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Philosophers

Help me to understand this quote from Voltaire: "The infinitely little have a pride infinitely great." I already tried to understand it, but I can't find a consensual thought of it. With the best regards from Portugal, Olímpio P.

I am not a Voltaire expert; I can't even find the source of thequotation (putting it back into context is likely to help anyinterpretation), although it is very similar to a line at the end of'Micromegas'. However, for what it's worth, I'll happily share whatI've always taken it to mean. 'Little' is a metaphor for rank on a scale of things one mightreasonably have pride in. As Voltaire is a satirist, there are infact very few things near the top of that scale, but never mind. (In'Micromegas' little means literally little, but ALSO pathetic,insignificant, narrow.) So, the quotation implies that there is aninverse proportionality between greatness and pride. Those who aregenuinely great either refuse pride or have little need of it; thosewho are insignificant have great -- though irrational and undeserved-- pride. One reason for this is that 'littleness' entails anarrowness of point of view or closed-mindedness. Thus, the littleare incapable of understanding that by comparison with...
Music

Just how 'universal' is music? That seems to be a very broad question, but here's some background to clarify: In the past, there have been many different ways of creating music. The only real standard of pitch is the octave, which is two notes exactly one half or twice the others' frequency. Between that, there have been tons of different ways of dividing the octave (12-tone, just intonation, 19 tone, 31 tone, pitch bending etc.) which obviously resulted in some very different types of music. When I listen to Armenian duduk music, for example, it all sounds very similar to me, a combination of familiar western music scales and modes with slightly bent pitches. I presume that they have many different types of music within their own culture, as we do in the west, and as every culture probably does. So, would our music sound similar to someone unfamiliar with it, as a person from a small Asian or African village that had its own, old and untainted musical tradition. Would they be able to distinguish...

Thanks for your question. I can think of a couple ways ofanswering your question, we'll see if you think any of them areworthwhile. It is often said in evolutionary accounts of human beings thatmusic is a universal feature, because it served or still serves somesurvival function. If one could indeed map the 'need' for musicagainst an evolved feature of the human brain, then that would provemusic is not merely cultural (and thus whether there is music in aparticular culture would be contingent). However, to evaluate thisevolutionary account empirically, presumably one would have torigorously define music, and distinguish it from language, poetry,noises, imitation, etc. And arriving at such a definition doesn'tseem easy for precisely the reasons you raise. Similarly, it is often pointed out thatcultures in cold climates have many words for snow, while culturesfrom tropical climes have few or none. Many words are needed in theformer case to indicate differences that culture finds...
Philosophers

Hi. This is a question on the nature of Reality, or rather Actuality. I say Actuality, because I like the distinction that Kant makes between Appearances he calls Phenomena, and things in themselves he calls Noumena. Anyway he ends up saying we can never know the thing in itself, i.e. actuality, but only our experience of reality, i.e. appearances. What I would like to clear up is if there is a way to experience the thing in itself, or whether we have to accept on good faith that actuality exists independently of us, and that it stops with I think therefore I am. In short is there an answer to the sceptics? My question has been fueled by the book, _A Beginner's Guide to Reality_, by Jim Baggott, which ends in "it depends on what you believe", which doesn't really do it for me. Cheers, Pasquale

This problem preoccupied many philosophers after Kant. Amongthe easiest to understand alternative view according to which thething-in-itself CAN be 'experienced' is that of Schopenhauer (have alook at section 18 onwards of volume one of The World as Will andRepresentation). However, sticking simply with Kant, it appears the two alternativepositions you propose ('experiencing the thing in itself', or 'accepton good faith') are not the only possibilities. Indeed, we might saythat these alternatives are pre-Kantian. For example, Hume is ofteninterpreted in this way. Kant's position is that experience is defined in terms ofappearances, and the notion of experiencing the thing-in-itself isself-contradictory. (There appears to be a difference between'thing-in-itself' and 'noumenon', but we'll pass over that.) On theother hand, what he calls appearances (reality) are precisely whatmost people would call 'actuality'. Appearances ARE 'independent' ofus, in any normal sense of that word. ...
Ethics
Literature

I have question about the ethics of life writing. What can I (or any other author for that matter) write in an autobiographical work? My life and my autobiography belong to me, so I should be able to decide what I reveal and how, but since they are so entwined with so many other lives, it seems as my autonomy is in conflict with the autonomies of the people in my life and my autobiography. For example: my girlfriend and I used to have a blog together (it’s closed now since we broke up some time ago) where we would write about very intimate things concerning our relationship and feelings and so on. We used nicknames to conceal our identity, so of all of the people who read the blog, only a handful of very close friends knew who were behind it. Although the blog is no longer available online, I have all the posts on my computer. It’s fairly obvious to me that I ought not to show any posts written by her to anyone, let alone reveal her identify to someone. But it’s not that obvious that I ought not to show...

A fascinating set of questions. Let me start by distinguishing atleast two: 1. the issue of 'entwined' lives and their relation toindividual autonomy. 2. The implications of this for 'ownership' ofautobiographies. The first of these is only a problem if we start with theassumption that everything that happens (in the human world) mustbelong to one and only one agent. As the saying goes, 'it takes twoto tango'. You wouldn't have been 'free' to write about arelationship if there hadn't been another person! You were, in asense, co-authors and co-owners of the events of the relationship. The second question is more difficult. In fact, I think theexample of the joint blog is not really appropriate. A blog is in thepublic domain, and is thus not a 'secret'. Your blog has been takendown but then the real moral issue is about respecting the wishes ofsomeone who has changed their mind, and not about my 'ownership' ofmy own life. A better example would be intimate secrets that werenever made...
Value

In our society, any modern way of making one's daily life easier is considered an advance. I am only fifteen, so I might not fully understand the importance of technology in our lives yet, but my question stands: If these advances ultimately have a consequence (an example being television, which may provide temporary distraction and entertainment, but in reality just distracts us from doing something more constructive), is it really an advance at all? My mind is in conflict because many of the examples I think of often have many pros as well as many cons. Is that the nature of advancement: with every move forward there is a risk of developing problems? ~Juliet

Very few things, if any at all, have value in an absolute sense.That is, not value for this or that purpose, or in this or thatcontext, but for any purpose or context. Some of the very fewcandidates that are sometimes suggested are the morally good, thejust, or the beautiful. A technological advancement, on the otherhand, would definitely be of value only for certain purposes/contexts and not in others. That's only to be expected. So, we use the term 'advancement' in at least two senses.First, in a very narrow sense to designate the ability to dosomething that wasn't previously possible. Second, in a broader sensein which a particular new ability has value in at least some purposesor contexts and that the inevitable areas in which there aredrawbacks are either not yet known or considered a small price topay. (When you mention the term 'risk', I take it that you arereferring to drawbacks that are not yet known, and which may make uschange our mind about whether something is an ...
Philosophers

Would Immanuel Kant oppose alternative rock? If we were to universalize the maxim "It is permissible to listen to alternative rock" then "alternative" rock would become mainstream, since everyone would listen to it. This of course creates a contradiction, implying we have a perfect duty not to listen to alternative rock. (I'm not trying to be silly. I think I've wildly misinterpreted Kant, and I was wondering if you could clear it up.) You might say that just because alt. rock was permitted, that doesn't mean everyone would listen to it. But if stealing was permitted, it doesn't logically follow that everyone would steal. (Same goes for lying.)

Very clever question. Maxims can fail to live up to the moral law in (at least) two ways. Either they are themselves impossible as universal laws; or they are impossible for us to consistently will to be moral laws. An example of the first type would be a rule such as ‘lie when it is in your best interest’. This is not universalisable at all. Lying only forms an advantage to you when the other person trusts you, and they would only trust you if they thought there was a strong possibility that you were not lying! Universal lying destroys trust, and thus makes lying itself impossible . An example of the second type would be ‘do not be charitable even to those in dire need’. This rule can be universalised in the sense that it is entirely possible that human nature should have been so constituted that charity was impossible. But, Kant claims, it is impossible for us consistently to will this state of affairs. We might find ourselves in dire need of help from others, and will the opposite. You cannot...
Ethics
Rationality

Do moral philosophers work like this: 1. I have a Wish to see a certain form of society. 2. I must now think of a Reason why everybody should work to create this form of society. 3. Got it! 4. In order to make my Reason compelling, I will now claim that the Reason pre-dates my Wish. 5. My Wish is now the product of the pre-existing Reason. 6. All persons of Reason will share my Wish and work to create the form of society designed by my Wish.

This is indeed the accusation thatNietzsche levels at moral philosophers: that they have culturally baseddesires (to acquire a form of power or influence over some othergroup) and that the reasoning comes afterwards. However, evenNietzsche doesn't accuse philosophers of doing this deliberately orconsciously (not surprisingly, since he doesn't hold much stock bywhat we in fact decide or become conscious of). On the other hand, a lot depends uponwhat the Reason is in your step 3. If the reason is philosophically compelling then itdoesn't matter at all whether it pre-dates the wish or not .Consider an analogy: scientist A hates scientist B. Scientist Bpublishes a paper putting forward hypothesis X. Scientist A devoutlywishes to demolish this hypothesis utterly , for no other reason thanto rub B's nose in it in front of their peers. A devises a proper experiment to test X,carries it out rigorously, finds that indeed X is false, andpublishes accordingly. Is that bad science? Well, A should...
Ethics

Hi, a friend of mine posited an interesting thought experiment (which may or may not be original) and it goes like this. A man's walking down the road when he gets shot at. The shooter misses but the sound of the shot startles the man so much that he jumps out of the way of an oncoming bus that would have most certainly killed him. The shooter runs away because he's afraid of drawing attention to himself. What is the moral judgement on this shooter who inadvertently saved a life while intending on taking it? What value is attached to morally 'good' actions motivated by 'bad' intentions? If the emphasis is not on an individual's inherent motivations, then I have another question which perhaps requires separate scrutiny to the first one but is related nonetheless: could colonialism ever be regarded as a moral act, given that it created several moral 'goods' (think of the abolition of widow immolation in India known as sati, or several brutal initiation ceremonies in tribal Africa) even though the...

Thought experiments of just this kindhave led many philosophers to reject consequentialism as the primarydetermination of ethical action, as I'm sure you are aware. However, even a die-hard consequentialist would likely conclude thatyour would-be assassin's action was reprehensible and had no othermoral value. Why? Because it only makes sense to talk about theconsequences of an action having moral value (or not) if they couldhave been predicted at the time. Without predictability (though ofcourse never rock solid), consequentialism would be useless as amoral compass. Therefore, unpredicted consequences are fortuitous ,but it's not meaningful to call them 'moral'. Thus also we condemnsomeone who causes harm through carelessness, claiming that he couldand should have foreseen the consequences; but we also leave room forpure accidents. Notice, however, that this is quitedifferent from saying that 'bad' intentions might have 'good'consequences. Suppose, for example, in my role as emperor of theworld,...
Justice

Recently in politics the word 'elitist' has been used in bad connotations; as if it is bad to be elite. Why shouldn't our leaders be elitists?

An interesting question. The word comesfrom 'elite', obviously, and ultimately from Latin by way of French;originally it meant the 'chosen' or 'elected'. So, in a democracy(and for the purposes of this answer I'll assume that's the positionwe are concerned with) our leaders are indeed the 'elite', andinsofar as we think there should be elections and that the winner ofthe election should be the new leader, all voters are 'elitist'! But that is disingenuous, because thatoriginal meaning would have had little to do with our modern sense ofdemocracy. Instead, the original meaning would have referred to thoseof high social rank (who were elected by fate, perhaps, to play thathigh born role), or those ministers of state who were favoured by theking, or a figure like the Pope who is (ultimately though indirectly)chosen by God. In fact, it was the transition to democratic modes ofgovernment in recent centuries that gave the word 'elite' a tarnishedreputation. The 'elite' were precisely those NOT chosen by...
Music

Recently I've had trouble comprehending the idea of a divide between music and noise. I was wondering, are noise and music one and the same? To compose something with the intention that it be noise music seems paradoxical to me, since music and noise seem to be two opposite ends on the line of 'sound'. Yet there exists noise music and even freeform jazz, with completely random notes and seemingly no structure at all. Is this still music? It seems to me that music is a form of art, and art is expression - so there is no reason really why this kind of noise shouldn't be classed as music, since it is the artists intention that it is music, even if its just random noise being recorded. I'm having real trouble understanding whether this is an actual problem or not. It seems to me there shouldn't exist any kind of boundaries in music (and so no boundaries between music and noise?), yet I am reluctant (for some intuitive reason perhaps?) to acknowledge these noise projects as forms of music. Thanks for your...

A similar question has already been asked. Have a look at: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/729 It seems to me that 'music' and 'noise' are being used in twodifferent senses here. First, an 'objective' sense, as types ofthings whose properties can be enumerated. Second, as values: 'I likethis', 'this is important', 'this is what music should be' and soforth. Here as in so many cases, distinguishing these senses andkeeping them separate is very difficult, perhaps impossible. It may be possible to give a fully objective description of sometypes of noise (e.g. 'white noise') but otherwise the term is appliedin a value-laden fashion: what is noise to one person is joyfullyraucous to another; even to the same person at a different time.Moreover, music is not a thing, it is a cultural production and a culturalreception, and any definition will have to rely upon cultural normsand histories. So, a piece of contemporary music that appears asnoise at first may 'resolve' itself into something...

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