I've noticed, perhaps incorrectly, that many philosophers and ethicists regard logical coherence as an integral component of forming and defending moral positions. While I can understand why logical coherence would be necessary for, say, a scientist who is trying to describe how something works, I do not seem to see why logical coherence would be needed for ethics -- where, presumably, there are no objectively right or wrong answers.

Comments

Your final assertion is where you disagree with most ethicists. Most of us still believe that there is something approximating 'objectively right and wrong answers' to moral questions. Ethicists disagree with one another concerning what the proper basis is for discerning objective right moral answers, but the overwhelming majority of ethicists still think such a basis can be found from sources such as: maximizing the good for all (utilitarianism), reason itself (Kantianism), some sort of ideal human character traits (Aristotelian ethics), or natural law (Thomism).

Your view seems to descend from David Hume's account that based morality in the sentiments rather than reason. Yet, even he thought there was a discernable pattern to what the sentiments approved of as 'virtuous'.

In any case, no one ever solved a difficult problem in ethics, science, math, or any other aspect of life by presupposing that there were no 'right or wrong answers'. There may be few answers that we can get universal consensus upon, but I don't think that implies that there are no right answers.

Suppose I think (a) that it is normally wrong to kill humans, because so doing deprives them of a future life. But I also think (b) women have a "right to choose", and it is permissible to have at least a reasonably early abortion.

Then I seem to be in trouble. For by (a) killing a very young human being in utero should be wrong, as it surely deprives it of the long future life it would otherwise have had, while by (b) killing it is permissible. On the face of it, then, my moral views (a) and (b) aren't consistent with each other, but imply that a certain act is both wrong and not wrong -- which is absurd. And note, I can't just shrug my shoulders and cheerfully say "ok, mymoral views are inconsistent" because inconsistent views don't give me anyguidance about what to do, and my moral views are supposed to help guide me! I want to decide to do in various circumstances, and inconsistent moral injunctions are no use at all for deciding. So I need to revise (a) or revise (b), or at least spell out (a) and (b) rather more carefully to remove the apparent tension.

But note, nothing in this presupposes that "there are objectively right or wrong answers" in ethics. Suppose we do accept a fairly naive subjectivism according to which "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." (As Eric Silverman in effect notes, it isn't too clear why we should suppose that, but imagine we do.) Still, even if my own moral views do just express a personal stance, I still will want my views to be logically coherent at least with each other -- or else, as we noted, I won't have a determinate personal stance on what to do and will be left in a state of confusion. So internal logical coherence still matters in morality, whether morality is "objective" or "subjective".

Read another response by Eric Silverman, Peter Smith

Read another response about Ethics, Logic