Mind

Is it just a philosopher's presumption to think the referent of the 'because' in a statement like, "He did that because he wanted to" is a causal connection?

Comments

'Because' is often used as the connective of explanation, and a great many of the explanations we give are causal. But not all: explanations in pure mathematics and at least most philosophical explantions are not causal, but are still given with a 'because'. So the appearance of 'because' in your example does not in itself show that desires are causes of actions (though I think they are).

By the way, here is a non-causal explanation I particularly like. Suppose a bunch of sticks are thrown in the air, so they spin and tumble as they fall. Now take a snapshot of the sticks before any of them hit the ground. More of the sticks are near the horizontal than near the vertical. Why? The answer is because there are more ways for a stick to be near the horizontal than near the vertical. This is a geometrical not a physical fact, so it is not a cause, but it provides a lovely explanation. (To see that it is a fact, think of a single stick with a fixed midpoint. How many ways can it be vertical? (Tw0.) How many ways can it be horizontal? (Many.) A similar argument works for 'near the vertical' and 'near the horizontal'.)

But what about the specific connection between desire and action? Some philosophers have in fact denied that this is a causal connection, but the view that it is causal is not just a philosopher's presumption. It is a commonsense view too, and one backed by straightforward considerations. In a typical case, the desire is distinct from the action and prior to it, and if you hadn't had the desire, you would not have performed the action. These are the characteristic symptoms of causation.

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