Do we have a duty to resolve contradictions within our own thoughts and opinions? For example, does a person who thinks killing animals is very wrong, but who has no qualms eating meat, need to revise one opinion or the other? What about someone who doesn't really believe in a god, yet insists on worshipping one and arguing for its existence? Or is it our choice to live with contradictions as we choose?

I would like to add a couple of further considerations to Douglas Burnham's response. I there is too much inconsistency between what a person professes to believe and what that person does, we have reason to doubt that she really believes what she says she does. If a friend claims to believe that killing animals is seriously wrong, yet continues to eat meat with no qualms whatsoever, I will doubt the sincerity of her belief; I will suspect that her professed 'belief' is merely a popular thing to say in certain contexts, or that it is merely an expression of the repulsion that she feels when she imagines certain scenes. Likewise, if a person professes to be an atheist but regularly and earnestly worships god, I will doubt his claim to be an atheist. If there is too much inconsistency between your beliefs one day and your beliefs the next, or your beliefs in one context and your beliefs in another, people will have a hard time relating to you as a single person and you will have a hard time...

I believe it would be wrong, in normal circumstances, to break a promise made to someone who died meanwhile, even if no one will benefit from the keeping of the promise. I also believe that, if keeping the promise would cause great damage to someone (to the promisor or to somebody else), it would be right not to keep it (it could even be wrong to keep it). Now, where should we draw the line between the two kinds of circumstances? If the promisee were alive, we could compare his damage to the damage of somebody else, but, since he/she is dead, to what should we compare the damage caused by keeping the promise?

In deciding whether or not to keep a promise made to someone who has died, I would ask the following question: Would that person have wanted you to keep the promise even after he or she died? Some promises are specifically about what one is to do after a death ("Promise me that you will send money to my daughter") while others are clearly irrelevant after a death ("Promise me that you will come to the beach this weekend"). With other promises ("Promise that you won't loan her any money"), the answer to this question is not so clear cut, but IF the promisee would have wanted you to keep the promise, that should count as a reason to keep the promise. As you say, there are cases where the costs of keeping a promise outweigh one's obligation to keep that promise. These could be thought of as cases of competing duties (to uphold a promise versus to save a life, for example) or they could be thought of as qualifications implicit to the promise itself (as understood by both the promiser and the...

I am HIV positive. Is it wrong for me to sleep with an HIV negative person if he knows the risk and wants to take it anyway?

One question to consider is whether the willing lover is making a sufficiently thoughtful and informed decision -- enough for it to count as mature, informed consent. We do not usually think of a teenager, or a drug addict, or someone in a rage as capable of mature, informed consent. Have you and your potential lover discussed the risks in detail, more than once, and at times of emotional calm? From what you have said, I can't tell whether you are considering 'safe' sex or 'unsafe' sex. The risks of safe sex are so much lower than the risks of unsafe sex, it is hard to imagine that it could ever be rational to engage in unsafe sex with someone who is HIV positive. Finally, and most importantly perhaps, you have some responsibility for the outcome of your actions -- even if your partner has offered mature, informed consent. It is not just he, but also you, who would be risking his life for the sake of sex. How would you feel if he contracted HIV as a result of your actions?

Is my body my property? Or is it not property at all?

If I am my body, then my body can't be my property because then there will be no distinction between owner and owned. But even if I am a different sort of thing than my body yet can't exist apart from my body, then some usual notions of property as that which I have a right to sell or exchange cannot apply in this case. I can exist without certain parts of my body, however, and it recognizing a right to sell or exchange such parts is not incoherent. Still, the commercialization of bodily parts is a dangerous trend, and there are good reasons to prohibit the sale of bodily parts in order to protect those who are economically vulnerable. There are good reasons to insist that one has important rights over one's body -- rights to make decisions about how it is used, rights to decide how it is altered, rights to decide how it is shared -- but none of these rights depend on viewing one's body as one's property.

I was listening to some rap music, and I was impressed by the artist's skillful use of rhyme, metaphor, imagery, allusion, and general wit. The artist is clearly skilled with the same tools of good poets and authors. Unfortunately, the music was also degrading; as it celebrated misogyny, violence, homophobia and elitism. It's a crying shame the artist wasted such talent to create something so hateful and unedifying. Would this artist's work be considered good art? Certainly there have been artists who have created disturbing, ugly pieces. However, it seemed to me such pieces were always meant to challenge the viewer, and ultimately aid in our growth and understanding. Is it possible for a great work of art to be degenerative, to make us more bigoted instead of enlightened?

Your question is about the relation between aesthetic value and moral value. Must something with great aesthetic value also have moral value (or, at least, not be morally harmful)? Some traditions of thought (within art criticism as well as within philosophy) insist on a sharp separation between aesthetic value and moral value -- allowing the rap music you mention to be aesthetically great but morally despicable. Other traditions consider aesthetic value and moral value to be inextricably linked -- treating the moral failures of a piece as aesthetic failures as well. Within either tradition, you may be right to praise the rhythms and sounds and creative imagery of a piece while denouncing the values it espouses, but according to the first tradition its moral failures has no bearing on its aesthetic worth, while according to the second its moral failures will always detract from its aesthetic worth. Likewise, within either tradition, you may say that a work that has moral value is a better work...

I've read several times about some "care ethics", but I'm still not sure what exactly is it about: seems like a part of an ethical theory rather than a complete system, but I really don't know. What is it, exactly, and what can I read to get a somewhat general (but deep) acount? Thanks, TT PS: please excuse my English, I'm from Argentina.

I would recommend a very readable but also very serious book called Caring , by Nell Noddings (University of California, 1984). An attitude of caring has often been considered to be an important part of being ethical -- one virtue among many. Nodding and other care-theorists, however, want to put caring at the center of ethics; and they do build a system-of-sorts around this attitude. One interesting aspect of her view is its accommodation of the notion that we owe the most to those we care about the most -- as opposed to those most in need, for example.

Are there any situations were forgiveness would be immoral?

Although there are many situations where it would be immoral to discount the wrongness of an act, and many situations where it would be immoral to absolve a person of responsibility for a wrong act, I do not think that forgiveness can ever be immoral. This is because I view forgiveness as a matter of giving up on one's feelings of resentment towards someone else -- not a matter of giving up on one's judgment that that person is responsible for doing something that was wrong. Even if feelings of resentment are sometimes useful (for motivating change, for example), they are not sufficiently under one's control to make the loss of resentment immoral. More importantly, though, I do not think it is our feelings that make us moral or immoral so much as our intentions, and there is no guarantee that resentful feelings lead to moral intentions -- even when the resentment is directed towards the doing of a serious wrong.

A couple of months ago, I had an experience which spawned an ethical dilemma which I find fascinating. I had been in a healthy relationship with a girl for some time, but after meeting and getting to know someone else—a girl in my class whom I got to know in a perfectly platonic fashion, so I can't see any wrongs committed on my part at that stage—, I fell in love with this other girl, whilst my feelings for my girlfriend withered and died. Understandably, our relationship could not go on after that, and so we broke up. I think we are both better off now than we were. However, assuming that I had an actual choice between (a) 'giving in' to my infatuation and breaking up with my old girlfriend so as to be happy with the other girl (it seems that we're also assuming no independent will on the part of the 'other' girl!) or (b) resisting my developing feelings for this other person to preserve the relationship I was already in, also assuming that I would, in fact, be as happy as I initially was with my old...

You assume (1) that you can, to a large extent anyway, choose whether or not to let yourself fall in love with someone new versus sustain the love you already feel for the person you are involved with, and (2) that you have no reason to think the new relationship will be any happier than the old (although you also claim to think that both you and your past girlfriend are better off now than you were before). You also seem to assume (3) that future happiness of your new acquaintance would be the same whether or not you allowed yourself to fall in love with her (presumably because without you she would be involved in some other, equally happy relationship). It is usually very hard to know the accuracy of each of these assumptions, but I do not find them unreasonable. On a straightforward comparison of current happiness with probable future happiness of everyone involved, there seems to be no reason to choose one relationship over the other. You seem to suggest, however, that the transition...

What is forgiveness? If I forgive someone for some misdeed, does that mean they are no longer obligated to correct that deed? Or is forgiveness simply an attitude change, when one chooses not to remain angry? Also when I say "I forgive you", is that a performative speech act? Or is it possible to forgive someone without saying it (or contrarily, to say you forgive someone when not really forgiving them).

The topic of forgiveness has recently received quite a bit of philosophical attention, which means quite a bit of philosophical disagreement as well. In particular: Charles Griswold, Pamela Hieronymi, Jacques Derrida have written in different ways about this topic. There seems to be agreement about the answers to most of your questions, however. Forgiveness is a change in attitude whereby one no longer holds a grudge or demands remediation from a wrongdoer -- despite continuing to view that person as responsible for their wrongdoing. This is not just a matter of ceasing to be angry; it is a matter of relinquishing the demand for recourse. A person who is forgiven by someone she has wronged may still be obliged to correct or compensate for her misdeed insofar as she continues to have obligations to herself, to society at large, or to a higher power. On the other hand, insofar as one is forgiven by oneself, one's society, or one's god, these obligations cease. Forgiveness may or may not be...

Does the morality of the universe depend on the presence of moral beings to "judge" it? Like the question of whether the tree falling in the forest makes any sound if there is no sentient being present to hear it.... (I'm not entirely sure if I've remembered that right!!!) So, would good and evil exist at all in a world without human beings?

Philosophers usually think of morality as applying to the way that people treat other people -- not the way that humans treat things like cups and chairs, and not the way that non-human animals treat each other. The way that we treat a cup may be better or worse, but it can't be moral or immoral. And the way that a cat treats a mouse can be kind or vicious, but it can't be moral or immoral. If this is right, then there can't be morality in a world without human beings. This does not mean that judging that something is moral makes it moral, however. The way that Jack treats Jill may be moral even if no one (not even Jack or Jill) notices. And Jack's treatment of Jill may be immoral even if everyone involved (including Jack and Jill) thinks that it is moral. Virtue is not always recognized, and evil can be disguised. A much larger, and more difficult question concerns the ultimate source of morality. Do the standards of morality depend on human judgements and concerns, or do they...