These are really tough and fascinating questions, both about what capacities are and what persons are. I hope other panelists might add to what little I have to say. What I will say (briefly, and without checking to see what the relevant literature has to say) is that one way to understand capacities is this: An object X has a capacity C to perform C-relevant functions or behaviors (C-stuff) if and only if X has a structural organization O such that, when X is in the appropriate circumstances, O allows X to do C-stuff. For example, I have the capacity to multiply any two numbers 1-13 because some structure in my brain allows me to get the right answer when the circumstances arise (e.g., when I'm asked to multiply 8 x 9 and I am awake and paying attention, etc.). Having a capacity to do C-stuff can be distinguished from having the potential to develop the capacity to do C-stuff. The potential might involve being in a position (both structurally and environmentally) to develop the...

Of course, it depends on how one defines 'person'. If one defines person as an organism with a human genome, then dolphins can't be persons and human fetuses are persons. But person ally, I think persons are conscious creatures that are able to think about their own and others' mental states, to represent and understand what they feel and believe, hold dear and hold true. Such self-awareness seems to allow one to represent oneself as a person, as separate from other persons, as continuous through time, as having a future self with interests that should be considered now. These capacities, I believe, are also what make persons autonomous and responsible in ways that non-persons are not. While there are important boundary conditions for personhood, so defined, it may involve many capacities, each of which is possessed to varying degrees, so it may be hard to delineate clearly which creatures count as persons and which don't, and to delineate exactly when an infant becomes a person. (I also...

I am against needless animal suffering, such as factory farming, so I should probably be against bullfighting. But it offers an interesting test case for a purely utilitarian response to animal cruelty. Basically, utilitarians believe that an action is wrong if it leads to a net decrease in happiness. So, something like factory farming is clearly wrong because the amount of suffering produced during the lifetime of the animals raised in awful conditions outweighs any pleasure meat-eaters might get that they couldn't get from eating other food. (This is oversimplified because there are other considerations, like the environmental damage from factory farming.) OK, but what about bullfighting? One might argue that the bulls are raised in relatively good conditions and then suffer pretty badly for some time, but that the suffering is outweighed by the happiness experienced by the spectators. Again, oversimplified--e.g., perhaps the spectators could easily find substitute sources of happiness that...

That's a clever argument. It looks like the form is valid. The problem is with premise 3 (it's better to choose option where fetus is definitely not immorally killed ...). Whether that premise is true seems to depend on whether there may be other reasons why the abortion may be justified that outweigh the possibility that the fetus is immorally killed, and of course, it's hard to assess the premise without more information about the likelihood that killing the fetus is actually immoral. This structurally parallel argument should help illustrate the problem: 1. If a woman does not have an abortion, then maybe the fetus will grow up to do horribly immoral things. 2. If this woman does have an abortion, then the fetus will definitely not grow up to do horribly immoral things. 3. It is better to choose an option where the fetus is definitely not going to grow up to do horribly immoral things, rather than an option where the fetus may grow up to do horribly immoral things. 4....

Yes, at least assuming that the "other woman" knows, or should know, that the man is married. The wife has grounds, in the sense of appropriate reason, to be angry because anger is an appropriate emotional response to having an important relationship messed up (not to mention other things, such as parenting help, financial help, etc.), and appropriate targets of that anger include persons who knowingly did things to mess up that relationship (hence the wife also has at least as much grounds to be angry at her husband). I am assuming here that it is sometimes appropriate to feel anger, an assumption that might be questioned by some (e.g., Buddhists?). Whether the wife has grounds, in the sense of moral justification, to be angry at the other woman is a more complicated question, since it is not clear what it means to be morally justified to feel an emotion towards someone (and also because the facts of the case might make such justification unclear).

This interesting thought experiment and associated questions deserves a substantial response. Alas, for now, I can only suggest that you read Robert Nozick's discussion of happiness and the "pleasure machine" thought experiment, a nice discussion of which was offered in the New York Times by David Sosa here .

Just to add to Prof. Greenberg's response, the question suggests that philosophers regularly make claims about physics, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, and other sciences without studying those fields. That is false. Few philosophers do so. Many who write about the sciences or use information from the sciences in their philosophy have formal training (coursework and sometimes degrees) in these fields. Many more read widely in these fields, and given their education, are able to understand what they read well enough to make claims about the philosophical implications of the science and even raise theoretical concerns about the methodology or results of the science. Some philosophers practice science by running experiments with scientists. I'd venture to say that more often you see scientists without much training in philosophy make claims about the philosophical implications of their scientific research.

Yes! But my answer is based on my metaphysics. I think that your brain is an essential part of you (along with your body) and that the part of you that consciously considers what to do and makes decisions is a part of your brain. So, you have control over your own brain because processes occurring in your brain control other processes in your brain that cause your bodily actions. Conscious self-control is a (very complex) set of brain processes. If this sounds counter-intuitive, it is partly because we simply have no good theory about how physical brain processes could be the basis of conscious experiences and thoughts (though we do have pretty good theories about how the brain carries out many cognitive tasks, such as perception, language, and initiation of movement). And it is partly because we have a competing metaphysical theory, largely based on religion, that says that our selves (our conscious minds) are non-physical entities separate from the brain and body (notice that this...

Yes, Buddhism suggests that we need to detach ourselves from our cravings and anxieties in order to escape from our suffering. The practice of meditation is designed to help with this process. By engaging in the focused breathing or other methods of meditation, you begin to learn to control the mind's tendency to wander and obsess. Instructions for a pretty simple type of meditation can be found here . But like any other practice, it is best learned from an expert and by repetition. One might also argue that the practice of philosophical thinking in general can help one overcome our transient worries and anxieties. By carefully reflecting on whether these worries are rational and on how one can best address them, one can reinterpret them in a way that should dampen the emotional reaction to them. Here, reading the Stoics might help. I also just read Ecclesiastes (from the Old Testament) for the first time, and enjoyed it. While it has a depressing edge to it, Solomon also argues that the...

I think the logic is fine, but I'm not sure about the content of the argument. The argument structure is: 1. X is an institution with an essential goal that is clearly immoral. 2. It is wrong for individuals and institutions not to do what they can to prevent an institution from achieving immoral goals. 3. So, it is wrong for individuals and institutions not to do what they can to prevent X from achieving its immoral goals. If we fill in Nazism for X and wiping out Jews for their essential immoral goal, the valid argument also looks sound (i.e., the premises and therefore the conclusion are true). But if we fill in Christianity for X, that argument is less clearly sound, mainly because Christianity is a much more diverse institution than Nazism with more varied essential goals. Some Christians take their religion to require fighting against homophobic practices, just as some fought against slavery and racism, while other Christians take it as an essential implication...