Do philosophers consider psychology to be a science? If not, do they think philosophy should inform personal life values or psychiatric treatment?

Interesting question! The field of psychology emerged in the 19th and early 20th century as a science; at least the early self-described psychologists first described themselves as developing a science of the mind, and later changed this to the science of behavior. In any case, I suggest that whether psychology is a science, it is difficult to avoid philosophy when addressing one's personal life or engaged in psychiatric treatment. Presumably, one's personal life will include some kind of philosophy of values or some ideas about what is good and healthy, bad and ill, what is kind or cruel, and so on. Some of the therapeutic communities I know in which persons seek recovery from mental illness involve a philosophy of health, responsibility, and care (see for example, Spring Lake Ranch in Vermont). They do not employ a philosophy course from Plato to Nato, but much of the dialogue is about wellbeing, the value of community, and living a philosophy of mutual respect.

Does intelligence imply obligation? That is, if you can understand a situation better than other people, or have a generally higher aptitude for solving problems, are you obligated to use that capacity to better help society? Are you held to a higher moral standard, say where crime (or harmful behavior) is concerned, if you have a demonstrably greater grasp of the values in play; are you more responsible to consider long-term consequences because you can anticipate them better? I'd be curious to know which, if any, philosophers addressed these sorts of questions historically.

Very good question! Those philosophers in the utilitarian tradition tend to think that such a gifted person ought to apply her intelligence in such matters if that would be the maximal way in which she might bring about the greatest happiness. Formally, what is called 'act utilitarianism' is the view that an agent should do that act of which there is no other act that will produce greater utility (or happiness). A Marxist approach to social roles (in which persons are assigned roles in accord with their abilities) would probably also deem the gifted person degenerate if she failed to help her comrades. Philosophers who are in some religious traditions would also contend that one should use one's talents in ways that maximally benefits others. Christians, for example, offer a Good Samaritan ethic that obliges us to help the vulnerable. In that tradition, though, it is sometimes thought there is a difference between ordinary obligations, and the precepts of perfection. Ordinary virtue may...

Hi, I don't know if you can help me, by here goes anyway. What does it mean to be Disturbed by Beauty. Can a philosopher answer this, or would I be better off asking a shrink, priest or mystic? Kind regards Pasquale

An interesting question! The phrase "Disturbed by Beauty" is not a common one in philosophy or aesthetics (that branch of philosophy that addresses beauty and ugliness as well as philosophy of art) and philosophy in the modern era has been somewhat skeptical about beauty. BUT there have been some important positive contributions about beauty in the past 50 years. Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of the Good makes a strong case for the role of beauty in challenging our tendencies to egotism and self-interest. In a sense, she argued that the experience of beauty (one of her examples is noticing the beauty of a kestral, a stunning bird) can disturb our self-absorbed daily routines. Elaine Scarry's book On Beauty is a more recent argument for the important role of beauty in our values and the way we live. There is a strong romantic tradition that contends that our experience of beauty in the world can be an important step in our becoming mature lovers of wisdom... This is present in the...

Is freedom of speech distinct from freedom of behavior? For example, is burning the Bill of Rights distinct from calling for the revocation of the freedom from unjust imprisonment?

Excellent question. The right to freedom of speech has been used to defend what used to be illegal acts (burning an American flag). But the two are certainly distinguishable. So, burning a copy of the Bill of Rights may be highly dangerous in a building full of petroleum containers or in a crowded elevator. Also, speech may be easier to interpret than behavior. If you call for the revocation of the freedom from unjust punishment, your conviction seems pretty clear. But if we see you burning a copy of the Bill of Rights, your views may be less clear: You might not know what you are burning. You might be cold and the copy of the Bill of Rights is the only paper available for you to light a fire to be warm. You also might simply like to burn things, whereas it would be highly unusual for someone to say in public 'Let us revoke our right to be free from unjust punishment" unless they honestly desired such a revocation (assuming the "speech act" was not part of a film script or artistic 'happening'...

I'm currently reading Simon Blackburn's "Think", in which he claims to use metaphysics to all but explain away the idea of Cartesian dualism. He claims that if it were true that the mind is distinct from the body, that it would create the possibility for "zombies" to exist who function just like us, but without a consciousness, and for "mutants" to exist, who have different mental responses to stimuli than most people. Because he believes that both of these conclusions are ridiculous, he rules out substance dualism. However, I don't see how the idea that the mind is not contained inside of the brain necessarily makes either of those options possible. As to the zombie theory, just because the two components of mind and body lie in different realms, it doesn't seem to make it necessarily true that the body would be able to function without the mind. The two could be separate but still rely upon each other in order to function. For the mutant idea, I don't see how that would be any less possible if the...

You raise excellent points. Blackburn is probably assuming Descartes' concept of what it is to be an individual substance which is, roughly, if S is a substance it may exist without other substances --or, as Descartes adjusted this concept, S is a substance if God can create and sustain A without creating and sustaining other substances. So if mind is a substance, it can exist without its body and vice versa. A zombie would be the body without a mind. HOWEVER, you raise excellent points. It may be that mind and body are distinct but the two cannot exist independently. Certain properties may be distinct but it is necessarily true that one cannot exist without the other: being the smallest perfect number and being the successor of five are distinct but it is necessarily the case that if one is instantiated (there is the number 6) the other is instantiated. Your counter-example is also good, I think. I believe it is also worth challenging whether the idea of a zombie is incoherent. B.F. ...
Law

Suppose you have been wrongly accused of murder. You know you are innocent but you also know that the states attorney believes you are guilty. The attorney offers you 25 years if you plead guilty but If you go to trial you will be executed if you are found guilty. You are unsure of your chances of winning the case so to prevent the possibility of death you accept the plea. Does the fact that you chose the plea bargain mean that you acknowledge that it is better to have a plea bargain than not have a plea bargain? If it is better for you to have it than not have it then does that mean that someone who would consider such a plea bargain to be coercion is wrong?

Great question! I suggest that if you do take the plea bargain and you think that your action was prudent and permissible (under the circumstances), then you are implicitly committed to think that others who are in a similar situation would also be prudent and doing something permissible if they did the same. But your taking the bargain is compatible with you thinking that the choice you were given (either take a bargain which involves you taking responsibility for a crime you did not commit or face execution) was itself the result of a grave, profound wrong. In your description of the case you do not stipulate whether the attorney's belief in your guilt is reasonable (there is some evidence you did the crime and, while it is false that you are the murderer most reasonable people would believe you are the killer based on the evidence). If the attorney truly and reasonably thinks you are guilty, the choice he gives you is tragic and wrong but it was based on (let us imagine) the attorney's best...

What defines a individual? What makes someone who they are?

What a difficult question! I believe (but could be wrong) that you are asking a question in terms of meaning, social significance, psychology, perhaps raising an ethical matter... There are two broad, distinct views to consider: one views individual persons as part of greater wholes --either in terms of societies, tribes, families, the state or the collective, perhaps a religious community or tradition. Another views the individual in terms that are very much anchored on a person's own values, desires, beliefs, action. So, the first is a kind of external point of view: how is the individual seen or should be seen in a larger context...while the latter is more internal. I suggest that a reasonable position would take the middle ground. An extreme internal position would seem to be close to absurdity: if I think I am a great musical, athletic egg, it is probably reasonable to think I am delusional. And an extreme external position would seem to be very dangerous. In some forms of Marxism, for...

Does justice necessarily have to be equality?

Interesting! In certain respects, when treating persons in terms of criminal justice, most of us believe that persons should not be given unfair, special treatment because of wealth, gender, ethnicity, family, and so on.... And in many areas, we assume that, in a just society, identical or similar cases should be treated equally. If you and I both earn the same amount of money from the same job and our conditions are similar (that is, it is not the case that, say, I am childless but you are supporting three children), we naturally expect that what we pay in taxes should be the same (or equal). But in a just society, there still may be inequalities in different areas: not all members of a society will be equally healthy or strong, equally intelligent, equally loved by care-givers, you may receive massive attention by fashion magazines because of your irresistible smile, while I get no attention at all, and so on. One way to make progress here would be to think in terms of justice as fairness. ...

I would like to have some non-theistic response from you about the value of life. (I don't know if people asking about the "meaning of life" are asking what I want to ask, but I'll try to be specific.) One thing is the value of other people's lives. I am not concerned about this: I'm pretty sure that homicide is a terrible crime even in the cases I will mention next. A different thing is the value of one's own life (the value of life for the person living it). Of course, many people have good, rewarding, happy lives. Such lives are very valuable. But many other people have no such lives. I would like you to consider two cases. The first case is that of very ill and depressed people, continuously and permanently suffering with their illnesses, or that of incarcerated people, tortured from time to time, without any hope of getting out of their suffering: I mean people who will commit suicide if they have the courage and the chance to. I think that those lives have no value and that, for instance, if we...

From an entirely secular point of view, plus some simple ethical assumptions that seem quite convincing (suffering illness, incarceration...are bad), plus a strong principle of respecting persons' choices (imagine the persons suffering would take their own lives if they could or they are actually asking others to assist them in committing suicide) it seems one can recognize cases when life has ceased to be of value to those suffering and one may well be sympathetic with providing (for example) a way that the prisoner could, if he chose, take his own life (imagine being able to get the prisoner a pill that would bring about an instantaneous, painless death, hence putting an end to the torture). BUT, even in such cases it may be that simply BEING ALIVE is a good, whether or not this is welcomed or valued by the person who is alive. It is hard to think of a compelling argument that life itself is and should be valued, quite apart from suffering and so on. Speaking personally, whether or not I am...

Is pragmatic truth inherently less valid than other forms of truth? If a Hindu believes in the truth that Vishnu exists and a Muslim does not, how could they both be right? I don't know how to word this, but are the correspondence and epistemic theories of truth the most "true?"

This is a complicated matter. Realist views of truth, including versions of the correspondence theory, hold that reality cannot or should not be split into different venues in which, say, Vishnu exists and is divine for one person, but not for another. Realists, then, hold that if Allah exists, then it is false to claim that Allah does not exist. The term "pragmatic truth" is a little puzzling to me, but perhaps what you are getting at is the idea that matters of what we call "truth" may be treated in terms of justification. So, for Saladon to claim that there is no God but Allah and Mohammad is his prophet, is to claim that he is justified in making such a claim. I suggest, though, that such justification or epistemic theories of truth are themselves pretty hard to justify (and, hence, on its own assumptions, a justification theory of truth might not be true because it is not justified). There may be one other angle to consider. Some apparent disagreements may not be radical. Consider a dispute...

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