violent death). In natural law theory, lack of concern for the dead or an indifference to personal failure or failing to honor family may be seen as failures to exercise important human virtues (whether or not this is due to a vice or an innocent injury). But some philosophers in ancient Greece taught that we should try to give up desires and attachments --not all...

I am a philosophy student in my second year and was disturbed by a conversation in my "philosophy of mind" course. The students were bashing philosophy as a discipline: "a fun waste of time", "sitting and thinking" for a living rather than finding a real job, etc. I'm sure you get the picture. I was discouraged by this. rather than being surrounded by others with a deep passion for philosophy, i am surrounded by shallow thinkers. My question is, how should one go about handling criticisms of this kind, both internally, as well as in social situations as mentioned above? it seems useless to defend myself to those who hold such opinions, but that doesn't mean i want the majority (and it really is most people i meet) to be holding on to those negative stereotypes. How often do you find yourself in these kinds of situations?

One way to respond is to point out the integral role philosophy has played in the history of culture, education, and in the context of other modes of inquiry. Philosophy as a discipline involves the exercise and refinement of skills that are essential for a democratic culture --a culture in which change can be brought about nonviolently through argument. Education is very difficult to conceive of without a philosophy of education. And it is difficult to imagine any sustained marketplace for jobs without there being an overall philosophy of values, of responsibility, and of governance. So, insofar as having a worldview and values is having a philosophy, the practice of philosophy is virtually inescapable. And insofar as we want to think about freedom and determinism, the nature of consciousness, desire and reason and so on, philosophy also seems unavoidable. The alternative would appear to be the mindless acceptance of the status quo or simply trying to shut down fundamental questions about what is...

One popular defense of theism makes the claim that, without god, we would have no basis for morals. Let's accept for the sake of argument that there can be no morals absent god. Does the alleged dependence of morality upon religion really evidence the existence of god? Or is the concern about morals actually irrelevant to justifying belief in theism?

The status of morality does have an important role in some arguments for and against theistic belief and it has an important place in developing almost any comprehensive account of human nature, other animals and the cosmos. If indeed there are objective moral rights and wrongs, goods and ills, virtues and vices, we need (at some point in our inquiry) to explore the origin of such values and their implications. From a theistic point of view (common to classical Judaism, Christianity, Islam and theistic forms of Hinduism), such values do not emerge from value-less, non-purposive causes. Utlimately, values (like the cosmos itself) are grounded in a teleological, purposive, good Creator. Naturalism (in most forms today) conceives of the cosmos in fundamentally non-teleological forces and needs to account for how such values emerge. For a constructive theistic moral argument, you might consider the work of Mark Linville, Paul Copan, C. Stephen Evans or see the entry on naturalism on the recent Cambridge...

I have been dating a guy for about a year, and the chemical spark has faded for me. How important is this in a relationship? He is a very nice guy and I realize the value of this in a long term relationship.

I think this is really a personal, even private question that involves many other questions: how important is the "chemical spark" for you? If you no longer have romantic feelings for him, does he know this or, if he does not know, should you tell him so as not to mislead him into thinking the relationship is very different from what it actually is for you --perhaps a non-romantic friendship? If you ceased dating, would the relationship transition into a friendship? Are you at an age and in a place when meeting others whom you can connect with --both sensually and in terms of friendship- is possible? I know of a number of couples in different age groups who certainly appear to be happily married, though romance or the "chemical spark" seems to be very subordinate to a life-long, profound friendship, and I know some couples who give primacy to eros and little thought seems to be given to a deep friendship between them. Personally, I would prefer only choosing friendship AND eros, but (again...

Is it morally acceptable to punish? And at what stage does punishment turn to revenge? Comparing something like lex talionis (which seems like revenge) with rehabilitative/correctional systems (which seem restorative), it seems that certain forms of punishment are more ethical than others.

What is quite interesting about the lex talionis ("an eye for an eye....") is that it functioned to limit retaliation (e.g. if my neighbor injures my eye, I am not thereby authorized to kill him and his family). In any case, there are many theories of punishment. These include the notion of retributive justice, the communication theory of justice, utilitarian theories, and so on. Keeping this reply short, you might consider a thought experiment (not my own) that will test your views about punishment and revenge. Imagine someone has done great harm to those you love --imagine a case in which someone killed a member of your family due to driving while intoxicated. Consider now two possibilities: in the one the person is punished (proportionately) and through this he comes to understand that what he did was wrong (imagine that until this event he lived as though he had little or no responsibility for others). Imagine, too, that through this process he becomes rehabilitated and even (when released...

Should the freedoms of religion and speech be more strictly regulated if this freedom is used for such destructive purposes? If so, who has the power to decide what is acceptable?

Interesting that you single out religion and speech, and not, say, politics and speech or certain types of industry and speech or even treatments of the environment and speech. I believe that there is an assumption in popular culture (perhaps encouraged by Dawkins et al) that religion is more dangerous than, say, secular alternatives. This charge has been effectively challenged by a range of thinkers; I especially recommend Keith Ward's book, Is Religion Dangerous? http://www.amazon.com/Religion-Dangerous-Keith-Ward/dp/0802845088 In any case, there are various reasons why the state may, even in a liberal, pluralistic democracy, regulate speech, religion, political viewpoints, industries, etc, in light of the wrongful infliction of harm or risk of harm and offense. Probably the best work on this is Joel Feinberg's awesome four volume work on The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press). The book is full of real and imagined cases that test current and future laws. Even if you...

Do people have a moral obligation to be honest with themselves? Is there anything wrong with priming yourself with delusions in order to experience the bliss of ignorance?

I'm not sure that ignorance is bliss, but perhaps an extreme form of ignorance (in which you are ignorant of your responsibilities and duties) might lead to a life unburdened by any sense of duty or any call to do good. You are probably not going to aid those in peril or seek to contribute to the lives of those you love if you are completely ignorant of values. In any event, some philosophers have taken very stringent views on lying (especially Augustine and Kant) and they would hold that it is wrong to engage in lying with others as well as (if it is possible) with yourself. The reason for a slight qualification about lying to yourself is that it seems to involve a paradox: a liar needs to get the one deceived to believe something that the liar thinks is false. Deceiving oneself would then seem to involve a person believing something and not believing the same thing at the same time, an apparent contradiction. The paradox of self-deception to one side, there are dangers of what might be called...

Is there a point at which a person can rightly dismiss a philosophical statement or even an entire philosophical system because it originated with a person of dubious character or intent, but (here's the catch) without committing the ad hominem fallacy in doing so? I am thinking of extreme examples, such as (alleged) philosophical systems created by, say, New Age healers, cult leaders, etc. Or, conversely, would it be necessary even in these extremely examples to address only the philosophical claims made by these movements -- one by one -- instead of addressing the character of the founders themselves in order to avoid the ad hominem?

Great question! I am afraid that at the end of the day one does need to consider the merits of the philosophical system or position on its own terms, however from a practical point of view time is precious and it is virtually impossible to fully assess all the claims that may come your way. If you have good reason to believe that your New Age healing cult "philosopher" has been producing complete nonsense in the past and has a quite dubious character (on top of all that nonsense), you seem to be reasonable in not taking his or her next claim seriously. Still, it is (perhaps remotely) possible that this rather odd chap might have come up with a new, compelling theory of human agency or an account of perception, and so on.

When I was a child, I wanted to know what forever was. I would sit and concentrate -- think and think and THINK -- until finally I felt what may have been a glimpse into something infinite. It was jarring, intense, and pretty incredible. What WAS that? Have other people had this experience?

Philosophers have expressed wide ranging views on the infinite, and even distinguished different kinds of infinites. In terms of the 'infinite' standing for a sequence of events without end, then (just as there is no greatest possible number) it is difficult for someone to claim to have experienced that (experienced all numbers, none of which is lacking in a greater number), though not perhaps difficult for one to claim to understand it (that is, understanding that there is no greatest possible number) or for someone to have an experience of time or space, along with the feeling that this will never end. There has been some interesting testimony by some philosophers to have experienced soemthing related that may be of interest. Some philosophers have claimed to experience that which is boundless or, in some sense, eternal. Probably the two most famous philosophers to have spoken and analyzed such experiences are Boethius and Augustine. Boethius spoke of God's eternity (and having some...

Perhaps someone will be able to settle this argument between me and my friend once and for all. Whenever I whine about some unfortunate happening or circumstance in my life, my friend will remind me that I'm better off than, say, poor starving children in Ethiopia. However, I think this is a faulty apples vs. oranges comparison. If I were to compare myself to others, shouldn't I compare myself among those who are in similar circumstances? That is, if I were to draw valid comparisons between myself and others, wouldn't it make more sense to compare across socioeconomic strata, rather than to compare myself to someone who is clearly more unfortunate or more successful simply because they were born in extraordinary circumstances different from my own? (Essentially, what my friend is trying to tell me is to not take things for granted. But I find that to be empty advice, especially since I don't think that it's a valid comparison and therefore not a valid argument.) Thanks for your time! --MJ

Great case! These sorts of deliberations cut in all different directions. On the one hand, a reminder that one is not as bad off as someone else who may be suffering more profoundly may be consoling but then it may also remind one of an obligation to aid those worse off. Such comparisons, then, can make one feel lucky and better off, or one might feel lucky (or blessed) and feel bound to somehow put things in a greater balance. But you do have a point that we do live in communities or socio-economic contexts and we often do make comparisons in terms of talents and fortune with respect to our given communities. Perhaps, though, you both have a point. Your friend is probably trying to see you (or get you to see yourself) as part of humanity or in light of all persons, and surely there is a point to this. It would be very odd to compare oneself to the community of beings who do not exist (I am less happy than the elves in the golden years of Tolkien's Middle Earth) and we are (in some sense) part of...

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