Is it unethical to avoid watching or reading the news?

What a great question! Though (fair warning): I may not be the most impartial panelist to reply as I come from a family that helped start a modest, and yet municipal newspaper, and I was brought up with being instructed by parents that, no matter what my politics, I should read at least one daily paper, and one weekly magazine! Moreover, I have actually sought to follow this practice, but I shall do my best in the following reply. As my goal is to offer an interesting reply, let me set aside some perhaps obvious reasons why it would not be unethical to avoid watching or reading the news. So.... I shall assume that there are many reasons why it would be perfectly fine for you or I "to avoid watching or reading the news" such as: we have reason to believe that the news is being used by the state to spread disinformation and watching or reading it will not aid us in combatting this abuse; we are engaged in honorable life-saving jobs that leave us no time to keep up with the news; we are...

When it comes to relationships between opposite sexes, there is the 'platonic' relationship. Does this have anything to do with Plato? And secondly, after advancing further in life, I find myself more drawn towards this type of relationship. It seems to have more meaning and depth. It transcends beyond any physical desires. Is there any research you could lead me to that uncovers some truths about these types of relationships?

Great question. Today, I think most people do think of a Platonic relationship as an intimate friendship without sex. The first time such a notion was explicitly identified was in the Renaissance when the philosopher / translator of Plato, Marsilio Ficino coined the term. Marsilio first called it "Socratic love," but then changed the term to "Platonic love" and he mostly applied it to male friendship. Marsilio's shared Platonic love with Giovanni Cavalcanti, a young man famous for his beauty. He maintained that you can be in awe with the beauty of your Platonic friend, but you must not touch or smell him. You refer to a Platonic friendship with an opposite gender; while Marsilio did not address this, Plato himself had female students and, given his high view of women in the Republic (women could be rulers), there is no reason why what we call Platonic love needs to be same-gender. I would say one of the key elements in what is love in the Platonic tradition is that, whether or not sex is involved...

DESCARTES AND RUSSELL Can anyone please explain how Russell thinks there is an error in saying 'I am a thing that thinks' (Descartes). I understand he talks about language, substance theory etc but his whole argument still remains unclear to me. HERE IS THE PASSAGE FROM THE BOOK (PORTRAITS FROM MY MEMORY): What I wish to emphasize is the error involved in saying "I am a thing that thinks." Here the substance philosophy is assumed. It is assumed that the world consists of more or less permanent objects with changing states. This view was evolved by the original metaphysicians who invented language, and who were much struck by the difference between their enemy in battle and their enemy after he had been slain, although they were persuaded that it was the same person whom they first feared, and then ate. It is from such origins that common sense derives its tenets. And I regret to say that all too many professors of philosophy consider it their duty to be sycophants of common sense, and thus, doubtless...

I think you are quite right to be puzzled. I believe that, when Russell wrote the above (he changed his mind on all sorts of topics, so one has to deal with-- as it were-- more than one Russell), he rejected a philosophy of substances and, instead, proposed that the concept of an event is more accurate. So, in another essay or book, Russell charged that Descartes' inference "I think, therefore I am" begs the question. It assumes the very thing it sets out to argue for. Russell thought that Descartes should rather lay claim to this thesis: "There is thinking." Such an event does not (according to Russell) commit us to positing a substance, the thinker, just as the statement "It is raining" does not commit one to holding that there is a thing that is raining. His absolutely mind-blowingly bizarre comments on cannibalism to one side (what evidence could Russell possibly be relying upon), Russell is claiming that our "common sense" inclination to think in terms of substances is owing to our use of...

Let's say when we measure the brainwaves of someone who is actually deluded and the brainwaves of someone who is fervently religious, they match up to an extraordinary degree. Are we justified to say that the religious person is deluded base on this observation of matching brainwaves alone? Can we judge the propositional content of a belief as to its truth value by brain activity? Can scientific neurological experiments determine the truth and falsity of propositional content or are arguments the only way to determine the truth and falsity of propositional content? Can we appeal to brainwave activity to invalidate theism? Galen O.

Interesting question(s)! I'm afraid that it will be very difficult to replace arguments and the different "tools" philosophers use with neurological data. First, I assume that in identifying a subject as "deluded" we would have to know the falsehood of her belief and perhaps identify which fallacies she has committed. We would also need to think through ideas of mental causation and the degree to which a person's beliefs may be linked to neurological events (are we going to assume a reductive account of the mental? or are we going to allow that propositions, mental acts such as 'believing' are irreducible to the physical, in particular, brain states and processes?. We also need more than neurology to identify and define what is a 'religion.' You seem particularly interested in theism, but some important religions are non-theistic (most forms of Buddhism), and some theists are not religious (Richard Taylor may have been a good case of this). Still, there are some common sense ways in which...

Do prenuptial agreements imply a lack of trust, or even a lack of love?

Great question! Consider, with apologies for the homeliness of this analogy: Does fastening your seat belt in a car or on an airplane indicate a lack of trust in the vehicle(s) or a lack of love for the pilot or driver or other pilots and drivers? I suspect one might have lots of trust and love and yet be realistic that sometimes the very unlikely and (almost) impossible does occur. In a prenuptial agreement, both parties may be passionately committed to each other and yet, out of a "realistic" understanding of the rate of divorce, they want assurance that there is a fair outcome if (heaven forbid) the life-long vow of commitment is not bourn out), it seems practically wise to have a safety net.

For a philosophy student, what is the best language to learn? Particulary, a student interested in moral and political philosophy, and epistemology too. I think is english, and that's why I'm already learning it. If I'm right, what is the best after english? I'm a spanish native speaker.

Great question! Your choice of language may depend on your philosophical interests. If you are interested in Greco-Roman and philosophy in late Antiquity and Medieval philosophy, then Greek and Latin would be excellent. If you are interested in Indian or Hindu philosophy sanscrit would be best. Your Spanish will be good for reading a very fine, dynamic Spanish philosopher and essayist, Jose Ortega Y Gasset. Spanish philosophy (that is, philosophy in Spain, not just in Spanish) experienced hard times after the defeat of democracy in 1939, but after the restoration of democracy in 1978, Spain has been a place of multiple, alternative philosophical debates. Two outstanding philosophers to consider (AFTER you have read some Ortega, who is fabulous), I suggest you consult J.L. Lopez Aranguren and J.M. Valverde. I think your pursuit of English is a great choice. I could be wrong, but I believe that probably the most number of philosophical works available today are accessible in English, more...

When arguing about the existence of God, the vast majority of arguments I have ever run into always go to the point of asking for evidence. With that word in use they are implying the physical manifestation of evidence to prove God true and, as a theist, that is not how God works in relation to what we are taught. Must evidence, in a physical form or with science backing its existence, be truly necessary to believe in the idea of the supernatural?

Thank you for this inquiry! The idea that all our beliefs, religious or not, must have sufficient evidence is sometimes called "evidentialism." It is much debated today: some philosophers think there is no uncontroversial domain of what may or may not count as evidence nor, if we did agree on what counts as evidence, how much evidence one needs in order for a belief to be justified. I am inclined to think that all or most of our beliefs are in fact backed up by some evidence (reasons for thinking our beliefs are true), however modest and elusive. And I also suggest that the belief in God is rarely without some evidence, even if it only amounts to 'it appears to me that God exists.' But four things might be noted in reply to your question(s). First, not all evidence for a belief need involve "physical manifestations," a "physical form," or the natural and social sciences. Part of the problem with these claims is that we do not have a clear, universal concept of what counts as physical. Second...

I'm starting a philosophy club at my university and I need a good name! Get creative and let me know what cool names you guys can give me for this club. Hope to hear from you.

I will try. Sometime philosophers have taken up names based on location or convictions. In the former, there was in the 20th century the Vienna Circle and in the 17th century there was Cambridge Platonism. In terms of convictions there have been movements and societies that employ names (like Platonism) or ideas (Ordinary Philosophy, British Idealism) or references to groups (e.g. the art and philosophy reading group) or exchanges (e.g. the Science Conversation) or to the ways in which a club might carry out its philosophical activity (e.g. 'the philosophy forum'). You can find a list of societies recognized by the American Philosophical Association and one or another term or name might seem attractive. OK, so you want something "cool." This probably means something better that Yhposolihp Bulc which is 'Philosophy Club" spelled backwards (though if you really are going backwards probably Bulc Yhposolihp might be more apt). So, setting aside the lame and the ridiculous..... Sometimes...

In his "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason", Kant argues that it is possible for people to become moral by following the example of Jesus Christ. How then would he comment on Abraham's actions during the Binding of Isaac? Isn't Abraham treating Isaac as a means to an end, even if that commandment is from God during a time when Jesus was not yet born? In other words, is Jesus just one example of moral guidance out of many and there is no one true religion; that is, anyone else can serve the same role?

Actually, I am 99% sure Kant actually rejected the (at least surface) interpretation of the narrative of the binding. That is, Kant thought it would never be reasonable for Abraham to think God (or any good being) would require a sacrifice of the innocent. My own reading of the text is that it should be read chiefly as a prohibition of child-sacrifice. The point of the story is that the God of Abraham is NOT like the other gods who demand human offerings. The purpose of the (divine) command of offering Abraham's son (verse 2) is only to set the stage for the dramatic prohibition of such sacrifice (11-12). The narrative stress on God providing a ram to take the place of Abraham's son further highlights the emphatic prohibition of human sacrifice. Abraham's naming the place where this substitution took place "God provides" (verse 14) rather than something like "This is the place where I almost lost my son" or "This is the place where Kant would have insisted that what I thought was a command to...

It seems all philosophical arguments for the existence of God all result in having nothing to say about the conception of God, God's attributes or religion. If someone accepts that God exists, how does that belief entail in accepting a particular religion over another, if at all? And if that entailment is accepted does that mean all of the articles of faith of that religion (i.e. ethics, rituals, afterlife) MUST be accepted given that God exists, by coherentism?

Actually, all the classical and most contemporary arguments for the existence of God are each based on (or involve) a conception of God and divine attributes. So, every version of the cosmological argument I know of as used to support theism relies on the idea that, if there is a God, God exists necessarily or is not causally dependent on other beings, God is without beginning or self-explaing, and so on. Most versions of the ontological argument begin with the idea that God is maximally excellent (or God is such that no greater reality can be conceived) and that thesis is used to argue that a maximally excellent being would be necessarily existing, essentially good, omnipotent, omniscient, and so on. For a fuller picture of how arguments rely on divine attributes see the Philosophy of Religion entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy or see the book published by Continuum: Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide. In terms of the philosophical concept and conviction that there is a God, it may be...

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