If knowledge is defined as justified true belief, why is it necessary to include

If knowledge is defined as justified true belief, why is it necessary to include

If knowledge is defined as justified true belief, why is it necessary to include "justified" in that definition. If I have a belief that corresponds with an objective state of affairs, why doesn't that count as knowledge regardless of justification? In the Theaetetus, Socrates seems to consider it self-evident that if one forms a belief based on unreliable testimony, that belief is not knowledge even if it true. I don't see why this is the case. If a delusional person tells me it is going to rain tomorrow, and I form the belief (which happens to be true) that it is going to rain tomorrow, why would that not be considered knowledge? Especially if I can use that belief to successfully guide my activity in the world? One more clarification: I can understand why justification matters with respect to the psychological process of forming a belief. I am talking about the definition of knowledge, which is already presupposed to be true.

Read another response by Richard Heck
Read another response about Knowledge
Print