I claim to be a pacifist (or: like the idea of it and have not yet had the chance to express it), and honestly do not care for violence or confrontation. I have also been thinking of moments where violence would provide me with a safe route out of a situation: Let's say I am walking the streets with my girlfriend, everything is fine and the sun is just setting. All of a sudden a crook runs up and tries to rob me and my girlfriend. Now, being that I claim pacifism, I would think not to take any physical action towards the crook, but being a good boyfriend I would think to protect my girlfriend with my fists if need be. What would be my options to a situation like this? Would fighting the crook off with violence make me a hypocrite? Would not fighting off the crook make me a bad person/boyfriend for not protecting my girlfriend? I understand that what Mohandas Gandhi did throughout his life would make many consider him a true pacifist, but if he were to be in this type of position and he just sat...

An interesting question on a number of levels. In answering the question much depends upon how one defines "pacifism," "good," "bad," etc. So, if we were to have an extended conversation about the question I'd explore with you some definitions. I also think we should look at a few of the specific words you choose. (Philosophers are picky, I know.) It seems a bit misplaced to say that the "crook" (I really like that word) would "rob" you of your girlfriend. Robbery it properly speaking involves the unlawful or morally wrong taking of property, not persons. We must all guard against the tendency to treat or conceive of women and girls in ways informed by the way we conceive of and treat property. Perhaps "kidnap" would be a better word. And take a look at the question itself. I find it interesting that typically questions like this are posed as men defending women from assault, not men defending men or women defending men. In fact, I'm not sure I can think of any case like this where I...

Why is murder considered a crime when the person who was murdered was going to die whether or not that person killed him or her?

Well, everyone murdered would have died anyway, had he or she not been murdered. After all, we're all going to die, whether we're murdered or not. It strikes me that the difference between death as a result of murder and death that resulsts from some other cause is that the former is in some sense a violation of law and moral principle, rights to liberty and life--not to mention a violation that occurs through some agency and might not have occured then. All deaths are deaths, but murders are illegitimate and wrongful deaths. Other deaths are perhaps unfortunate but in many cases not unlawful.

Why isn't Christianity considered evil? After reading the Bible, I noticed that homosexuality is 'abominable', that if anyone chooses to work on a sunday then they should be 'put to death', that slavery is fine, animal sacrifice is fine and that the mentally-ill are possessed by the devil. Why then, do we not actively supress Christianity? How can a Christian legitimately believe that homosexuality, for example, is fine and still call themselves a Christian, despite what it says in the Bible? It seems to me that it is an evil moral theory to subscribe to.

A good and courageous question in my book. First, you should know that there are quite a few philosophers who have regarded Christianity as morally unsound. Nietzsche is perhaps the best known among them. For myself, I have argued that common Abrahamic conceptions of God are immoral (see "The Moral Imperative to Rebel Against God"). But your question calls for some qualification of its own: Don't assume that the Bible defines Christianity. It's true that some Christians hold that the Bible is literally true and inerrant in every statement and command. Most, however, don't accept this view of Scripture. Rather, they hold that some parts of the Bible are today inapplicable, other parts erroneous, and other parts metaphor, symbol, or fable (including the portions you cite). From this point of view, it's not the Bible that defines the Christian church but the church (or community of believers, anyway) that decides how to interpret and what to do with Scripture. Remember that in the early days...

Is it morally wrong to only want to marry someone from your own ethnic group?

Simply put, no. Doing so, however, may be immoral if the reasons why one wants to marry only someone from one's own ethnic group are immoral. For example, it would be immoral to only want to marry someone from one's own ethnic group in order to produce children belonging to that group for purposes of creating a dominant population, especially an invasive and newly dominant population, and this because one regarded one's own ethnic group as the natural superior to others. It would also, I think, be morally diminished, though under many circumstances not strictly wrong, to only want to marry someone from one's own ethnic group only because that person belonged to one's ethnic group--so long as one is honest about it. It's preferable to consider other factors in marriage as well. All things being equal, it is also morally preferable (more excellent) to consider partners from other groups. Note, in addition, that there's a difference between "wanting" or "desiring" only members of one's own...

Are there actions which are morally permissable when undertaken by a group but which would be immoral if performed by an individual?

An important philosophical consideration here before you get going on this issue is deciding what you mean by a group. In particular, you might consider whether you buy into what's been called methodological holism which means here, basically, that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. So, an economic class, a nation, a people, a family is more than just the individuals that compose it. Methodological individualism holds just the opposite, namely that the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts. Would you say that the state is a group? Then, certainly, there are things that this group can do that would be immoral if performed by an individual. For example: imprison people, judge and punish criminals, conduct wars, appropriate property and tax, marry, etc.

Is extreme (very violent) consensual sadomasochism morally wrong? If so, should it be against the law to cause injury by this practice? Or would it be a 'private' matter?

The old principle of liberty that one can do what one likes so long as it doesn't harm others (famously formulated by John Stuart Mill) is challeneged by this sort of issue. What if someone consents to being harmed or even asks to be harmed? Can one consent to be another's slave? My view is that liberty has been found to be such a good thing that it should be maximized. But it does have limits. Sometimes those limits have to do with advancing collective, social, or political goods, like education and equality. Sometimes they involve protecting people from themselves. Why should people be protected from themselves? Because our actions towards ourselves as well as towards others are not matters of simple will disconnected from the structures of character, coercive power relationships, psychological manipulation and pathology, deceit, and plain old stupidity. On this score, I vote for maximal sexual liberty. And so I support undermining compulsory heterosexuality, compulsory binary relationships,...

Following a class discussion of Augustine's position on slavery, a student in my Ancient Political Theory class made the claim that slavery was essentially good and necessary for the United States. When I began to think about all the ways to refute this claim, I came across another question: "Can slavery be morally justified?"

No, it can't be morally justified. Frankly, that's all that really need be said. Indeed, I must say I find asking the question today in a serious way to itself be morally unjustifiable. It suggests a kind of negligence with regard to learning about the moral accomplishments of our civilzation, or perhaps a debasement of our moral fiber. I suppose it's like asking whether genocide can be justified or whether torture and secret detention without review, trial, or warrant can be justified (!). So, to be charitable, I must conclude that you're really not asking this question in a serious way but, rather, as a kind of intellectual exercise. Briefly, then, let me suggest why slavery can't be justified by some of the central ethical frameworks philosophers have developed: 1. Virtue ethics. Slavery (as it was practiced in North America and the Carribean by Europeans--Roman slavery might have a slightly different inflection here) can't be justified since it inhibits development of the excellences and...

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