Ethics

When philosophers say that something is morally relevant or that a reason is a moral reason, what does "moral" mean? What makes moral reasons different from other reasons? Can something be both selfish and moral?

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Well, to a large extent the answer to your first question depends upon the author and the context, because the phrase "moral reason" isn't exactly a technical term. One general way to distinguish moral reasoning from other forms of reasoning (for example, strictly theoretical reasoning) is to say that moral reasoning leads either to action or to a prescription for action. So, while a chain of theoretical reasoning is likely to end in the claim that something is the case (e.g. X is true), moral reasoning is likely to end in an action or a prescription for action (e.g. one ought to do X). Something else one might include in moral reasoning is the ability to apply general moral principles to particular situations (e.g. this is a particular case of Y type and where the right thing to do is X).

About "selfishness," the term itself commonly connotes something immoral; and so it seems that selfishness is wrong as a matter of definition. But it does depend upon how one defines the term. If you simply mean by selfishness something like "acts that serve and/or are intended to serve one's own interesst," then selfishness is not necessarily immoral. Its often a good thing, arguably sometimes obligatory, to serve one's own interests and to treat oneself well. What's immoral is serving one's self, one's interests or one's own desires improperly.

A good approximation is this: A moral reason for action is one whose application and weight is (taken to be) independent of the agent's preferences.

Many reasons for action depend on the agent's preferences. For example, that a certain program starts at 9pm is a reason for you to head home only if you want to watch this program -- and the weight of this reason depends on the strength of your desire. That reading makes you wiser, or ice cream makes you happier, is a reason for you to read or to eat ice cream only if you want to be wiser or happier. All selfish reasons are of this kind.

The fact that a child will drown if you don't rescue her is (normally understood as) a reason for you to rescue the child and, more specifically, as a reason that applies to you, with a certain weight, regardless of your preferences. It is then (understood as) a moral reason for action.

We can refine this explication by distinguishing motivating and normative reasons. A reason that actually motivates some agent is a moral motivating reason just in case this agent takes that reason to apply to her, with a certain weight, regardless of her own preferences. Interestingly, such a moral motivating reason may actually be immoral, as when a person believes he ought never to help black people even if he'd want to do so.

A reason that applies to some agent is a moral reason just in case it applies to her, with a certain weight, regardless of her own preferences. If a person's need for help is a reason to help this person, whether one wants to or not, then it is a moral normative reason. This contrasts with non-moral normative reasons: That the stock of a certain company is overvalued is a reason for you to sell such stock. Yet the application and weight of this reason depends on your preference for being more rather than less affluent -- the ought here is not moral (unconditional), but rather prudential (conditional). Normative reasons may not be motivating: Agents may not recognize normative reasons (of either kind) that actually apply to them and may then fail to take them into account.

We can explicate moral relevance along the same lines: A decision-maker takes something to be morally relevant just in case she takes its relevance to be independent of her preferences (motivating reason). And something actually is morally relevant to some decision just in case its relevance is independent of the preferences of the decision-maker (normative reason).

Can something be both moral and selfish? That depends on what this something is. A reason for action cannot be both moral and selfish -- it either is or is not (taken to be) independent of the agent's preferences. Persons are typically mixtures -- more moral and less selfish or less moral and more selfish, depending on the extent to which they are motivated by reasons that are, or are not, independent of their own preferences. An action can be both moral and selfish -- when it is motivated by reasons of both kinds.

As you'll have noticed from the responses by Peter and Thomas, philosophers can suggest different ways of defining 'morality'. So here's another one, which owes a good deal to the British empiricist tradition, and J.S. Mill in particular. Morality can be seen as a system of social control analogous to positive law, though its sanctions are different from those of law. Legal institutions will punish you with, for example, some financial penalty, or a period of detention. Moral institutions punish you with blame, shame, guilt, and so on. (This is not to say, of course, that there isn't much more -- and a more positive side -- to both the law and morality.) So what is meant by a moral reason in some society is a reason which you may be morally punished for not acting on. Here's an example. Some action might have the property of being the sadistic killing of an innocent person. Actions like that will meet with the moral sanctions, so that means the property in question gives us a moral reason. Now, could an action be both moral, in this sense, and selfish? I suspect not, since 'selfish' is itself a morally charged quality. To call an action selfish, that is to say, is to criticize or blame it.

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