Language

If "saying" refers to an action, and "believing" to a mental state, what is "asserting"? It seems to require an action (i.e. you have to say something) and it also seems to require a mental state (you need to believe what is said).

Comments

Thank you for your question! Saying is indeed an action, and believing is a mental state as you say (though just what a "mental state" is is no easy question). Asserting is an action, too: it is something we do at will, something we can refrain from, something we can be held responsible for, something we can try but fail to do and so on--in short, it has all the hallmarks of an action. However, unlike mere saying, asserting is subject to a norm, namely, "assert only what you believe." This is colloquially referred to as the norm of sincerity, thought there are some delicate issues about just what sincerity is. At any rate, that asserting is subject to certain norms involving mental states, does not imply that it is itself a mental state. (In this respect, compare asserting with promising.) Nonetheless, asserting is a comparatively sophisticated action, since it is subject to norms, without which I suspect assertion would not even be possible.

Philosophers have long been fascinated with assertion. One (Robert Brandom) has gone so far as to call it, "the form of cognitive discourse." Debate is currently under way on such questions as whether another norm governs it besides the one I've mentioned. This is the norm that says: assert only what you know. For more on assertion and the norms govern it, please see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's articles on 'Assertion' and 'Speech acts'.

Mitch Green

Read another response by Mitch Green

Read another response about Language