I was recently reading about the potential effects of violent media, such as film, on people. I noticed that the effects of film were being condemned using language that was rather utilitarian. Such films are said to be problematic because that kind of influence could cause the spectator to become violent and harm others in the future. However, this kind of argument seems, to me, to be remarkably similar to virtue ethics - where it is wrong to cultivate the wrong kind of character (in this case, a violent character). It would seem the wrongness of cultivating certain kinds of character stems precisely from the kind of influence that character has on its surroundings, which actually sounds rather consequentialist. So I wonder, is virtue ethics really just utilitarian ethics, but with a focus on the person performing the action rather than on the potential victims? Or is there more to it than that?

In scenarios where the metaphorical glass is either half-full or half-empty, so to speak, are there any compelling rational reasons to come down on one side or the other? Or is a person's optimism or pessimism just a character trait independent of rational thought?

Has anyone written about platonism with regard to emotions? I know that philosophers have written about platonism with respect to beauty and love, and while those are not proper emotions (at least, beauty is not an emotion), experiences of them certainly involve emotion. Has anyone written about platonism regarding, say, sadness? Couldn't a state of affairs be considered, in Plato's language, an instantiation of the form of sad events? Given the role of emotion in moral reasoning and love and appreciation of beauty, it isn't clear to me why platonism wouldn't apply to other instances of emotions.

A recent while ago a person asked why their were so few religious persons in Philosophy departments these days. One philosopher responded that there were many opportunities for abstract thinking in the religion department of universities. Most religion departments are centered around particular religions such as Christianity while historically philosophers have often been spiritual but not affiliated with a religion. So I guess you could still ask why are so few philosophers spiritual in orientation and what educational department could they possibly turn to?

According to Wikipedia, "any definition that attempts to set out the essence of" a concept "specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing being a member of" the set corresponding to that concept. Ok. But I wonder if it wouldn't be great if, for some more difficult concepts, we could at least specify some sufficient conditions in a way that we would pick most things that are members a the corresponding set. For instance, wouldn't it be a nice philosophical progress if we could get a "definition" (?) of beauty that would cover most beautiful things and no non-beautiful thing? I mean a definition that is not circular, of course.

Most words function properly because we more or less agree on what they mean. I can say "chair" and you will most likely have a good idea of what I am talking about. There are other terms, however, where people seem to squabble quite a bit about what a term actually means - like "art", "personhood", "fairness", etc. My question is: Can such terms be useful even if there are several opposing interpretations of what they mean? How? No doubt the debate itself is informative, but if we don't have a clear understanding of what "art" means, I wonder how useful it is to talk about the qualities of art, the study of art, or whether something counts as art. So how useful are terms where people can't agree on a concrete meaning? When does a term become too vague or disputed to be useful?

I am wondering how philosophers try to resolve ethical dilemmas in which both sides have reasonable claims to be "right." In particular, I'm wondering about the conflict recently in the news between a woman's right to contraception and an employer's right to refuse to do something considered sinful by his religion. As a more specific example, consider a woman's right to obtain a medicine such as Plan B in a timely manner (say, a woman in an isolated town with only one pharmacy, to whom a pregnancy is likely to prove fatal, and who was raped by her brother) and a pharmacist's right to refuse to dispense such a medicine because he considers doing so the equivalent of committing homicide. Is there any method of resolving such a dilemma in a way that recognizes the ethical arguments of both sides?

My supposition is; can an abstract possess an abstract? That is, a person (tangible) can possess morality or happiness, but "time" can not possess either. Or, a "society" can be said to be moral (or immoral) but is it the "society" that possesses that morality, or just the tangible members of that society?

I am curious to know what philosophers have said, existentialists in particular, about raising children or procreation. I am seeing a few problems in these things such as: At what point does the child/dependent have freedom? Is it immoral to procreate if/when you know that you are in control of another beings existence and essence? What duties or obligations to parents have to their children and vice versa? Any feedback would be great, I have heard that de Beauvoir has a little say on the subject as does Wollstonecraft (though I have not found more than a handful of pages). In addition to existentialists, in general ethics I think a relevant question would also touch on the issue of overpopulation. Any feedback would be very helpful, even a simple list of texts/authors would shed some light. Thank you.

Can a person love their country in the manner that those that claim to love their country love it? For the sake of the question any country is relevant.