It is perhaps worth pointing out, belatedly, that Kant's idealism (in the first sense) also includes idealism (in the second sense). For example, the ideas of pure reason (the topic of the 'Dialectic' chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason ) have a role in our thoughts concerning the nature of reality. This is idealism in the first sense. However, that role functions by being something akin to an 'ideal' in the second sense. Specifically, the ideas of pure reason function 'regulatively', by guiding our thought towards something that is strictly speaking impossible, but the being guided is never-the-less important for us.

You are certainly correct thatNietzsche is often enough INTERPRETED in that way.: as if the onlygenuine moral value lay in the self-interest of individuals. This,however, is not Nietzsche's view. To be fair, Nietzsche is adifficult writer and thinker – some would say incoherent – somisinterpretation of Nietzsche is partly Nietzsche's fault. First of all, Nietzsche argues thatthat stage of human development which emphasises and valuesindividuals is not the highest or last stage – it is just anotherhistorical transition. It occurs every time a culture becomes'decadent', and eventually leads to another configuration ofcollective culture. If human individuals are to be valued, then, itis not for their own sakes, but for what they can achieve – giventheir current historical situation – on behalf of the developmentof a mode of human life. Second, the will-to-power does not correlateto individuals. Every 'individual' is always a multiplicity of'wills'; the appearance of being a unity is an effect of...

An interesting question, and the waythat you put matters at the end of your question is excellent. Aprimary issue is that the notion of 'religion' conflates together anumber of different phenomena on Nietzsche's analysis. Let usdistinguish between at least three types of religion: 1. A religionthat projects as its ideal a mode of living specificallycharacterised by fears and weaknesses (for example, Judeo-Christianity, as Nietzsche conceives it); 2. A religion that projectsas its ideal some specific mode of life characterised by a reactionagainst life more generally (again, aspects of Christianity as wellas Nietzsche's rather basic understanding of oriental thought); 3. Areligion that projects as its ideal a mode of life that ischaracterised by an increasing affirmation of all that lifecomprises. Now, depending upon how one defines 'paganism', it couldeasily fall under any of these three descriptions. What isdistinctive about Greek religion, Nietzsche suggests, and perhapsonly in some places or periods...

I fully agree, Zarathustra is not the best place to begin withNietzsche – although many people do, without suffering unduedamage! However, as you have worked your way through it and enjoyedyourself, just a few pointers for getting something further out ofZarathustra: first, don't forget its novel-like characteristics:Zarathustra develops as a character right from the first few pages,and these developments and also his emotional responses to situationsand to emerging ideas are not just for effect, but part of thephilosophical content. Second, to my mind the most philosophicallyimportant symbolic contrasts are between change/ motion andstillness, and between male and female. If, when reading, you payparticular attention to these, many of the more cryptic passages makesense. Notice that these are not terribly original symbols; in fact, they are about as old as symbols get. Nietzsche's 'gift' (a very Nietzschean word you've used there!) is to provide new meanings for very old symbols and very old systems of...

Nietzsche's analysis of the 'genealogy' of cultural forms (ofwhich moral ideas is the most obvious) is directed not to the past,but to the future. That is, what is key is what happens to subsequenthuman beings because of that origin. So, the fact that moralityoriginated in a lie, a misunderstanding, a violence, an act ofrevenge, etc. -- this matters for two reasons. First, insofar as anotherphilosophy might have justified morality based upon its historicalorigin (e.g. the law of God) or its foundation (e.g. the possibleautonomy of practical reason). But, as asprofessor Taliaferro points out, this argument only really works if there is an absence of any otherjustification provided for the moral system. Second, and I think more importantly, the origin matters because of whatfuture possibilities of human life get lost as a consequence of that origin.So, if the origin is that a group of the weak find a way to recastthe existing cultural values system so that the strong are relabeledas 'evil', then Nietzsche...

Unfortunately, this is not a uniquephrase in Sartre, and neither 'negation' or 'absolute' refer only tosingular moments in his thinking. So, we probably need theexact citation in order to help you. However, one possibility is thatthis is a description of the relationship between the in-itself andthe for-itself, that is between being and consciousness. Very crudelyput: the in-itself is 'absolute' in the sense that it simply is, itis all 'here'. That is, there are no 'gaps': neither future nor apast, neither possibility or ideality, nor appearance as opposed toreality in itself. The for-itself, on the other hand, commences asthe opening up of just such a 'gap'. Consciousness is transcendence:consciousness always projects beyond the simply here. Insofar asbeing appears for consciousness, being will have a future or past,other possibilities of being or of appearance. The initial, formaldefinition of consciousness then is this transcending negation of theabsolute in-itselfness of being.

I really do not believe that any of the philosophers you mentionseek to 'bully' others in their writing, or to achieve the submissionof their readers. We are all human, so no doubt there areoccasionally misjudged attacks to be found in everyone, but I don'tbelieve these philosophers make it a habit. Although that does notrule out that there may be other philosophers who do this. And itcertainly does not rule out that I often find Derrida in particularexasperating for other reasons. There is a ratio of effort needed toinsight gained that, in many of Derrida's books of the mid or late70s in particular, gets way too high for me. I have had a go atgiving one reason for this difficulty here: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/1593 There are other reasons, too, not least that a philosopher willnaturally tend to write for his or her colleagues, especially whenthey see themselves working on a particular problem together. Alanguage game can become severely 'denaturalised' in such a case.

It is unfair for two reasons, at least.First of all, a moral action for Kant is one that is motivated byduty, however, it may be in accordance with inclination. These twomotivations, that is, may be in agreement as to their 'direction'.The better the world is in terms of its moral organisation -- themore it is like a kingdom of ends -- the more these will align.Friendship is one of the ways that a world can be morally organised.This leads us to the second unfairness: friendship is not simplymorally irrelevant. For example, if a friend of mine behaves like anjerk, he or she doesn't stop being a friend. Instead I forgive, orhelp. I have committed my friendship to this person, and that moralcommitment is part of the nature of friendship, surely.

The usual place people look in Hume forthe 'ought'/ 'is' problem is the end of the first section of ATreatise of Human Nature . Essentially, Hume wants to demonstratethat moral conclusions are founded only upon emotional reactions.This means, among other things, that a moral conclusion concerningsome event or object outside of me cannot be derived rationally froma consideration of the facts concerning that event or object. Or,more simply put, a moral 'ought' cannot be discovered in anythingthat 'is' the case. So far so good. However, Hume admits upfront thatthe emotional feeling I have is itself a 'fact'. Strictly speaking,therefore, an ought (you ought not to do that) not only comes frombut is practically identical with an 'is' (because I feel that it iswrong). This means Hume has to distinguish between two senses of'fact': a fact concerning an object of reason, which is a feature ofan idea or of the relations between ideas, and a fact concerning anobject of feeling, which is the way in which I...

A fine question. Let us assume thatyour basic characterisation of of the conception of freedom withneoliberal thought is correct. It seems to me that there are two basicissues behind Kant's account of freedom. The first (which he wouldcall 'theoretical') is that a free act liesoutside of the series of causes that act upon me. This corresponds roughly to what todaywe would call 'freedom from' constraint. This at least resembles thenotion of freedom that you are criticising. Any limitation upon therange of my free act could be construed as a limitation upon freedom.Thus, the more things around me to buy, sell, or trade, and the fewerrules telling me what I must or cannot do, the more I am free.Accordingly, 'Freedom is choice'. While Kant seems to think of this theoretical freedom as instrinsic, belonging to me as a potential even if not exercised in fact, some interpretations of 'freedom is choice' go further: freedom exists only in choosing. One implication of this is that the latter...