Obviously, there are better reasons for desisting from some evil wish than others--it would be better not to murder someone, when you experience the wish, because you feel some compassion for others who might grieve the death, or because you realize that you could never forgive yourself for such an act...and so on. Worse reasons might include: Someone pays you not to knock the so-and-so off! Wishing to avoid incarceration is also not a very noble reason, as you notice--but it is understood by lawmakers (following the deterrent theory of punishment) as the very kind of consideration that is supposed to deter people from such crimes. The best person, it would seem, is one who does not even wish for such things--bad things, that is. But it is hard to be perfect--and few (if any) of us are...so we end up wishing for things it would be better not to wish for. Applying something like a Kantian universalizability principle, however--consider which of the following principles we would...

I think there will be different answers to your question, depending upon what kinds of examples you specify. But as a general rule of thumb, I would be inclined to say that for the most part, we don't necessarily know what is right and what is wrong--we have to use our judgment about this, and human judgment, as I suppose you already realize, can be very fallible and faulty. But just because we don't know something, it doesn't mean that we should just give up or not try--questions of right and wrong are really, really important ones, and so we need to try and do our best when we make these kinds of judgments. The way we philosophers try to do our best is to consult with the main theories and explanations of right and wrong that very smart and thoughtful people have offered and then think about how those theories apply to the cases we have to judge. So let me give you three different sorts of theories (and these are not the only ones, but they are commonly regarded as three of the...

I am inclined to think that any very definite answer to this question would amount to a "just so" story--in other words, it would be pure speculation, as we obviously have no access to the origins of ethics, which would appear to be pre-historic (that is, before anything was written down so as to be preserved for future generations). But doesn't it seem plausible to think that ethics will become a topic of interest just as soon as (a) human beings start to congregate together, and (b) human beings wonder about what might make their lives better. Since my guess is that it would be difficult for some creatures to qualify as a human population, if the members did not do (a) and (b), my own speculation would be that ethics has its origin in human nature itself. (That, by the way, is anything but an original speculation--have a look at the very much more sophisticated version of this idea in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics , especially Book I.)

Your question seems to presuppose that life itself has some value all on its own...or maybe it doesn't, because you don't mention ending the lives of plants that we eat, or bacteria that cause infections, or stinging or blood-sucking insects. I use these examples to make a point: Virtually no one believes that life of any kind should be protected. Vast resources are spent each year on exterminating certain forms of life (for example, those that cause malaria). So this leads to the more important (and more philosophically interesting) question: What lives should we value, and what is it about these forms of life that makes them valuable, whereas the others are not (or even have negative value)? Now, we often think that just because we asked the question, the burden of argument shifts to those asked. My point in this response, however, is to suggest that some reason needs to be given even for thinking that we should value lives we do not now value. Animal rights activists, as...

In some ways of thinking, there is no significant moral difference between the two cases. For example, have a look at the gospel of Matthew 5:28 ("But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart.") I gather that what this means is: One who experiences lust for someone not his wife is already guilty of the sin of adultery. But I must say, this seems like a pretty goofy idea to me. For one thing, if the mere wish made me already guilty in every morally relevant way, it is hard to see why acting on that wish would make matters worse ...but of course, it obviously does. Depending upon how one assesses moral value, the mere wish (not enacted) might have no negative value at all. For example, if we count moral value in a consequentialist way--that is, by determining whether the consequences of something are (predictably or actually) beneficial, then a non-enacted wish, having no (notable) consequences, is morally neutral. ...

Strange question! I am sure others can give a host of more sophisticated answers, but how's this, for starters: Sexism is wrong because it treats one group of people who are morally equal to another group of people as if they were not morally equal to that other group. Why is racism wrong? (Same reason.) Why is discrimination on the basis of any morally insignificant difference between people wrong? (Same reason.) But perhaps your real question is a different one: Maybe you are asking why differences in gender are not considered morally significant. To this, I am inclined to challenge you to explain to me why you think they are (or might be), and to regard the idea that they are not as the obvious default. So, here's my challenge: Give me a good reason to think gender difference is morally significant! I deeply doubt that anyone can meet this challenge...but if someone can persuade me otherwise, well, then we can return to the question you asked at that point.

There is more to your question than you might think. In the case of some living things, it looks as if it is not only OK to kill them, but actually good--disease organisms, for example. I raise this kind of case to try to show that "respect all life!" is not likely to serve us very well as a moral mandate. If not, then the questions become much more complex: Which lives? Why? On the one hand, your intuition (widely shared, I'm sure) that even insects' (and arachnids') lives have some worth seems to be counter-balanced somewhat by an intuition that these lives are not worth as much as human lives (or, perhaps, those of primates). As with so many other questions that seem to require straightforward "yes" or "no" answers, I am inclined to think that the expectation of clear decision principles in these and many other kinds of cases is unwarranted. In the approach to ethics that I favor (virtue theory), the real question will not be about whether all (or some) lives are intrinsically...

Although I am somewhat sympathetic with your intuition that we should be free to choose to end our own lives, if we decide that they are no longer worth living, I am also cautious about removing all social interventions intended to prevent suicide, as well. My reservation comes from the (not implausible, I hope) observation that many of those who attempt suicide are not in a fit condition to make that decision, and would not make that decision under other circumstances that are actually available to them. For example, as we all know, depression can make someone suicidal--and when deeply depressed, a person can come to the decision that his or her life is no longer worth living. But depression is a treatable condition (at least in many or most cases), and if the depressed person is given effective treatment, he or she will cease to think that his or her life is not worth living. So I think society (and all of us in it) has a strong interest in intervention, precisely because so many cases of the...

The way you put this question seems to presuppose an approach to ethical reasoning that is driven by rules (imperatives). For those of us attracted to others approaches (in my case, virtue theory), it is difficult to respond to your inquiry in that form. Moreover, I think the context in which you plan to have the pet and what kind of pet you plan to have are extremely significant. Consider how differently one should answer questions like yours if the pets in question are goldfish or dogs. So let's assume you mean a very standard pet, such as a dog or a cat. Now, do you live in the country, where the dog is not going to foul sidewalks, potentially menace pedestrians or bicyclists, be at risk for being hit by a car (which could also put others at risk, from drivers swerving to avoid hitting your pet), or attack others' pets in the street? If the context is a city or similar, then it looks like you will be obliged to keep your dog leashed at all times when outside the home. In the case of a cat, it...

When your daughter is looking for colleges, I hope you will encourage her to considering coming to where I teach! Ethicists take different general approaches to replying to such questions, and one of the interesting things about this question is that it may allow us to see how different approaches will sometimes provide different answers to ethical questions. Very roughly, a consequentialist would say that in order to determine what to do in this case, one must calculate the benefits and detriments to all who may reasonably be expected to be affected, and do whatever maximizes benefit and minimizes detriment. In simple terms, you weigh the damage to the friend if you snitch against the damage done by leaving their wrongdoing undetected and do what will minimize that damage. A deontologist might count the requirement always to expose wrongdoing as a fundamental duty. (I actually doubt that any serious deontological theory would put is in such an unqualified way, in fact.) If so, a...