I'm struggling to reconcile David Hume's critiques of science and religion. On the one hand, he suggests that our application of cause/effect to natural phenomena is problematic since it ammounts to simply equating the present with the past. On the other hand, he warns us against believing in second-hand accounts of miracles since they are interruptions of natural law. Isn't our use of causal reasoning the way we determine the characteristics of natural law? Is this an inconsistency in his argument and, if so, does he address it anywhere?
Good question. You are pointing out an apparent contradiction. Hume seems both to say that we have no good reason to rely on induction (predicting the future based on the past), and yet that we should rely on it when we reject belief in miracles. What Hume says about causal reasoning is that we never have sufficiently good reason to believe present predictions based on past experience. We can only justify induction by appeal to induction itself, but that is arguing in a circle. So we have no good reason to believe that the conclusions of induction are true. Nonetheless we instinctively make and believe the predictions, anyway. We can't help it. So we make a virtue of necessity and rely on these predictions. That is how we come to believe in natural laws. Now comes the part about miracles that are supposed to be violations of these laws. Based on past experience, it is more likely that a report of a miracle is mistaken than it is that the laws were really violated. So if we rely on our instinct to...
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Yes, that's a good point. It is true that Hume's practical recommendations are based on inductive claims that he can't ultimately justify. However, he is relying on the natural force of appeals to induction, not their epistemic justifiability. So he is still not relying on the justifiability that he denies.
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