I think it will entirely depend upon what particular area of science the scientist is working in, but for the most part, there is no reason to think that even the best scientists could not be religious. Now, certainly a scientist whose work was in evolutionary biology could not be an excellent scientist and at the same moment accept creationism (or, as it has been strategically renamed more recently, intelligent design theory), for these two are incompatible. But I see no reason why someone could not believe there is a God and also do superior work in the area of inorganic chemistry, say. But it is even more complicated than this, I think. People are magnificently complex beings, and one of their most puzzling complexities is the ability to "partition" their lives in such a way as to isolate one area of their life from other areas, and thus avoid noticing or being moved by the contradictions that might be revealed if the "partitions" were somehow removed. (Before saying what follows, I...

I certainly do not agree that creationism is "utterly optional" for a good scientist, on the obvious ground that it is bad science (or else pseudo-science). That was my point. On the other hand, I accept that someone who was religious could do exceptional work in evolutionary biology--either by partitioning in the way I noted, or by conceiving of evolution as part of God's plan, or (as Heck proposes) by seeing religion as no more related to science than poetry is. I would add, however, that most religions I am familiar with seem to have a great deal more intersection with science, in their putatively factual assertions about the world and how things work, than poetry does. Keeping these intersections from generating conflict, I continue to think, is the partitioning trick. But look, some philosophers (Heck included) both defend and practice religion, in which case it is no surprise that these philosophers would think that all talk of conflict between religion and science (or reason) is...

Yes. Let me explain: Identification with some group (religious, especially, but also philosophical) extends your ability to make a difference in the world by adding your efforts to those of others, rather than limiting your efforts to the confines of whatever you can do on your own. By joining Habitat for Humanity, for example, you will find you are much more effective in building homes for those who cannot otherwise afford them than if you go out and try to build such homes all by yourself and without others' help. On the other hand, you might also find that Habitat for Humanity did things in ways with which you could not entirely agree or be comfortable. I am not at all religious (indeed, I would say I am the opposite of religious, at least insofar as that involves believing in dieties and such things), but even I can't miss the fact that many churches are associated with very significant and very well organized charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs, as they are...

Although I agree with Peter Lipton (having actually recently made such arguments in a commentary I did with Thomas Brickhouse on the Euthyphro itself, in the Routledge Guidebook to Plato and the Trial of Socrates , I think it is also fair to mention that some theistic philosophers have recently attempted to defend the Divine Command Theory (DCT), by arguing that it makes sense to think that something might become morally required as a result of God commanding it. Have a look at Philip Quinn's Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford, 1978), 30-52. I personally do not think this avoids the problem (because we can still ask why God would command it in the first place, in which case, the only available options seem to be "because it is good," which seems to defeat the DCT, "for no reason," which seem to make divine commands completely arbitrary, or "for some reason other than that it is good," which would seem to there being some non-good reason for God's commands, or perhaps...

The problem with the analogy is that the existence of the author of a book is not in question. But whether the universe has an author is the question. On the assumption that the universe was designed, what we will or will not be able to tell about the designer on the basis of the design will depend upon just how much the designer betrayed of Him-Her-Itself in the design. If God did design the universe, but wanted us to be very confused about His-Her-Its nature, then we would not have much reason for thinking that the design would tell us much. So, to answer your question completely, we would have first to figure out exactly what we mean by "God" and whether a being of that sort would hide, deceive, or wish to remain mysterious. As for authors, it really depends upon the kinds of books they write, doesn't it? Isn't there a difference in authorial voices between genres (fiction, biography, technical writing, for examples)?

You want mysteries without God? For heaven's sake (well, maybe not...) just look around you! Despite all of the advances of science (about which, no one of us is wholly expert, nor could we even possibly be), the world will be filled with things we do not know and do not understand. Mostly, we pay no attention toi the vast amount and degree of our ignorance. Aristotle said, "Philosophy begins in wonder." From any human perspective, the world is simply filled with wonders--because our limitations will always prevent our knowing much, relative to what is out there. You want a greater context than just yourself? Just open your eyes and look around you! Think of all the other people in the world, and how different their esperiences are from yours! If you want to preserve the "beautiful, mysterious aspect of life," then for goodness sake don't give your mind away to some God (whom you could never understand anyway, and therefore who cannot at all help "to explain the abstract and intangible." Just...

Most philosophers, when they teach the philosophy of religion, actually teach their classes the arguments they regard as the best ones for (and also against) the existence of God. These include several versions of the cosmological argument (in which God figures as the first cause, or as the cause of the universe as we know it), the teleological argument (in which the universe is understood as showing signs of having been intelligently designed, indicating a Designer), and the ontological argument (in which God's existence is argued to be derivable just from the definition or conception of God). I find the argument that works best with students who are inclinded to be atheists or agnostics is some version of the ontological argument. I usually teach several versions, but here is a version of one of the most famous of those arguments, by Anselm: Even the atheist grants that God is that being than which no greater can be conceived. Hence, even for the atheist, God exists at least in the...

Important in what sense? Religions, in one sense, are more important in the actual lives of people--for the obvious reason that they influence people's lives whether God exists or not. But if God doesn't exist, then much of what religions say is based upon falsehood. Truth is sometimes less important to people's actual lives than falsehood. But don't you think that truth has value in itself--intrinsic value--even if people find it easy or desirable to ignore it? If truth has value apart from what people want or do with it, in that same sense, then, the existence of God is more important than the existence of religion--since religions can exist and even flourish even if most or all of what they proclaim is false.

Your reasoning is very clever, and actually enjoys a significant history in philosophy--and also has several philosophers even today persuaded. So you're in good company. Despite the cleverness, however, I am not persuaded that your reasoning is actually correct. The issue gets into some technical issues involving what is known as modal logic (the logic of possibility and necessity), but I think I might be able to explain why I am not persuaded by your argument in an intuitive way. Consider: what would show that you did not have free will regarding the cereal would be evidence that you could not do otherwise than what God knows you will do. God's knowing what you will do, however, only seems to show that you will not do otherwise--it doesn't show that you cannot or could not do otherwise. There are plenty of things that are the way they are, but could be otherwise . So similarly, from the fact that God's knowledge of the future would settle the question of how things ...

I am uneasy with the phrase "absolutely prove...non-existence." It is difficult to imagine what sort of scientific discovery could "absolutely prove" the non-existence of something. I am inclined to think that scientific evidence just doesn't work that way. On the other hand, there have been a number of arguments offered for the claim that the very concept of God is logically incoherent. If something can be shown to be logically contradictory, then this does seem like a decisive proof of non-existence. A fairly extensive survey of such arguments appears in Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification , chapter 12. But I think it is fair to say that the philosophical world has not been completely won over by any of these arguments. Most philosophers who are atheists, I surmise, would say only that the evidence available to us strongly favors disbelief in God, rather than "absolutely proves" it. Of course, there remain a number philosophers who regard the weight of evidence...