Language

Are Quine's arguments against the distinction between analytic and synthetic in "Two dogmas of empiricism" really convincing? I have read Grice and Strawson's "In defence of a dogma" and agree that there is consent enough about the situations where the distinction is applied to and about the results of those applications so that we can't say the distinction doesn't really exist. Am I wrong about it? What readings else should I do? André C.

Comments

The fact that the debate about the status of the analytic/synthetic divide is still raging shows that many people share your opinion that Quine's objections aren't really convincing, and given the fact that Quine brings a lot of baggage to the problem with him (in terms of his overall behaviourist framework) it can seem easy to resist his sceptical conclusions about analyticity. On the other hand, though, the Quinean view still has many strident defenders in the contemporary domain (Jerry Fodor being perhaps the most famous, as well as probably the most strident) and the notion of analyticity itself can look pretty problematic on closer inspection. So, like all the core issues in philosophy, both sides of the argument have their strengths and weakness and both sides have their defenders and opponents; it would thus be hard for someone to say that you are actually wrong to think the distinction does hold. For further reading, see Georges Rey's article on the analytic/synthetic divide in the Stanford Encycopedia of Philosophy and the bibliography there, also Fodor has a recent article on the topic in Devitt and Hanley's Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language (2007).

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