Existence

I guess some philosophers discuss whether in some exact location there is only one object, a statue, or two objects, the statue and the stone it is made of. Are there well-known philosophers who argue that this is a false question, a mere matter of choice of words, that there is no criterion to distinguish one object from two objects? Thank you.

Comments

The philosopher Peter van Inwagen is rather skeptical about such relations. Although I may be wrong, but I think he is quite reluctant to believe that (strictly speaking) there are gross macroscopic objects like books and chairs and statues. These "objects" can (in principle) be described and explained in terms of simpler parts and things. I am not sure that terms like "statue" or "marble" are just a matter of words without any clear understanding of criteria / criterion of application... It seems like common sense that one might destroy a statue without destroying the material that makes up the statue. A philosopher who is highly respected but sometimes severely criticized in such matters is John Searle who (in my view) has done great work on identifying how objects exist in our "social world" as constructions through shared intentions and how some objects are not so constructed. The general area of philosophy that explores the relationship of objects and their parts is called Mereology. An important defender of the view that there are differences between objects and the material that constitutes them is Lynne Baker (a "retired panelist" on this site). As noted, for a philosopher who is (more or less) on the other side, Peter van Inwagen may be your best bet.

You might also look into the work of philosopher Eli Hirsch (Brandeis University), who argues that various disagreements in ontology, perhaps including the one you mentioned, are "merely verbal" disagreements.

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