What role can emotions, principles and personal (or borrowed) convictions play

What role can emotions, principles and personal (or borrowed) convictions play

What role can emotions, principles and personal (or borrowed) convictions play in a philosopher's reasoning process when approaching a specific issue? What role can they play in a philosopher's way of seeing things, or even in a given philosophical trend in which a number of philosophers share similar ideas about a certain number of issues? Is it possible to be completely or at least reasonably neutral when approaching a subject, in spite of your own personal background? If not, then, is it still a good idea for philosophers to try to be neutral? What happens, for example, if you as a philosopher are not aware of the fact that some of your arguments, or thoughts, are being "influenced" by something other than reason, like fear or rage, for example? Are the conclusions of such influenced ways of reasoning, something that you can refute (or at least recognize as "impure") in the long run through uninfluenced (if possible) or at least reasonably uninfluenced reasoning? And finally, are there any known examples in the history of philosophy where you could say emotions, principles or personal convictions played an important role in a philosopher's conclusions regarding important subects? Thanks for your time and for your great website (Juan J.).

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