Ethics

In a code of intellectual conduct in a truth-seeking argument between A and B for positions X and NOT X respectively, starting a new thread of attacking the person A either by B or by the some members of the audience is definitely a fallacious argument (Argumentum ad Hominem) for the context under discussion. What about glorifying tributes to person A by some members of the audience as a part of the SAME thread of discussion? It obviously is irrelevent to the argument or the issue under discussion. How far is it inappropriate, sinister, or otherwise in the code of conduct in an intellectual truth-seeking debate between two participants A and B in front of the gallery of audience? My strong gut sense is the behaviour is inappropriate because it does not contribute to the strengthening or weakening of arguments in favor or against X. What do the panel of distinquished philosophers have to say on this (not so much the irrelevance but the inappropriateness as an intellectual conduct)?

Comments

If you're after truth, it's often a big win to trust people. And in deciding whom to trust, the reports and evalutions of others can be of great value. So there's nothing specifically about truth-seeking that makes it inappropriate to support, or indeed to attack, the reliability of someone who claims to know the answers.

However, if a person is trying to establish something not by asking you to trust their word but by claiming to provide reasons which, independently of their source, ought to convince you, then you seem to be right that testaments to their character are as out of place as personal attacks. Similarly, there are two different ways to evaluate the validity of a mathematical proof: you might rely on the expertise and good will of the person who supplied it, or you might evaluate it step by step. In the former case evidence as to the person's character and track record is obviously relevant; in the latter, not.

But maybe that's too simple. Even if the propounder of an argument is relying only on the power of the reasons themselves to convince you, he might (intentionally or otherwise) be providing misleading reasons---feeding you a convincing but fallacious argument. Information as to the person's character and track record might well be relevant to weighing the odds of this and hence to whether you should rely on even what seems to be air-tight reasoning. Maybe this is no big danger in mathematics, but surely it can be, for instance, in economics.

And in philosophy.

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