Recent Responses
I read that questions are directive speech acts, where the questioner requests for some information or, in any case, for an answer. An exception is usually accepted for rhetorical questions. Being a teacher who has to examine students, I often ask questions, but I'm never requesting information or, at least, never on the questioned subject. My students are also always absolutely free not to answer, and I will certainly not blame them for that. Does this mean that my questions aren't real questions?
Amy Kind
October 19, 2006
(changed October 19, 2006)
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Many statements that have the apparent form of a question do not function as interrogative speech acts. For example, in many contexts, if I say, "Can you please close the door?," my remark really functions as a command rather than as a question. (Likewise, my declarative statement, "You haven'... Read more
During a heated argument about social placement resulting from speech, a close friend of mine asked me "WHY should I speak correctly?" The question was an inclination that he wanted to be persuaded by my answer, more so that just asking for a fact on the matter. As I answered him, he started to dismiss my opinions, question everything I posed with a simple phrase: "But if I CHOOSE to speak improperly, and I know I can switch back to proper speach (he tried to make it seem to me he had prior knowledge of more enhanced words that he could use when I know he did not (he is pretty dull)), then shouldn't it not be held against me to do so?" I disagree with him. If one knows how to speak properly, they should not need to be persuaded into doing so, they should just do so, knowing it is correct and proper to do so. Can one of you please afford an opinion on this argument.
Peter S. Fosl
October 19, 2006
(changed October 19, 2006)
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Yes, issues of speech, morality (and politics) can be rather agitating. Perhaps one way of getting at the issue here is to ask what you mean by "should" when you say "should just do so" and what your friend means by "shouldn't" (and "held against") when he asks with regard to speaking impr... Read more
If there was a God who existed and was prepared to punish you for not believing in him, then if this God was fair, it seems that there would have to be some pretty good (obvious) reason why he could expect everyone to believe in him. Even if some of these difficult (for me) cosmological or ontological arguments are any good, then a fair God could hardly punish you for making an incorrect evaluation of such difficult arguments. So maybe there is another reason why God could expect someone to believe in him - could you maybe make a decent argument as to why someone should believe in God along these lines: It seems (obviously this is controversial) that there is something a bit more virtuous about believing in God than in not. What I mean by this is that belief in God seems very humbling, optimistic, honest and hopeful, whereas rejecting the existence of God seems a bit more cynical, easy and self-centered. In other words it is a better reflection on a person's character if they believe in God than if they don't. If we should act virtuously, then, it looks we should believe in God, because doing this would be acting virtuously. Even if this argument is any good, though, it doesn't seem to show that God exists, only that someone should believe in him. But if it is true that people should believe in God, then wouldn't it be very remarkable that this would be the case if there was in fact no God?
Oliver Leaman
October 19, 2006
(changed October 19, 2006)
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I think right at the end you hit the nail on the head as to why the argument is not particularly useful, since all it shows, if it shows anything at all, is that we are better off believing something rather than otherwise. As you say, that demonstrates nothing about whether the belief itsel... Read more
My question pertains to the idea of happiness being induced by a drug. If the drug--like modern anti-depressants--actually changes a person's neurochemistry such that for all intents and purposes the brain looks just like a "happy" brain, then wouldn't you consider that person happy? (Would you give a different answer for a drug like Ecstasy that alters the brain in slightly different ways than classic neurochemical happiness but still brings about a perception of happiness?) And what about the perception of happiness over the long haul? If someone is on anti-depressants for, say, fifty years, and has an over-all sense of peace, purpose, etc that they would NOT have otherwise had, have they, in fact, been happy?
Jyl Gentzler
October 18, 2006
(changed October 18, 2006)
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For the reasons that David offers, I agree that subjective feelingsof contentment are not sufficient for well-being: one couldfeel good and not be doing very well. At the same time, I would notconclude (not that David suggests otherwise) either that (1) positivefeelings of contentment are... Read more
How do we know our right hand from our left hand when there is literally nothing that can be said about one which cannot be said about the other? -ace
Douglas Burnham
October 15, 2006
(changed October 15, 2006)
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Two important historical discussions of this problem. First, Leibniz in the Third Letter to Clarke, par.5. Interestingly, Leibniz asks whether the entire cosmos could be reversed (its handedness changed). Second, Kant, Prolegomena, par. 13, where he calls handed object 'incongruent counte... Read more
How much does competition, fashion, etc. influence academic philosophy?
Douglas Burnham
October 15, 2006
(changed October 15, 2006)
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How is it that philosophers make their views know to others? By lecturing at a University, for one. But here we have competition for students: Universities with each other, and between departments over students. The student-customer has to make a choice where and what to study. So, in ord... Read more
How do we know our right hand from our left hand when there is literally nothing that can be said about one which cannot be said about the other? -ace
Douglas Burnham
October 15, 2006
(changed October 15, 2006)
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Two important historical discussions of this problem. First, Leibniz in the Third Letter to Clarke, par.5. Interestingly, Leibniz asks whether the entire cosmos could be reversed (its handedness changed). Second, Kant, Prolegomena, par. 13, where he calls handed object 'incongruent counte... Read more
Is there anything existing within or beyond the human body or mind that can be called I? If so, exactly where is I located?
Louise Antony
November 2, 2006
(changed November 2, 2006)
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Paul Bloom, a developmental psychologist at Yale, has evidence that human beings are "natural dualists," who believe that minds are distinct from, and can exist separately from, their bodies. He's just published a book about his findings, called Descartes' Baby. In addition to the scient... Read more
How do philosophers decide where to draw a distinction between what one "has" and what one "is". That is to say, am I the same "I" that existed before I lost a toe, or a leg, or the rest of my body, or even my brain, my mind, my thoughts, my self? Is it not logical to say that what is "me" must be distinct from what is "mine"? If this is not true, then would not "I" exist only in a virtual sense, as the image or focus of all "my" possessions?
Sally Haslanger
October 13, 2006
(changed October 13, 2006)
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This is a good quesiton and one that philosophers disagree about. There are three sets of issues to consider.
One is how to make sense of the persistence of anything through any change whatsoever. For example, if a tomato ripens and turns from green to red, is it the green tomato the... Read more
Hi, I'm a first year philosophy student at Hull university in the UK, I've been searching for an answer to a question that has arisen as a result of a piece of work we were set on the nature of love. Most people try and quantify love, or in fact, any emotion based on the idea that it is subjective. My problem is this, I have never seen anyone explain to me exactly WHY emotions are subjective. It seems pretty obvious, but no one ever sat me down and said, here is the logically correct reasoning behind emotions being considered subjective. In a world of hypotheticals, isn't it hypothetically possible that emotion is an objective entity, so why is it considered not so? The best explanation I've had for this was that no one can agree on what the necessary and sufficent conditions of emotions are. But then, scientists still don't agree where the other nine tenths of the universe is hiding, does that make the rest of the universe subjective?
Karen Jones
October 13, 2006
(changed October 13, 2006)
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People mean many different things when they say that emotions are subjective. Before we can answer why people think emotions are subjective and whether they are right to do so, we first have to step back and ask what someone might mean by the claim.One thing people sometimes mean when they cl... Read more