Here is a simple response, which I think is true: Language shapes our understanding and our perception of reality (different words will cause us to focus on different aspects of the world around us) and reality shapes our language (different environments will cause us to adopt different words). Speakers of different languages all belong to the same world, however, for there is only one world. Here is a more complicated response that may do a better job of addressing your concern: When people use different words to refer to the very same objects -- a bug, a chair, a curtain -- the differences in their view of the world can seem trivial. But when different languages focus on entirely different things (even the words for objects such as bugs and chairs can have importantly different associations in different languages), they are bound to reflect important differences in the worldviews of the relevant speakers. In some cases, the different views may be quite compatible because they simply attend...

There is a wealth of psychological theorizing that can help to clarify the many ways in which memory works, or fails to work. Philosophers can sometimes help to clarify the possibilities, though. On the assumption that a memory involves the retrieval of information about an event that has occurred in one's past, there are at least three different possibilities: 1. The information trace has been eliminated. This would be the case if the part of one's brain that stored the information has deteriorated to the point where it no longer contains the relevant information. 2. Your access to the information (or a certain type of access to the information) has been lost or lessened. The information is still stored, but the processes that enable that information to be recalled, or reactivated, have ceased to operate. 3. The information continues to play an active role in your thoughts and feelings, but you are no longer aware of its role.

The answer to your question will depend on what counts as a fact. Certainly it is possible for people to observe the same state of affairs while reacting to it differently. You observe the same wallpaper as I do, but you like it while I hate it. Or we both observe the same behavior on the part of a friend, but you find it wierd while I find it normal. On the other hand, if the likability of the wallpaper is itself a fact that you (alledgedly) observe, then you and I do disagree about the facts when I find it hateful. Likewise, if the wierdness of a friend's behavior counts as a fact. Rather than argue over what counts as a fact, it is probably best to recognize that different people will focus on different facts (without disputing the facts that others focus on), and that different people will value the same facts in different ways (without disputing others' descriptions of what they value). This does not mean that our focus of attention or our valuation is purely subjective, or that...

Compare the case of pain to the heat of spicy curries or steamy saunas: I recognize certain green curries to be just as hot/spicy as certain red curries, but I have a higher tolerance for the heat/spicyness of green curries; and I can tolerate steamy saunas better than in dry saunas even when I experience them as equally hot. I am not less sensitive to the heat of green curries or the heat of a steamy sauna, but I am not bothered by them as much as I am bothered by the heat of spicy curries or dry saunas. Why isn't pain like this -- tolerated differently in different forms, or by different people, even when the amount or degree of pain is recognized to be the same? You might think that pain just is intolerance, and that the degree of one's pain is equivalent to the degree of one's intolerance, so that finding a sauna less intolerable should be equated with finding it less painful. But since the two words, "pain" and "intolerance" are used in rather different ways, and since (as you...

I agree with Allen Stairs comments about the logic and the possibility of dreams within dreams. I wonder, though, whether your question is also about the possibility of different "levels" of reality. When we 'wake up' from one dream into the reality of another, are we shifting from one level of reality to another or are both dreams equally unreal? There is certainly a tradition (in philosophy and in religion) that embraces the idea of different levels of reality, and that often characterizes the move from one level to another as being like awaking from a dream. From any particular standpoint, however, there seems to be a single line that divides what is real from what is unreal. So from my current waking standpoint, the dream within a dream is just as unreal as the dream that contains it.

I agree with Mitch Green's response with regard to the possibility of controlling our beliefs indirectly. But in the case of a jury member instructed to ignore certain evidence, it is not really belief that is at issue. The jury member is asked to reach a conclusion following certain legal guidelines, but there is no requirement that the juror believe that conclusion -- and thus no requirement that the legal guidelines constrain belief. A jury member can wholeheartedly believe that a defendant is guilty yet confidently cast a "not guilty" vote -- because her belief is based on impermissible evidence. Some philosophers (Jonathan Cohen and Michael Bratman, for example) use the term "acceptance" as opposed to "belief" to refer to an attitude of endorsement that is restricted to certain contexts or concerns. In the case of a jury member, the endorsement is restricted to legal contexts; in the case of an actor, the endorsement is restricted to a theatrical context; and in the case of an athlete,...

There are no agreed upon answers to your questions, but here are some possibilities: Some philosophers (including myself) think of sensations as as a special class of perceptions -- namely, perceptions of one's own internal bodily states. When I perceive (versus infer) that my stomach is cramping, it is a sensation; and when I have an aching sensation, it is a perception of a bodily state. If this is right, then it is possible to have a perception (of a nearby house, say) without having a sensation (of tension in one's muscles, say)-- unless our awareness of external states is always accompanied by some awareness, however minimal, of our own internal states (our awareness of the house requiring some awareness of its effect on one's own body). Other philosophers think of sensations as the sensuous qualities (or "qualia") that accompany many experiences. The sensuous quality of redness and the sensuous quality of a minor chord count as sensations on this view. If someone can perceive that an...

There are many different definitions of intelligence (the ability to solve problems quickly and accurately, the ability to generate creative responses to new situations, the ability to synthesize diverse information into a coherent whole, ...), many different measures of intelligence (tests that focus on spatial tasks, tests that focus on understanding stories, tests that focus on analyzing social situations, ...), and many different areas of intelligence (formal, emotional, artistic, ....). This does not mean that intelligence is relative to the person observing it; rather, it is relative to the assumed definition, the means of measurement, and the type of intelligence at issue.

Certainly, there is a difference between saying "Harry is rude" and believing that Harry is rude since we can say things that we don't believe and we can believe things that we don't say. But I think your (first) question is about how closely the content of our words matches the content of our beliefs in cases where we do our best to say what we believe. Here are a few cases where the content of my sincere words and the content of my beliefs may diverge: 1. I may say "Harry is rude" without really understanding the difference between being rude and being obnoxious, in which case the content of what I say may be somewhat different than the content of my belief -- if what I really believe, without having the right word to express it, is that he is obnoxious. Once someone explains the difference to me, I would recognize that I believe Harry is obnoxious rather than rude. 2. I may say "Harry is rude", knowing that this is a rather simplified expression of my belief yet being unwilling...

Freud made many questionable claims about the function of dreaming (e.g. as the fulfilling of wishes) and the meaning of particular dream images. I wouldn't want to defend everything he says about dreams, but I do want to resist your conclusion that dreaming is "meaningless" and dream interpretation is "at best harmless entertainment ." Many therapists (Freudian and otherwise) treat a person's dreams as a source of insight about that person's thoughts and feelings, preoccupations and fears. This is entirely compatible with your claim that dreams are a by-product of moving information from short term to long term memory since it is (at least in part) our thoughts and concerns that determine what information gets moved into long term memory. The things that a person continues to remember over time show us something about the topics and the feelings that preoccupy that person. All recent events have some connection to a past event,but not all recent events make it into our dreams; so it is...