Question What role can emotions, principles and personal (or borrowed) convictions play in a philosopher's reasoning process when approaching a specific issue? What role can they play in a philosopher's way of seeing things, or even in a given philosophical trend in which a number of philosophers share similar ideas about a certain number of issues? Is it possible to be completely or at least reasonably neutral when approaching a subject, in spite of your own personal background? If not, then, is it still a good idea for philosophers to try to be neutral? What happens, for example, if you as a philosopher are not aware of the fact that some of your arguments, or thoughts, are being "influenced" by something other than reason, like fear or rage, for example? Are the conclusions of such influenced ways of reasoning, something that you can refute (or at least recognize as "impure") in the long run through uninfluenced (if possible) or at least reasonably uninfluenced reasoning? And finally, are there any known examples in the history of philosophy where you could say emotions, principles or personal convictions played an important role in a philosopher's conclusions regarding important subects? Thanks for your time and for your great website (Juan J.).

Accepted:
December 2, 2010

Comments

Although philosophers are in the rationality business, well, many of them are, they are no more rational than anyone else about assessing their motives when it comes to themselves. Often we wish to beat someone else in an argument because we want to beat them, not establish the truth, and much motivation for writing books is to be found in promotion and increased pay, rather than pushing the boundaries of knowledge on a bit. This will not come as news to those in the profession.

Is there evidence that our personal opinions play into our arguments? Almost every philosopher of religion I have read has a particularly favorable attitude to his or her own religion. When they elucidate its theology they find remarkable similarities with philosophical positions of which they approve. Perhaps the best example of all here is Hegel and his argument that the development of rational religion achieves its apex in what just happens to be his own variety of religion.

I don't think this is surprising, we are after all human, all too human.