I agree that most philosophers use the terms interchangeably, and that there is no generally agreed upon distinction. But one reasons for thinking that there is a distinction to be made is to consider whether the general approach to values is rule-based or agent-based. Virtue theorists (whose approach to value is agent-based) in many cases see no important distinction between what other philosophers call moral virtues (such as honesty), and other virtues, which might be just as important to pursuing the good life. So, Aristotle lists gentleness and wittiness among the many ethical virtues, along with honesty and generosity. There is nothing immoral about being gruff (as opposed to gentle) or humorless (as opposed to witty), but gentleness and wittiness are included, for Aristotle, among the ethical virtues.

I generally gree with Heck and Leaman have said, but would add a proviso: I am inclined to think that there is something (not without exceptions, of course--even numerous exceptions) in the kind of suspicion that people tend to have when they consider relationships between people who are unusually far apart in age--a suspicion that grows considerably more acute when the younger one is very young (i.e. a legal minor). In another response I made (on a question about animals), I noted how significant the value of reciprocation is, as a measure of relationships. People very different in age can, of course, enjoy fully reciprocal relationships. But differences in age usually also tend to be associated with differences in perspective, in interests, in worldly wisdom, and in lots of other areas that are profoundly important in relationships. So, when one tends to be suspicious of romantic relationships between people of very different ages--and all the more so when one partner is extremely young--it...

Not quite sure I get this one: If the relationships you have in mind are not one-sided, then neither description you have provided is entirely accurate...right? So it is difficult to pin down here exactly what you are asking. Is the "someone you love" someone who also loves you back--but does not seem to love you as much as the "someone who love you a lot"? And on the basis of exactly what do you determine that one loves you less, and one loves you more? As much as I might wish to urge you most of all to choose to love--to love as much and as completely as you can--on the ground that loving grounds greatness in one's life far more than does being loved, I am also inclined to a degree of caution here. Loving another who is incapable of loving in return will not bring greatness to one's life; it will bring only misery. Loving another who merely "likes" one in return is barely better. Your specific circumstances in life are also significant--is the love you are talking about also connected...

It is a little unclear precisely what you have in mind here. Love scenes in mainstream films most certainly do not require the performance of most sex acts (beyond kissing), and so could hardly constitute rape done by or to anyone. The same can be said as to why this is not prostitution, as there is very little in the way of actual sex performed in such films. Of course, real sex acts are performed in pornographic films, and it may well be that in some instances those performing these acts (or on whom they are performed) have not given their consent. By the way, I do not agree with your definition of rape. I think consent--rather than whether the sex is wanted --is what is key here. Many loving people occasionally consent to sex even when they don't really want it. I would not call that rape. In some cases I could imagine--which may occur, or even occur rather more often than we might suspect--I would call such cases extraordinary acts of love. After all, loving may involve willing...

I agree with you that Dworkin's arguments "horribly simplify" the relationships between men and women. But I would also say that this kind of simplification is unavoidable in arguments of the general kind she makes--from any point of view. For one thing, notice the difference in how I put my agreement with you--from the way you put the point. In my agreement, I put "relationships" in the plural. Dworkin understands well the generality of male domination and oppression. But arguments such as hers fail (and cannot help but fail, by their very nature as generalities) to take into account the indefinitely great variety of ways in which human beings can be related and can interact. This is not at all to say that Dworkin's arguments do not deserve our attention and respect. But we should always take care not to allow such arguments to obscure the fact that the generalities to which they point are, to some degree and by many individual cases, not at all without exceptions.

I'd like to add to what Professor George has said. A year ago, I led an overseas study program from my college to East Africa, and saw first-hand how not everyone has the kinds of choices we enjoy about nutrition. But this observation also raises questions about what kinds of moral considerations "trump" others (and why, or on what ethical grounds), and whether or not those who don't have our choices are forced at best to choose between evils (and thus cannot really choose the good in their lives). The fact that animals can suffer is clearly morally relevant. But I am not at all confident that this is the only morally relevant consideration in this or any other moral judgment--plainly, the fact that they suffer does not seem to be decisive evidence for the claim that no one should ever eat them, or we would condemn even those who do so because they have to. So, at best, the fact that animals suffer is what philosophers call a prima facie ground for not willingly causing them to suffer. ...

Your question seems to presuppose that love is the only reason to be in a marriage. It may be the main reason that one gets married, but I think that the kind of companionship and interconnection that married couples can generate, as a result of living together and sharing lives for so long, can become very important (not to mention the family relations that entangle, as well--for example, with children and in-laws). Perhaps what I am trying to say might be put another way: I think that "love" comes in many "flavors," and it is certainly conceivable that the "flavor" that led a couple to get married might fade completely, while being replaced by one or more other "flavors" that serve equally well to preserve the relationship in a valuable way. If a couple finds that there comes to be no love of any kind--or worse--then I can certainly see why it would make good sense for them to divorce. Given the social and economic realities of our world, other considerations apply here, as...

What you propose is a start, but not yet a "reliable base," as you put it. Problems lurk here: Just "furthering humanity" may in the long run actually lead our own species (and many others) into extinction--especially given our proven propensity to gooble up the earth's resources and spew out pollutants at great cost to the environment. At a certain point (and I am not sure we are not already there--indeed, I am inclined to think we are already there), I think humanity needs to consider making some fairly extensive concessions to ceasing our aggressions against other species and the environment even if doing so comes at a substantial cost to our present well-being. Moreover, many ethical problems derive from our need to make judgments that require us to provide advantages to some, but not all human beings. For example, money that I spend on my children's education could also be spent on relieving hunger or for that matter on educating others--including others whose aptitude and...

I stuck my neck out on another question like this, so I suppose I should go ahead and compound my earlier error by responding to this one, too. I really think that the ethics of having children is more complicated than your examples make it. Each example seems to give a reason not to have children--or at least not to have them as long as the reason continues to apply (for example, one would hope the alcoholic would dry up first, and then reconsider having kids). But a single such reason, it seems to me, does not necessarily rise to the point of duty . If considerations of initial conditions worked this straightforwardly, then most people would have a duty not to have children, because most people would find they have one or more failings that could (or even certainly would) have adverse effects on their ability to raise children. Consider: Are wealthy people the only ones who have the right to reproduce? Does poverty leave one with the duty not to reproduce? I think that...

I am not sure whether ownership is the right way to frame this question. It seems that it might be more perspicuous to think of the question in terms, perhaps, of duties we owe to one another, in terms of respect for other cultures (and others' cultures), or of virtue considerations such as being respectful of others. From these points of view, I think answers are easier to reach: It certainly seems like a kind of violation of a duty to respect others (for example, as an application of one of the ways Kant formulates what he calls the categorical imperative, which mandates treating others as ends only, and never as means), and also seems like the vice of disrespect for others to violate rituals in this way. Of course, it might also be more complicated, depending upon what motives apply to the apropriation (commencial? for the purposes of ridicule? out of a sense of shared reverence?).