If I am understanding it, some philosophers don't beleive in moral facts because such facts would have to motivate all people who KNOW about them regardless of what those people WANT (or something like that). My question is if it will make a big difference if those philosophers are right, and we give up talking about moral facts, but talk instead about, say, almost-moral facts (with words like "almost-wrong" and "almost-right"), which are almost identical to moral facts except in that they do not motivate people who just know about them? Let me put it another way: some philosophers say that nothing is wrong, because something being wrong would have to be, by itself, a motive for people not to do it, and this is impossible. But can't we just say: ok, nothing is wrong, but some things are almost-wrong, and "almost-wrong" is close to be a synonym of "wrong", except that something being almost-wrong, by itself, doesn't give anybody a motive to avoid it?