The evolutionary explanation in terms of genetic fitness (kin selection) goes roughly like this: Grandchildren share 1/4 of each of their grandparent's genes (parents and siblings share 1/2), so genes that help to "code" for traits that lead you to give up X/4 amount of your fitness (your chance of reproductive success) to increase your grandchildren's fitness X amount would spread through the population more than genes that "code" for more selfish behavior. So, all else being equal, we should expect to see selection for genes that lead grandparents to be nice to their grandkids. Of course, things are messier than this. Such traits won't be selected for in organisms that disperse such that grandparents aren't near their grandkids. Conversely, since grandparents (e.g., in humans) are typically past reproductive age, genes that code for even more generosity might be selected for--that might explain why grandparents spoil their grandkids rotten! Of course, it would be hard to code for something...

As far as I can tell from your description, it would not be unethical to report such fraud--indeed, reporting it is likely the right thing to do. Depending on the details, it might even be illegal not to report it. You might want to consult a legal expert to determine your rights and responsibilities in this case. It sounds like you are in a bad company and a bad situation. I wish you the best as you try to make things better.

Hmm, I don't know why you think there are exactly three characteristics, but since you asked it that way, I'll give it a go: 1. Philosophical questions tend to concern (to paraphrase Led Zeppelin) what is and what should be (and also how we can know what is and what should be)--that is, they tend to be about metaphysics (what exists and how it exists), ethics (what we ought to do and what a good life is), and epistemology (what can we know and how). They are the questions kids ask: "Why?" and "Why should I?" (and "How do you know?") 2. Philosophical questions typically look like they are (a) not objective (such that we know just what it would take to figure out the one right answer), (b) not subjective (such that the answer depends just on whatever someone thinks about it), and (c) difficult. As we discover agreed-upon methods for finding objective answers to questions, they tend to migrate into the sciences (and become "easy"--just kidding, scientists...

I begin my Introduction to Philosophy classes by saying that philosophical questions are those that children ask, "Why?", and those that adolescents ask, "Why should I?" I share your feeling that there is an energetic curiosity in children (and "pre-adults") that is often drained as we age--alas, in some cases by our educational system and media. I think we should try to fight having that philosophical feeling sapped by trying to explore new questions and fields, reading widely, talking with others about the big questions, and reminding ourselves how each thing we learn also illuminates how much we have yet to learn. But it is hard to force oneself to feel. So, we just have to inculcate the best habits we can and hope the feeling of love of wisdom (philo-sophia) will wash over us occasionally as we age. (It always helps to engage philosophically with children too and hope some of their questioning curiosity is contagious!)

I agree with Professor Smith. The only thing I would add may be obvious and may be something you've already tried. It sometimes helps to have third parties intervene to provide all the facts and arguments you would use to try to persuade your wife to change her mind. Here, your knowledge of who might influence her is useful. Would she trust your family's pediatrician or react harshly against him/her as a member of the 'vaccine conspiracy'? Her parents or yours? Mutual friends? While an 'intervention' would be extreme, making friends and family aware of a serious issue that affects the health of your children (and others) and enlisting their help might make it easier for your wife to back down without feeling pressured to do so solely by you. But should these methods fail, then Prof. Smith's suggestion seems appropriate.

You've got it right. If one believes meat-eating is wrong and has reasons and arguments for that view, then one should offer those reasons and arguments to others to try to convince them to stop doing something wrong. The reason meat-eaters respond this way is presumably that they do not think they are doing anything wrong or they think that vegetarians' reasons for avoiding meat are subjective (e.g., they don't like the taste or feel they don't need it) or, more likely, they are trying to avoid confronting reasons, facts, and arguments that would make them have to give up something they like doing. Conversely, some vegetarians might not want to confront meat-eaters because they don't take their position for ethical reasons or because they think the harm involved in meat-eating is minimal enough that they don't need to try to change the world, even if they do think it's wrong enough that they don't want to engage in that practice. The latter view seems difficult to pull off consistently. I say...

Very good question. Most people just assume that Matrix worlds aren't real. But that assumption derives in part from our perspective--we take our world to be real and, relative to our world, the Matrix world is a replica created by computers in our world. But what reason do we have to believe our world is not a creation of intelligences (e.g., gods) in another world? And would our world be an illusion if that were the case? The creators of The Matrix blew a chance to make the sequels more philosophical (and less goofy) by raising the question of whether the "real" world Neo enters might be another Matrix. Of course, that possibility should seem even more likely to someone like Neo who has discovered that the world they thought was real was not, though he never seems to ask that question. But now I'm talking as if matrix worlds are not real, and I'm not convinced that's the way to talk. What does "hand" refer to in the matrix? One plausible answer is that "hand" refers to the ...

Good questions. The answer to your first question is, basically, all of the things you list in your second question, plus some. The justifications for criminal punishment are typically divided (oversimplistically) into two theories: "backward-looking" retribution and "forward-looking" consequentialism. The forward-looking theories (often associated with utilitarian ethics) focus on the future benefits of punishing criminals: (1) deterring the criminal from further crime, (2) deterring others from carrying out crimes, and perhaps also (3) rehabilitating the criminal and (4) restitution of the victims. The backward-looking theories (often associated with Kantian ethics) focus on what happened in the past--the crime committed, the harm done, the guilt of the criminal--and aim to punish the criminal as much as he or she deserves it, which may include making the criminal suffer an appropriate amount, but perhaps also forcing him or her to make up for the crime with restitution. This...

You have some philosophy questions in here and some psychology questions. The philosophical questions are about (1) whether a machine could ever replicate all human behavior (i.e., pass a "complete Turing Test"), and (2) whether such complete replication of behavior would entail that the machine actually had the mental states that accompany such behavior in humans (i.e., whether a machine's (or an alien!) passing such a complete Turing Test means that it is conscious, self-aware, intelligent, free, etc.). There's a ton to be said here, but my own view is that the answers you suggest are the right ones--namely, that there is no in principle reason that a machine (such as an incredibly complex computer in an incredibly complex robot) could not replicate all human behavior, and that if it did, we would have just as good reason to believe that the machine had a mind (is conscious, intelligent, etc.) as we do to believe other humans have minds. I think there may be severe practical limitations to...

I think the answer is that when we are considering how responsible people are for their beliefs and behavior, and considering how much blame they deserve, we think that the appropriate degree of responsibility and blame to ascribe depends in part on the degree to which the person (a) had the opportunity to know better and (b) was able to control her behavior accordingly. And we recognize that it is more difficult to know that X is wrong when most of the people in your society believe X is not wrong and have taught you that X is not wrong than it is to know that X is wrong when most people believe and teach that X is wrong. And even if one comes to understand that X is wrong, it is then more difficult to behave accordingly if most people in your society believe that X is not wrong and also set up systems to make it difficult to act against that belief. Figuring out exactly how difficult it was for the average American, especially in the South, to figure out that slavery is wrong is not...