Great question! It might mean different things in different contexts! When a firefighter tells you this after rescuing you, she is probably trying to prevent you from thinking she is the new love in your life. "It's all part of the job" sort of thing. In the context of philosophy, the expression probably comes up when one philosopher is criticizing another. Aristotle says something like he has loyalty to Plato (his teacher for 20 years) but he loves truth more. He might have said: "Plato. My not accepting your theory of ideas and the soul is not personal." I suppose the expression conveys (on occasion) that mutual affection, even close friendship, is not a guarantee of agreement or loyalty to the views and arguments at issue. In that sense, while the expression may not "mollify" it might be intended to convey the message that disagreement does not mean personal disrespect or (even) lack of love for the persons involved. Still, I am drawn to the (at least general) idea that philosophers should...

The way you set up the question is quite interesting. While you are right (as J points out), one reason to think that the "home wrecking" is wrong would be foreseeable suffering, but this would seem to be not the strongest reason because (as you point out) the "home wrecking" might actually produce a net gain in happiness even if J suffers quite a bit from the loss. I suggest that the stronger reason for A not to pursue the breakdown of the marriage is that marriage itself consists of mutual promises (vows) between two persons to be steadfast in their loyalty / faith to each other. In most cases, this is probably a vow for life-long fidelity in terms of sexuality -- but also in terms of the primacy of allegiance in a couple constituting a family, even if only two are the family with no children. Assuming that the marriage vow is for life-long fidelity, the third party "A" really is the outsider and is launching an external (intentional?) challenge (J would probably see it as an assault) on the vow...

Great question! I suggest that Mary did not (unknowingly) harm John, given the case as described. One reason for thinking this is not a harm is a kind of slippery slope line of reasoning. If John is harmed by the rescue of his aunt, many, many people are being harmed right now when their benefactors are enabled to live. You have singled out John as facing a timely opportunity (without the money this week, the farm of his dreams slips through his fingers), but I suspect that my nephews and nieces would really like their inheritance from me right now for all kinds of reasons and, while I hope they actually love me and would prefer I lived a while longer, I think it would be (at least) odd for them to believe they were harmed when I narrowly escaped death from a drunk driver car accident. Actually, come to think of it, I can imagine my nephew and niece thinking "if only that bloke had driven a little faster, we would have the funds we want from Uncle Charles's estate' so maybe this is not so odd. But ...

There can be a paradox here: imagine Mr. A vows he will not go through a door unless Miss B goes first, and Miss B vows she will not go through the door unless Mr. B goes first. Sadly, they may be in a fix, unless the two of them fall prey to optical illusions or somehow wrongly come to believe that the other has slipped through the door first and the way is clear for them. But in your case of A and B altruism, I am not sure the problem is arresting: imagine that A gives primacy to B and so goes and prepares lunch for her, whereas B gives primacy to A and prepares lunch for him. In this case, perhaps they both enjoy lunch (especially if they both believe it would be showing respect to the other to eat together --Mr. A might enjoy his lunch out of consideration for Miss B, while Miss. B would enjoy her lunch for the sake of Mr. A). I wonder whether your case might raise a question about the alternatives you have set up. You seem to give us two choices: either put another person first or be self...

Not an easy question to address. "Moral questions" might refer to questions about a particular act (is it morally permissible for you to buy a cup of coffee when that money might go to Oxfam and save a life) or a general practice or an institution. Moral questions might also include general questions about an overall moral or ethical theory. I suggest that in questioning the moral status of something, it is difficult to avoid some philosophy of values, even if this is not being explicitly invoked or applied. Even when employing historical and scientific methods in addressing the moral status of some state of affairs, some philosophy will be (or so I suggest) at work, even if this principally involves the philosophy of inquiry itself.

I am not entirely clear about the question, exactly. If "philosophical ethics"means ethics (either ethical theories or specific ethical positions) that are supported by philosophical theories or reasons, then many such theories and reasons may be consistent with different religious beliefs and practices. For example, Christian philosophers have adopted or worked with utilitarianism (some of the first utilitarians in modern philosophy were theists, pre-dating Jeremy Bentham), Kantians; they have advocated natural law, intuitionism, moral particularism, and so on. You might have in mind, however, ethical positions that are advocated by particular kinds of philosophers such as those who are deeply committed to secularism. In such a case, a Christian philosopher like John Hare (currently at Yale University) who defends a divine command theory of ethics (defended also by C. Stephen Evans, Baylor University) is not at all going to be compatible with the moral theory of non-theists (atheists or agnostics),...

Great question about a paradoxical matter. In ordinary cases, if I stole something it does not become my property in the sense that I have rightful ownership of it; I may have it as a possession (something I possess) but I lack possessory rights to exclude others from taking it or being compensated if someone takes it without my consent. So, when someone sets out to take it from me, they are not involved in a classic case of robbery --they are, instead, perpetuating the alienation of the thing stolen from the (presumably) proper, original ownership. So, if I steal your boat, and someone (Jones) then takes the boat from me I do not have a right to claim damages and compel Jones (legally or morally) to return it to me, but you retain the right to blame both myself and Jones for the original and then perpetuation of the theft. There might be an odd case to consider: what if I stole your boat and you (as it were) stole it back? I would say that was not a case of your stealing from me; it was, rather, ...

Excellent and highly relevant to some contemporary debates. A very minor first point, something might be immoral (for example, kicking dogs) even if dogs are not persons (though I admit that I think of my dog Pip as a "someone). Those in what is traditionally described as liberal political theory (e.g. John Stuart Mill) give more latitude for self-harm than what is traditionally thought of as conservative (e.g. Edmund Burke). When liberals seek to interfere with persons involved with self-harm (those who seek to commit suicide or engage in high risk acts), they sometimes appeal the ways in which the self-harm might be motivated by mental illness or some other impairment (e.g. Johny does not *really* want to harm himself, he just wants attention). I suggest that many of the reasons why we think we should not harm others, applies to our own case. I should not lie to others, for example, and, similarly, I should also not lie to myself (except under outrageous conditions). Your second question goes...

Insulting a person may be morally wrong --when, for example, the insult is based on racist or sexist stereotyping or the insult is designed to shame a perfectly innocent person into doing something awful or the insult is aimed at a fragile person such as a defenseless child. But we also sometimes think of insults as matters of rudeness and manners. Someone may act in an insulting manner at a restaurant by shouting at a waiter; often this seems a matter of simply being rude or insensitive rather than a matter of serious wrong-doing. Still, I am of the mind that how we treat each other in these social matters does reveal or reflect something of our character. It may be that an evil person can be quite polite at restaurants, but when a person is truly rude to others in social settings, I think we are all not surprised when we learn that they engage in wrongdoing when things really matter.

Typically, a libertarian (in the domain of politics; "libertarian" is also the label for someone who adopts a view in philosophy of mind or action theory involving free will) is someone who believes that societies should have a government that is the smallest possible in order to protect certain basis rights (perhaps a proper government should, on the grounds that persons have the right to life, prohibit murder and seek to prevent it). A libertarian might (on rare occasions) support some publicly funded health care, but he or she would (ideally) like such matters to be funded by individuals voluntarily by the individuals themselves. So, what about libertarians and suicide? If the libertarian believes that a minimal government should prohibit and prevent murder and she believes that suicide is wrong because it is a case of self-murder, then she may consistently support the government's prohibition and prevention of suicide. However, she may be "opposing suicide on" different moral grounds, e.g. she...