Recent Responses
My girlfriend and I had a discussion about probability as it relates to a weekly lottery draw. She argued that the probablity of winning remains the same from draw to draw, and because of this anyone who plays the lottery more than once stands no greater chance of winning than someone who only plays it on one occasion. Against this, I argued that because any lottery operates with a finite series of numbers, given enough draws all possible combinations will eventually have appeared at least once, and as such someone who plays more than once stands a greater chance of winning. I also claimed that the probability relating to each draw is different from that which relates to a succession of draws (again because of the finite series of numbers). Which of us is right?
Daniel J. Velleman
September 29, 2006
(changed September 29, 2006)
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Marc is right that if you play the lottery more than once, your chance of winning at least once is higher than if you only play once. However, there is another possible interpretation of your question. Supppose you have played the lottery many times and lost every time. Is your... Read more
How should one go about defining their own morals? I have lost track of what I deem completely acceptable behaviour; I am an athiest and hold no reverence to any one religious guide and have recently become apathetic and non-caring. I am having a hard time grounding myself morally and would like to know how one goes about questioning the topic.
Oliver Leaman
September 28, 2006
(changed September 28, 2006)
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I suppose one place to start is to work out whether you feel that what you might consider taking on as moral principles are consistent with each other. Do you feel, that is, that one principle interferes with another in such a way that you don't know how to proceed? Suppose you think th... Read more
I think we are all a product of our own culture. We see everything through a veil of conditioning, this veil is worn by us from a very early age, and it is worn unwittingly by most of us. All of our learned ideas, consisting of everything we have absorbed from our surroundings, history, parents, taught religion (as we all tend to be more informed about a particular religion, than religion as a whole) media and peers, have been absorbed through this cultural veil, and these new absorbtions, over time, can add to the veil and define the way we see the world through its holes more. It may also be the case that we reject some ideas as we live, thereby retaining the veils shape. But we still wear it. As an example, and it is a mild example... In the UK it is polite to finish your food when dining as a guest in someones house, to have seconds is to show you enjoy the meal. It can often, and commonly is considered rude to leave a substantial amount of food on your plate. In Nepal, in the same scenario, to finish your meal is to show that the portion you were given was not enough to satisfy you, and can lead to embarrasment for the host if more food is not available. To leave food on your plate, even if you are still hungry, is commonly considered to show your satisfaction with, and enjoyment of the meal. Which cultural veil is correct? And is it possible to remove the veil? If it were what would we feel? What if it could be removed on mass?
Karen Jones
September 27, 2006
(changed September 27, 2006)
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You are right that we approach all questions, whether of manners, morality or science, with a lot of presuppositions. We cannot help doing this, but more important, it would not be a good thing to shed all our presuppositions -- we wouldn't know how to go about assessing a claim's truth w... Read more
Philosophers appeal to human intuition all the time as a sort of "data" on which to base various arguments. but what if we are simply possessed of intuitions which are plainly contradictory in an unintelligible way? I have to imagine that an appeal to thought experiments presumes that there is some underlying truth to our feelings, but what if there is no such truth? Might we simply be running in circles?
Peter Lipton
September 25, 2006
(changed September 25, 2006)
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This sounds a lot like Descartes' demon scepticism in the First Meditation. There he worries that he might be mistaken even about things that seem most obvious, like simple mathematical sums. If one suffers from this kind of 'hyperbolic doubt', a doubt that even what seems obviously co... Read more
Is homosexuality ethical? If so, what differentiates it from incest? More specifically an infertile incestual relationship that has two consenting adults.
Peter S. Fosl
September 23, 2006
(changed September 23, 2006)
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An interesting question. To answer in order: Homosexual relationships, like heterosexual relationships, can be conducted in both moral and immoral, virtuous and vicious, ways. I find no reason to regard homosexuality to be itself immoral. Of course, many others, especially those wit... Read more
When we talk about necessary truths, do we say that they are as such simply because we cannot imagine how things could be otherwise? (Does 2+2 = 4 simply because I cannot imagine that 2+2 could be equal 5 or 6?)
Peter Lipton
September 23, 2006
(changed September 23, 2006)
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I would not say that necessity is defined by our powers of imagination. Maybe some people are better at imagining things that others, but necessity doesn't vary. Like many philosophers these days, I find it helpful to think about necessity instead in terms of 'possible worlds', in terms... Read more
Why are there so few women philosophers?
Gabriel Segal
October 9, 2006
(changed October 9, 2006)
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Just to respond to afew of Jyl's points.
(1) We practice philosophy according to a sort of lawyers-in-courtmodel. This practice has its downside. It encourages aggression, whichoften impedes rather than promotes progress. And it leads people oftento defend views that they do not strongly beli... Read more
My question is about the free will problem. I hope it is not too stupid or anything. Many philosophers seem to argue against free will like this: "Either everything has a cause or not. If everything does have a cause, then it looks like you have no free will, because the chain of causes leading to your actions began before you were born. And if not everything has a cause, if in particular some of your actions are uncaused, then that doesn't seem like free will either. It seems just like a random event." This is from what Peter Lipton wrote in another question. I don't understand why if it is true that not everything has a cause, it must also be true that an uncaused event must be a "random" event. Suppose that a Cartesian "soul" caused an event, but there was no prior cause for the soul's causation of the event. That doesn't seem like a random event, it seems like an event which was caused by the soul, but which was not caused by anything else. To me it looks like this would be compatible with free will, because the soul is choosing something. I know that there are other objections which might be made against this sort of picture, but doesn't it at least avoid the argument that an uncaused event is random and so incompatible with free will?
Douglas Burnham
September 21, 2006
(changed September 21, 2006)
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When you say that a 'soul' caused the event, I guess you are referring to (i) something distinctively mental (like a decision, a belief, a judgement), rather than something physical; (ii) something that belongs to or is inside that soul, rather than something extrinsic to it.The first... Read more
Hi - My question is as follows It is possible for anyone ( alive or dead ) to 1.Make any kind of statement ( including those made in response to this question ) which is not a statement which claims that a. Something is possible ( or impossible ) b.Something is actual ( or not ) c.Something is necessary ( or not) Please note that I am NOT asking about the truth of the statement but only the form in which it is stated - So, for example - A statement which claims that 'Triangles have four sides' ( though false) could be classified as making the claim as a possibiliy, actuality or necessity ( subject to clarification by the maker of the statement ). Also if possible could I have a response to the isues of 'Explanation' what is an 'explanation' - I've often read in textbooks that some author is not offering an 'explanation' but rather a 'description'. Regards - Colin
Peter Lipton
September 21, 2006
(changed September 21, 2006)
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Since 'p' entails 'it is possible that p', the answer to your first question seems to be no.
An answer to your second question is that a description says how something is while an explanation says why it is that way. You can think about this in terms of the contrast between knowing that... Read more
I have a question about philosophy itself that I hope is not too general, for you (as I feel it's important). I have my B.A. from an accredited University and am still trying to figure out how a philosopher explains the processes of intuition. I consider myself to be a philosopher in my heart---a manner with which I analyze and view the world from all different angles (surely, a logical process). I also have a side of me that is intuitive (or, that sometimes goes completely against logic, yet ends up being extremely accurate). It would seem that intuition itself sometimes (or usually) expresses a certain accurate knowledge of the universe in a different manner than logic; yet can (for some more than others, depending on giftedness in this vein) be depended on for things that logic alone cannot provide. What is the purpose and reliability of intuition, from a professional philosopher's vantage point? Do you feel this concept is tied into religion and God, or strictly to the former life experiences and personality of the individual from whom the intuition comes? (i.e.: I am an "INFP" on the Meyers-Briggs personality inventory. Yet, I am highly "thinking" oriented and analyze everything to a maddening pulp, within my own lens of reality). Your perspective would be much appreciated. Thanks!
Roger Crisp
September 30, 2006
(changed September 30, 2006)
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I suspect part of what you may be getting at is a contrast between explicit or articulated argument or deduction on the one hand (which you call 'logic') and a kind of 'seeing' on the other (which you call intuition). Either seem to be a respectable way of arriving at the truth (and, of c... Read more