Strange, isn't it? Maybe the key is to appreciate that not all "containment" or things with an inside are physical or spatial. So we might talk about how a theory of justice should contain or include an account of property rights or a theory of what the mind is should contain an account of the origin of mind. And we might talk about what is inside or included in a concept or theory we might even speak of trying to get inside someone else's mind --which (I hope) is not a literal matter but a metaphorical way of speaking about understanding someone else's thoughts and feelings! Pointing out that we use the language of "containment" and "Inside" in nonphysical, non-spatial contexts may make things seem more mysterious than ever! But perhaps we need to appreciate that our language and ways of thinking about ourselves invovles more than speaking of concrete spatial things that contain things, like the way our brain is contained in our head!

Interesting question! There are philosophers who would seek to undermine the whole picture of ourselves that is presupposed by your question. Some of them argue that we do make direct contact with the objects we touch, feel, smell, hear, and taste and that the idea that we only directly deal with sensations (or what is sometimes called "sense-data") is an illusion brought on by people like Descartes or, in the 20th century, by Bertrand Russell or A.J. Ayer. But I am inclined to think we do not directly feel and see what is around us; while I think we do (under normal circumstances) relaibly see and feel "what is really out there" this is mediated (in my view) by sensations, our visual field and so on. On this view, skepticism of an even very radical sort is conceivable. It is logically possible (I suggest) for the movie the Matrix to be right; we merely think we see what is really there, but we are being manipulated by complex computers to have the sensations we are having. One other matter...

Great question! In the dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates offers reasons why the girls (if you are right that all girls prefer verbal communication) may be right. Among other things, Socrates proposed that verbal, in-person communication is superior to writing for it is less subject to misunderstanding. One can, on the spot, correct misleading communication, and one can also retain the ability to revise one's position in the here and now. Socrates thought that writing things down, in contast, is akin to abandoning your speech. Still, even if Socrates is right about this, we would not know his position unless his observations were written down (asssuming that a reliable oral tradition going back to 399 BCE would be a bit unlikely) and there is often (though not always) a clarity and endurance in written communication. In reply to your question, I suggest, instead, not that there is no difference between written and verabal communication; each has its virtues and vices. If you want a record, I would go...

What an interesting situation, perhaps one that is unique, given the advance in technology. In a less technological age, when you had to tap phones or literally follow someone around to observe them, the line between respectful and disrespectful behavior might be clearer. Still, even in cases when a person might use stealth and covertly or even openly follow someone in public, so long as this was not done in a fashion that suggests a threat, the "stalker" may not be breaking any clear moral (or legal) codes. The idea is that when you go out in public, you more or less waive your right to privacy (the right not to be observed, in particular). But when it comes to the internet, it seems that you are only using sites and getting information and pictures that are licit or that people have themselves made public, and thus you are not breaking any privacy rules. So, let's imagine that you never use the information and pictures for any untoward ends (blackmail, extortion, harrasment, voyeurism....) and so...

Actually Emerson sort of beat Nietzsche to the punch on one point. Nietzsche is famous for having proclaimed "God is dead," but Emerson came up with that line earlier. You are right that Emerson is not on everyone's list as an outstanding philosopher, though I bet that any anthology of American philosophy will include some of his work --probably his essay "Nature." Some philosophers have given him close attention. such as Stanley Cavell of Harvard University (incidently, the building that houses the philosophy department at Harvard is named after Emerson, Emerson Hall). I suspect that he has not had more influence due to the obscurity of some of his work (his transcendental idealism is very difficult to cleary state and assess) and the simplicity of his other work. By the latter, I am not being negative. Some of hessays like "The American Scholar" are simple but brilliant --that essay is a compelling statement of what it is to think independently and to give primacy to experience over against...

Good question! First, it must be said that sometimes aesthetic considerations seem to be quite positive scientifically, at least according to books like The Elegant Univers by Brian Greene: "In physics, as in art, symmetry is a key part of aesthetics." In the International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Eligan has argued that "Aesthetic devices are integral to science." And there have been various claims about how Einstein, Pincare, Heisenberg, Weyl, have been led by aesthetic considerations. On that, check out Truth and Beauty by Chandrasekhar. When you look at what is meant by "aesthetics" in this literature it sometimes refers to symmetry, simplicity, harmony, order, consistency, economy, unity, elegance, beauty... I suppose one way to answer your question is that aesthetics can lead to bad science if the sense of the beauty of a theory is somehow misplaced or there is (what we might think of later as an ugly) ignoring of evidence for the sake of a simplicity that is inadequate to the task...

Great questions that have vexed many philosophers who have reflected on parenthood and debts of gratitude. Some philosophers (perhaps most famously John Locke) worked historically to limit the control of parents over children. Locke opposed what may be called patriarchalism and a tradition, that goes back at least to Roman times, that a parent (especially a father) could, by virtue of being a parent, exercise tremendous power (in ancient times this included the power of life and death) over the child. This seems to have been built on what you are calling a structual component (you created the child, therefore you have power over him or her) and this could back up claims on the child to demonstrate family loyalty. Behind Plato's dialogue the Euthyphro there is a hint that Socrates himself may have thought that a child should honor his father. (In the dialogue, Socrates challenges a man intent on prosecuting his father.) In any case, I suggest that there may be a prima facie debt of gratitude...

Great question. Some philospohers have been quite firm that thought cannot exist without language, but this has always struck me as quite implausable. One problem is that it is hard to know how one might even begin to learn a language unless you had thoughts. But the case you raise is another reason to be suspicious of such a linguistic account of thought. There might be a middle position, however, in which one recognizes that in expressing thoughts in language we can achieve greater clarity; a poem may help crystalize in sharper terms what had, until you read the poem, only been vague hunches. Your language even suggests this, for the poem seems to be something more concrete than "thoughts ...that had been floating in" your mind. Good wishes! CT

Great set of questions. In any community (whether on the job or in a family) it can feel quite unfair if one party is having to do all the work or at least more work to understand the other person's point of view (using more empathy, imagination, listening more). Ideally, one expects that each party will be equally open to being persuaded by the other. Actually, political philosphers today are spending quite a bit of time on this topic. For example, this is Joshua Cohen's description of ideal deliberation: "Ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensu -to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals." I suppose you are not equals with the "boss" but Cohen would probably argue that from the point of view of fair deliberation, one should be on an equal footing even if (at the very end) the boss decides on (for example) what policy should be followed. For further technical work...

I am a little confused by the last question --the fault is mine, I am sure, but let me have a go at what you have written. Some philosophers have been and are skeptical about the objective status of ethics. Probably a philosopher like J.L. Mackie who wrote a book called Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (approximate title) might think that ethics is indeed very much unlike deliberating about (for example) how to get to Yellowtone Park from New York City. Though I suppose if Mackie was highly skeptical about sense perception and genuinely doubted whether anyone could say Yellowstone Park exists, he might think ethics and geography are in the same boat! In any case, those of us who are not skeptical of perception and ethics might question what you advance as a disanalogy. So, in the case you cite, a moral philosopher may argue that the man should break off his affair on the grounds that it breaks a vow he has made or it involves wrongul deception or it dishonors his marriage and family and the...