Recent Responses
Can people be held responsible for their emotions? Or, why can't people be held responsible for their emotions?
Jyl Gentzler
October 7, 2006
(changed October 7, 2006)
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I agree that the idea of being held responsible for our emotions ispuzzling. It seems that in order to be responsible for X, it has tohave been up to me whether to X. Actions seem to be good candidates forresponsibility, since they seem to be something over which I havecontrol– when someone an... Read more
I've been reading some online articles on the concept of "function", but I'm not very sure about it. An ashtray, according to my dictionary, is a "container for cigarette ash", but I don't know what this "for" means. It can't mean that people ought to put ashes in the ashtray, because there are other places where we may put it. And it can't mean that people may put there the ashes, since, once again, we may put the ashes in places which are not ashtrays. It can't either mean that the ashtray was made "with the purpose" of serving as a container for the ashes, because an object may be an ashtray now but haven't been made to be an ashtray. So, what is an ashtray?
Jyl Gentzler
October 7, 2006
(changed October 7, 2006)
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Your question suggests that answers to the question “What is thefunction of X?’ will have normative implications about what we ought orought not, may or may not, do to Xs. And this fact is puzzling. How,you might be wondering, can certain facts about an object’s functionhave any implications a... Read more
I found the following statement on a website, along with many other radical philosophies, and just wondered what the panel thought of it. "The state (society) shouldn't outlaw activities like drug use/sale, prostitution, pornography, gambling, euthanasia, and abortion (the traditional "victimless crimes") -- or indeed even old-skool duelling, killer game shows, and consensual cannibalism. No matter how stupid, dangerous, "shocking", or "perverted", as long as it doesn't actually harm anyone against his will, it shouldn't be illegal, period. One has every (moral) right to ignore any law that violates the above-mentioned principle (at one's own risk, of course). Or, in the words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "Lex malla, lex nulla"; a bad law is no law."
Jyl Gentzler
October 7, 2006
(changed October 7, 2006)
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Such a view about legitimate state action often rests on the following sort of argument:
(1) Since coercion is generally wrong, the coercive activities of the state (setting up rules that are backed up by credible threats of punishment) need a special justification.
(2) The only such justifi... Read more
It was suggested (http://www.amherst.edu/questions/1368/) that, among other criteria, an incestuous couple would have to be infertile in order for their relationship to be considered morally permissible. This is presumably because inbreeding allows for the heightened expression of recessive, deleterious genes. What is the significant difference, however, between an incestuous couple, and a couple of unrelated individuals both of whom have family histories (i.e., genetic predispositions) to chronic illnesses?
Richard Heck
October 1, 2006
(changed October 1, 2006)
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I think the really deep question here is why incestuous relationships seem so morally problematic, quite independently of the child-bearing issues. Here are a couple thoughts.
The case of parent-child incest is clearly the most problematic, even when the child is of age. And here, I think the... Read more
Why is there anything weird about the sentence 'This very sentence is false'? If it is that the sentence seems to be true AND false, what makes it so different from certain ambiguous sentences which are true and false as well? If it is that the sentence seems to be neither true NOR false, what makes it so different from imperatives and questions which are neither true nor false as well? (The reformulation 'The proposition expressed by this very sentence is false' does not help, it seems, because it fails to express a proposition at all.)
Richard Heck
October 1, 2006
(changed October 1, 2006)
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Sentences of this kind are sometimes called `Liar setnences', and they give rise to the Liar paradox. What is "weird" about such a sentence is is that, if it is true, then it follows that it is false, and if it is false, then it follows that it is true. Or, at least, that's what intuition sugg... Read more
From a philosopher's point of view, should logic be taught in grammar school or junior high in preparation for algebra, or, should algebra be taught in preparation for logic? One consideration might be that we begin learning logic as early as the first year of life, but not in an ordered or conscious way. Should we get that part of thinking straight before being introduced to its applications, or follow the usual procedure and experience the applications then be confronted with the general principles?
Richard Heck
October 1, 2006
(changed October 1, 2006)
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From any point of view, I think the question here ought to be: What way of teaching such material will make it most likely that students will learn it? But that's not a question a philosopher is well-placed to answer. Someone with expertise in education would be the right person to ask.... Read more
Alexander George has made a distinction between the brain making a decision and "I" making a decision (see http://www.amherst.edu/askphilosophers/question/636). I'd like to know what exactly he means by "I" if not the brain. Unless the flesh of our bodies thinks, then it seems perfectly acceptable, if not more accurate, to say the brain makes all decisions. What more can he be referring to that is not contained within the brain?! Not only that, it seems that the brain is doing all this decision-making automatically since there is nothing outside our own brain that we can use to control it. I believe a good and simple answer to the original question, (to paraphrase) "How am I responsible for my decisions when it's my brain that makes the decisions"? is to say that the "I" IS THE BRAIN.
Alexander George
October 1, 2006
(changed October 1, 2006)
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I am now typing. My brain isn't typing. Nor are the tips of my fingers, though I am typing by having them strike the keyboard. I am typing. You ask who this "I" is if not my brain. It's me, Alexander George. If this is acceptable, then we (you and I) can turn to decisions.... Read more
I have a question about philosophy itself that I hope is not too general, for you (as I feel it's important). I have my B.A. from an accredited University and am still trying to figure out how a philosopher explains the processes of intuition. I consider myself to be a philosopher in my heart---a manner with which I analyze and view the world from all different angles (surely, a logical process). I also have a side of me that is intuitive (or, that sometimes goes completely against logic, yet ends up being extremely accurate). It would seem that intuition itself sometimes (or usually) expresses a certain accurate knowledge of the universe in a different manner than logic; yet can (for some more than others, depending on giftedness in this vein) be depended on for things that logic alone cannot provide. What is the purpose and reliability of intuition, from a professional philosopher's vantage point? Do you feel this concept is tied into religion and God, or strictly to the former life experiences and personality of the individual from whom the intuition comes? (i.e.: I am an "INFP" on the Meyers-Briggs personality inventory. Yet, I am highly "thinking" oriented and analyze everything to a maddening pulp, within my own lens of reality). Your perspective would be much appreciated. Thanks!
Roger Crisp
September 30, 2006
(changed September 30, 2006)
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I suspect part of what you may be getting at is a contrast between explicit or articulated argument or deduction on the one hand (which you call 'logic') and a kind of 'seeing' on the other (which you call intuition). Either seem to be a respectable way of arriving at the truth (and, of c... Read more
My girlfriend and I had a discussion about probability as it relates to a weekly lottery draw. She argued that the probablity of winning remains the same from draw to draw, and because of this anyone who plays the lottery more than once stands no greater chance of winning than someone who only plays it on one occasion. Against this, I argued that because any lottery operates with a finite series of numbers, given enough draws all possible combinations will eventually have appeared at least once, and as such someone who plays more than once stands a greater chance of winning. I also claimed that the probability relating to each draw is different from that which relates to a succession of draws (again because of the finite series of numbers). Which of us is right?
Daniel J. Velleman
September 29, 2006
(changed September 29, 2006)
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Marc is right that if you play the lottery more than once, your chance of winning at least once is higher than if you only play once. However, there is another possible interpretation of your question. Supppose you have played the lottery many times and lost every time. Is your... Read more
Ok, so these pre-socratics... How valuable were they? For example, could you explain how the following sentence makes any sense and what relevance it has to philosophy that has happened since Socrates? "He concludes as follows that nothig is: if something is, either what-is is or what-is-not is or both what-is and what-is-not are." (Sextus Empiricus, 'Against the Mathematicians' 7.65-86, on Gorgias)
Douglas Burnham
September 29, 2006
(changed September 29, 2006)
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The sentence you quote is the first step in the most fully-stated version of Gorgias’ skeptical argument, designed to demonstrate that nothing exists or, at least, that the concept of existence is nonsense. It has a logical form something like this: 'If it is the case that A is a mean... Read more