The problem with the analogy is that the existence of the author of a book is not in question. But whether the universe has an author is the question. On the assumption that the universe was designed, what we will or will not be able to tell about the designer on the basis of the design will depend upon just how much the designer betrayed of Him-Her-Itself in the design. If God did design the universe, but wanted us to be very confused about His-Her-Its nature, then we would not have much reason for thinking that the design would tell us much. So, to answer your question completely, we would have first to figure out exactly what we mean by "God" and whether a being of that sort would hide, deceive, or wish to remain mysterious. As for authors, it really depends upon the kinds of books they write, doesn't it? Isn't there a difference in authorial voices between genres (fiction, biography, technical writing, for examples)?

Huge question--too huge for me to try to answer fully. But I will say this: I seriously doubt that your preference for blue shorts over yellow ones is free and rational . It may be that it is rational to buy shirts you find more attractive, but I doubt that your attraction to blue over yellow is rationally driven (as if, by thorough observation, you notice that people are more inclined to react with hostility if talking to someone in a yellow shirt). Moreover, philosophers called "compatibilists" on the free will issue will claim both that your choices have causes that can entirely explain them, but that their having such causes does not determine them in a sense that leaves you unfree. There's a large literature on this, but you can start out by looking up "compatibilism" in one of the encyclopedias of philosophy linked to this site. Finally, I think one's choices of moral values is different in kind from choices of entertainments, choices of shirt colors, and many other...

I guess I want to begin by saying that I deny your premise. I think we actually have very little reason for thinking that our forefathers were more loving, or meant more when they said "I love you" than we do. It may be true that marriages did not as often end in divorce as they do now, but I strongly suspect that the explanations of this fact have very little to do with our ancestors being more loving, or more stable in their loves. In many ways, actually, I am inclined to think that the relevant sorts of relationships in most cultures of earlier times were more exploitative, more limiting, more unequal, and less about "love" (in any form I would be willing to recognize) than relationships are now, at least where women's rights are recognized (if not, alas, always respected). As for your second question, the answer will depend upon what you mean by "love." Certainly most people who love their spouses also love their children, parents, and close friends. But you would no doubt object that...

The way you put this question seems to presuppose an approach to ethical reasoning that is driven by rules (imperatives). For those of us attracted to others approaches (in my case, virtue theory), it is difficult to respond to your inquiry in that form. Moreover, I think the context in which you plan to have the pet and what kind of pet you plan to have are extremely significant. Consider how differently one should answer questions like yours if the pets in question are goldfish or dogs. So let's assume you mean a very standard pet, such as a dog or a cat. Now, do you live in the country, where the dog is not going to foul sidewalks, potentially menace pedestrians or bicyclists, be at risk for being hit by a car (which could also put others at risk, from drivers swerving to avoid hitting your pet), or attack others' pets in the street? If the context is a city or similar, then it looks like you will be obliged to keep your dog leashed at all times when outside the home. In the case of a cat, it...

I really think it is a good idea to be as well-rounded in your training as you can be. I often find myself using skills not normally associated with ancient Greek scholarship, my own specialization. The best thing about "analytic philosophy" is that it provides useful ways of looking at philosophical questions--no matter who framed them, and no matter whose answers you might find the most interesting.

When your daughter is looking for colleges, I hope you will encourage her to considering coming to where I teach! Ethicists take different general approaches to replying to such questions, and one of the interesting things about this question is that it may allow us to see how different approaches will sometimes provide different answers to ethical questions. Very roughly, a consequentialist would say that in order to determine what to do in this case, one must calculate the benefits and detriments to all who may reasonably be expected to be affected, and do whatever maximizes benefit and minimizes detriment. In simple terms, you weigh the damage to the friend if you snitch against the damage done by leaving their wrongdoing undetected and do what will minimize that damage. A deontologist might count the requirement always to expose wrongdoing as a fundamental duty. (I actually doubt that any serious deontological theory would put is in such an unqualified way, in fact.) If so, a...

The question does not seem to me to have a general answer. But you have left out at least one of the factors that must be taken into account. Helmet laws (for bicycles and motorcycles) are not just for the protection of the riders. These laws also protect those who are dependent upon the riders and those who may be involved in accidents with the riders. For example, does a fatal head injury resulting from being hit by a car--which may well not have occurred, had the rider being wearing a helmet--put some legal limit on the degree to which the driver of the car, if he or she was at fault, may be punished or sued for the fatality? There needs to be a balance struck between the legitimate interests of society generally and the private interests of individuals (which plainly include freedom of religious expression). But I see no reason to think that freedom of religion or freedom of expression (religious and otherwise) cannot be trumped by the authentic requirements of civil society. So, for...

I agree that most philosophers use the terms interchangeably, and that there is no generally agreed upon distinction. But one reasons for thinking that there is a distinction to be made is to consider whether the general approach to values is rule-based or agent-based. Virtue theorists (whose approach to value is agent-based) in many cases see no important distinction between what other philosophers call moral virtues (such as honesty), and other virtues, which might be just as important to pursuing the good life. So, Aristotle lists gentleness and wittiness among the many ethical virtues, along with honesty and generosity. There is nothing immoral about being gruff (as opposed to gentle) or humorless (as opposed to witty), but gentleness and wittiness are included, for Aristotle, among the ethical virtues.

DikaiosunE (with an eta, which is why I used the upper case for the "E") is closer to our word "justice." DikE is really a broader term, which could mean simply "custom," or "the normal way of things," "or what is fitting (or suitable)." The word also applies to legal judgments and enacted laws.

I think you are right to say that the political system of the United States considerably privileges certain kinds of people (wealthy religious white men especially). But it seems to me that a basic feature of representative democracy will always be that candidates will represent the priorities of the electorate. I see no reason at all to think that the electorate of the United States highly values "amazing brilliance" or even basic grammar!