Perhaps one might well claim that one has to have some prior experience ("experience" being broader than "perception") in order to have memory. One might remember prior thoughts, abstract propositions or a sensation rather than a full perception. Memory seems (by definition) to be about the past (I cannot remember the future, though I can remember that I believe or know that something will occur in the future) and so if there is no experience in the past to recall, it is hard to see how one might have any memory at all. In this sense, memory appears to be a dependent cognitive power --it depends on the exercise of other cognitive powers. I suppose someone might claim that they remember remembering, but this begs us to ask the question: remember remembering what? While that is my proposal (one needs prior experience in order for memory to function), the issues can be stretched a bit... Imagine God or some super-scientist made a creature (Skippy) on Monday at noon full of ostensible memories of a...

Good question. I think there is considerable influence: Heidegger's notions of contingency, authenticity, death, our "thrownness" into being, the importance of time or temporality in our identity, are all in play in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. In my view, there is something magisterial about both books (S's Being and Nothingness and H's Being and Time) and H's Being and Time has received the most attention, and yet Sartre's work contains more arguments to engage and colorful thought experiments (perhaps reflecting his novelistic ability) that invite engagement. I think it is also an interesting question to consider to what extent Simone de Beauvoir's (Sartre's partner) thought influenced Sartre. I suggest that her influence on Sartre has been quite underestimated. Good wishes in your further reading!

The Latin for the term is: ceteris paribus. When a philosopher is articulating a thought experiment, she may use the expression 'all things being equal' or 'other things being equal' / ceteris paribus, to put aside extraneous factors not essential to the thought experiment. So, to take a simple example, imagine a philosopher is developing an argument from analogy for the conclusion that it is permissible for a nation to launch a preemptive attack against a nation that is threatening it. She might ask you to imagine the following: you are an innocent person and you are alarmed by the sight of someone you believe has assaulted and killed another innocent person drawing a gun and he appears to be getting ready to shoot you. Under these circumstances, when there are no police around and there is not time to run away or attempt to verbally confront the apparent assailant, wouldn't it be permissible for you to harm or perhaps even kill the person on grounds of self-defense? Why should you be compelled...

Terrific question(s). You may indeed begin studying philosophy with questions. Kant once observed that there were three foundational questions: what can I know? What should I do? What may I hope for? But you can expand these to include: who or what am I? What is the meaning of life? What is the best form of government? Do I have duties of gratitude to my parents? When (if ever) is it justified to go to war? and so on. And if we follow the practice of Aristotle, one good way to begin reflecting on these questions is first to consider how others have tried to answer such questions, and then begin working out which answer you are drawn to and why. Probably the best historian of philosophy by a living philosopher is Anthony Kenney. You can do a search on Amazon for either his single volume history of philosophy or his multi-volume undertaking. If you would prefer not to undertake an historical approach, an easy introduction to the practice of philosophy is T.V. Morris's Philosophy for Dummies. ...

I really appreciate your recognition of the significance of philosophical questions! As I was the panelist that responded to the earlier posting, I thought I might take a shot at replying to your question and observations. There are a few issues in play: there is first the question of what it means to solve or successfully answer a philosophical question; then there is a question about consensus. On the first point, I think that if we take your question, 'Is morality objective?' many philosophers, but not all, would say yes, and appeal to many considerations to bolster their response (they may, like me, appeal to experience, as in a phenomenological approach to ethics, or they may argue that those who deny the objectivity of morality are, if consistent, must deny the objective normativity of reason, and are thus in danger of undermining the authority of reason itself, etc). I am inclined to think that success does not require the consensus of all reasonable people. So, while I fully grant that...

You are on to a puzzle or problem that has vexed some philosophers at least going back to Plato. In some of the Platonic dialogues it is proposed that art (like theatre) is an imitation of life, and that if something is evil in life (like a mother killing her children) there is something evil or not good about imitating it or acting it out as one would in the play Medea. From that point of view, acting out murder (but using only fantasy violence, viz. no one is physically killed) would not itself be good (and a traditional Platonist might even call it evil or murderous). But (after Aristotle and much history) we seem to have moved beyond Plato and enjoy theatre, films, novels that depict horrific evils. I personally am drawn to a middle ground. Let's say the LARP ing includes evil and good knights, wizards, and so on, and we wind up with epic battles akin the one that occurs at the end of The Hobbit. Off hand, this seems no more objectionable than performing Hamlet. But imagine the LARP ing...

Before replying directly to your question, I suggest that what you are expressing is itself a philosophy. It seems to me that you are probably a sceptic (which is a philosophy, in fact there are several schools or types of skeptics) about the ability of persons to engage in the traditional topics of philosophy (metaphysics, ethics, and so on), and you will find some resonance (I suspect) with some of the ancient philosophers like Pyrrho. Sextus Empiricus or Protagoras might also be of interest. But on second thought, your comments about sticking with "what is real" versus "mostly specious rationalized imagination and raw speculation" sounds as though you are NOT a skeptic about what might be called "common sense" and so while Pyrrho may be good in terms of being skeptical about what philosophers try to inquire about the concept of infinity (your example), he may be too overly skeptical for your taste (too much danger of "smoke and mirrors"). There is a school of what is sometimes called "common...

When someone does use a highly selective set of examples to support their conclusion (Wittgenstein referred to this as a matter of relying on too narrow a diet of examples) a person might be begging the question --which, technically, is assuming the very thesis you are seeking to support or prove. But probably the informal fallacy you may be looking for is simply called a hasty generalization: e.g. reaching a conclusion inductively on the basis of too few cases, as when I might observe a dozen white swans and draw the conclusion that 'All swains are white,' notwithstanding the fact that some swans are black. As an aside, I think that the term 'begging the question' is now used (at least by most of my students) not in its technical, prior use (here is the St. Martin's Dictionary of Philosophy definition: "The procedure of taking for granted in a statement or argument, precisely what is in dispute"). Many students seem to use it to mean that an event / statement / argument calls for questioning, as in:...

I think it would be tough to identify "the" philosophical response --as there have been many. Probably the most effective reply (in my view) is Max Scheler's (1874-1928) book Ressentiment in which he argues for the positive content of an ethic of compassion for the vulnerable and exposes some of the troubling consequences of Nietzsche's more aristocratic valorization of strength. When I began this reply by questioning whether there is "the" (singular) response to Nietzsche I may have been a little hasty. What I mean is that there are many alternative ethical systems (ranging from utilitarianism and Kantianism to the Christian ethic Nietzsche attacks in Beyond Good and Evil and elsewhere), but there is a general philosophical tendency not to discount a theory because of its origin. Imagine Nietzsche published his will to power philosophy, not because he believed it, but to win a bet with Wagner or Mary Wollstoncraft was actually into patriarchal governance --even so, we would have to assess N's work on...

We would add just a tad to the earlier respondent: Downloading without consent or payment would still involve disrespect of the filmmaker, artist, and so on. Also, the question itself suggests you really do want the object you have downloaded --otherwise downloading wouldn't come up as a question. You also say would "not buy the movie in any case," but if there was no other way of viewing the movie, would you still come to the same conclusion that you have. CT and his friend and consultant TJ Hagen