Why is an amoeba considered alive, but a car is not? The car is as complicated as the amoeba. It eats gasoline, and produces waste. It also has a reproductive system: by providing humans a useful service, cars have been able to use human factories as breeding grounds. When a car stops working, we say that it dies. Finally, if you look at cars through the decades, you can see that the primitive species of car (i.e. Model T) evolved into modern species (i.e. Prius). So why aren't cars alive?

As you suggest, there are a lot of analogies between cars and living things, and if you had used computer programs, there might have been even more. So, if we wish to say that amoeba and such are alive, whereas human artifacts are not, we need to find the relevant differences . There are at least three salient ones that seem relevant to picking out what counts as living (and the proper subject of biology): 1. What they do: Self-replication. All living things can replicate themselves. No artifacts can. Of course, it gets tricky when you consider things like computer viruses. Or future robots that might build robots like them. People also talk about other functions such as metabolism and self-regulation, but they might offer even less clear boundaries between living and non-living. 2. Where they came from: Evolution from a common ancestor. That is, the current (well-supported) theory is that all living things share a common ancestor. No artifacts evolved from living things. ...

A famous philosopher is coming to visit my university. Would it be inappropriate to ask for his autograph?

It depends on the setting. But if after the talk, there is an informal reception or something where you could talk with the philosopher and unobtrusively have him/her sign a book, I suspect s/he would be flattered not bothered. We philosophers tend not to get many such requests! (alas, not many of us count as famous)

Many ideas on the 'meaning of life' (assuming death is an ultimate fate of non-existence) presuppose that meaning may still be derived in this world through the actions we make and the impact we leave, our 'legacies.' However, it is perfectly rational and scientifically plausible that not only will we die, but our entire race, world, and indeed the universe itself (at least this incarnation of it, assuming there ARE multiple incarnations) must some day end. Assuming this is in fact true, doesn't the argument that the meaning of life can be derived from our impact on the world seem, if not wholly incorrect, than at least rendered moot by the rather over bearing reality that whatever impact we have is not merely fleeting but permanently erased?

I would suggest reading a wonderful essay by Thomas Nagel titled "The Absurd" (try here ). One point it makes is that if our lives would be absurd or meaningless if they are fleeting (or if human existence is fleeting and small), then they would just be more absurd if they were longer (e.g., eternal) or had a larger place in the universe. In this case, says Nagel, size doesn't matter . Rather, what matters is whether our lives have meaning from within (e.g., from within our human cultures and relationships) rather than from some external (impossible?) point of view. And there looks to be every reason to think that our lives do have meaning from within--that the projects we engage in and the love we give and receive and the experiences we have, at least if they are good, are important, significant, meaningful , far from absurd. (Oh, and what makes them count as good is also determined, I think, from within our system of social and personal relationships, which...

The other day when work ended, rather than go to my car and drive home as I have every day for the last four years, I just sat outside the building for no reason at all. Maybe I didn't want to go home just yet; maybe I was tired; maybe this maybe that. I sat for about 30 minutes, almost without moving, before finally leaving. I was thinking and thinking about why I did it, and then I started to wonder why I felt anxious about not being able to answer the question. Is it possible we've all been brainwashed into accepting the - if I remember this correctly - "principle of sufficient reason" (assuming this states that all things happen for a reason). Is it possible I sat down for no reason at all?

Professor Silverman is right about the PSR and how it relates to your question (though I'm not sure I agree that "it certainly seems that everything we observe does have a sufficient reason"). But perhaps you were also wondering if your action (or inaction) happened for no reason in this sense: it was caused by factors that you were unaware of and you would not think of as reasons at all (much less good reasons). Maybe it was caused by some random thing a co-worker said to you or by some unnoticed aroma or by some neural glitch. In these cases, it might be right to say you sat down "for no reason at all" (even if something causally explains the event). Another possibility is that nothing causally explains the event. Quantum mechanics gives us a model for probabilistic causation, such that given exact conditions X (e.g., electron being shot at barrier), there is some objective chance A will follow (e.g., electron being deflected) and some objective chance B will follow (e.g., electron...

Well, I am a math major. I am about to graduate, and I wish to attend graduate school in philosophy. I took one class in the philosophy of science. I know it is not enough, but I really have a deep passion for philosophy. I read alot on metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics and science by myself. It is to the point that I can understand much of the material in professional philosophical papers. I have a deep interest on the issue of ontological commitment to abstract objects, and the nature of the laws of nature. I really want to be a philosopher. What can I do?

I suggest: 1. you talk to the philosophy professors at your school and ask them lots of questions. Hopefully, there is someone that who has a good sense of what it takes to get into grad school in philosophy, to succeed, and to get a job. 2. you explore websites at some PhD and MA programs. There is also some useful information at http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/ 3. if you remain interested (as I hope you do!), you consider putting off graduation one semester and taking more philosophy courses. I fear that only one course in philosophy will take you off the radar at many programs (I suspect it would take a lot--e.g., very high GRE and GPA--to get some PhD programs to consider you, when they have so many applicants that are philosophy majors or even have MAs in philosophy). 4. you consider applying to MA programs in philosophy to strengthen your background (though it will still help to have more courses in philosophy to get in to MA programs). 5. you will need a polished...

Occam's razor seems to be a devestating weapon when it comes to the atheist's argument to why God doesn't exist, or more precisely it is more likely that he doesn't exist. It seems the scientific community has the consensus that they will never rely on "God" for the answer to any problem. Will there ever be a scenario in which God might prove simpler than the scientific or mathmatical explanation, and Occam's razor can be used to justify a belief in God?

What if a burning bush appeared out of nowhere in Central Park in front of hundreds of people and said, "It is God speaking. I have come to tell you that you should believe that I exist. Also, love one another. And, by the way, the health care bill does not say anything about a 'death panel'"? Well, a scientifically minded person would want to consider various alternative explanations for this event. For instance, perhaps it's an elaborate hoax involving holograms or even mass hypnosis. But another hypothesis worth considering is that it was God, and God is able to perform miracles that cannot be explained by anything the sciences study (or could study). There might be ways to test whether this event was a hoax, but presumably a 'hoaxster' would try to cover his tracks. So, what if an agnostic scientist in the crowd said to the burning bush, "I would like to believe in God but I need evidence that the best explanation for this event is that you really exist and that this isn't just a hoax...

As in literary or film criticism, often some aspects or compositions are "over-analyzed." I mean this in the same way that a metaphor can be belabored. Could such a thing be true of philosophy? Can a work of philosophy be "over-analyzed" or belabored? Is there any theory or treatment of the problem of "over-analysis" or do you think this could never possibly be a problem since analysis is always good. N.B.

My answer will exemplify my answer: Yes, some philosophical problems and texts can (and have been)over-analyzed; no, I don't think there are any theories that treat this problem (it has been under-analyzed); no, analysis is not always good. I won't belabor these points! (But good question.)

Could a robot, imbued with artificial intelligence, feel emotion? And could it feel the desire to improve its lot in life - e.g. if it was a servant robot, could it feel the desire to overthrow its master, escape the humiliation of being a servant, and possess things for itself?

I don't see any reason that a robot could not, in principle, be built that would be conscious and feel emotions. Some people (John Searle, most famously) disagree, at least about an artificial system that does not replicate our brains' "causal properties". However, I don't think we have any good ideas about how to create consciousness in robots, in part because we don't have any good theories about how consciousness in humans works. It's always possible that human consciousness only exists because we have something robots could never have (e.g., immaterial souls, although it's not clear why it is impossible robots could be endowed with souls, or our particular biological materials). But it seems more likely to me that our conscious experiences and emotions (including our feelings to improve our lot in life, our desire for possessions, our desires for freedom) are the product of complex processes in the brain that could, in theory, be replicated in a non-biological system. It seems likely to...

How do you know that you are consciously making the decision and not just consciously acknowledging the pre-determined direction give to your body by your brain depending on the factors which are affecting it.

This is an interesting question, and one that has been discussed quite a bit by philosophers and by scientists, some of whom suggest that there is evidence for the sort of picture you describe--i.e., first the brain initiates a decision and only then do we become aware of having made a decision. I think it is possible that our non-conscious brain processes do all the interesting deliberative work and form decisions and then our conscious brain processes simply become aware of the final product and perhaps make up some stories (rationalizations) for why we made the decisions we did. But I don't think the evidence has shown that this account is actual . First, we need to avoid a common mistake, which is to think that if our brain does it, we don't. It seems very likely that in some sense, we are our brains (our mental processes are very complicated neural processes), and we do not have non-physical minds that make decisions and then "send them" to the brain. Once we understand the mind...

Let's accept that women have the right to abortion. Now consider the case of several states before 1973. Persons who provided abortions could be prosecuted under the law, but women who received abortions were not. (Abortion was legal to "buy", but not to "sell".) Did such laws violate women's right to abortion, even though were legally allowed to get abortions?

Let's try some analogies. Suppose U.S. citizens have a constitutionally guaranteed right to vote for President, congressional representatives, etc. Now suppose that anyone who sets up or runs a voting booth is prosecuted for violating a law that says providing outlets for voting is illegal. It seems that this law would violate our constitutional rights. Or try it with the Second Amendment. In general, it is unconstitutional to bar selling guns as well as buying them, presumably since it would violate our right to bear arms if there were no way to get them. Accused defendents' right to legal counsel would be violated if it were illegal to practice law. And so on. I think that the way you set up the question, by supposing women have a right to abortion, suggests the answer: it would violate that right to make laws entirely restricting doctors from providing abortions. However, if you did not make that initial assumption about women's right to abortion, then it seems there is...

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