This is an interesting question which could arguably yield a booklength study, or even a series of them. I should caution you at the outset, however, that in a sense there is no such thing as "postmodernism." The term largely stems from usages in architecture and from Jean-François Lyotard's 1979 book, The Postmodern Condition . But there's not really a "postmodern" philosophical movement or a definable "ism" in the way that there's a Marxism or a Platonism. Neither Derrida nor Foucault called themselves postmodernists, and you might be surprised to learn that the term is largely used in Anglo-American circles; the French hardly use it at all. Postmodernism is rather a family of texts, thinkers, and techniques that have been gathered together for various purposes. Post-structuralism you might coonsider as a more precise term. Having said that, one can't really find an ancient school that "corresponds" to post-modernism. Different interepreters, however, will point to different moments in either...

It sounds to me like you're a something of a skeptic--resistant to dogmatism of any kind, whether theist, atheist, or agnostic. (Yes, agnostics can be dogmatic, too, holding dogmatically that religious questions can't be answered.) It also sounds like you remain, however, troubled by a persisting need to be dogmatic about something. Perhaps you can let go of that. Perhaps you might consider the possibility that there's something inherently unstable about religious dogmatics, or anti-religious dogmatics for that matter. Theistic/atheistic/agnostic alternatives seem to come and go in a kind of natural way to people (in a way that beliefs about ordinary, middle-sized, middle-distanced objects like tables and chairs don't). I find something of this in Hume, for example. You might try reading some of Hume' Dialogues concerning Natural Religion , as well as Montaigne's Essays related to religion, and Erasmus's In Praise of Folly .

One of the criteria philosophers generally agree upon for just war is "legitimate authority"--that is, a just war must be authorized in legitimate (usually meaning lawful) ways. The United Nations charter and the U.S. Constitution, for example, set out procedures for properly authorizing war, as will the legal codes of most nations. To evaluate the legality of this war, one must extablish whether those procedures were followed in proper ways. In particular, here you should look at whether the U.S. Congress authorized the war and whether the U.N. Security Council authorized the war. (See Articles 39, 42, 51 of the UN Charter; also see Security Council Resolution 1441; see the U.S. Congress's Joint resolution on the war of October 2002.) Another issue to consider is whether or not, even if authorization was given, the authorization was rendered illegitimate or void since it was predicated on deceitful claims about the nature of the threat posed by Iraq. You may also consider whether any ...

Let's assume that one can't "know" that there are other minds. Does solipsism follow? It may be possible, but remember that from ignorance only ignorance follows. From not knowing whether there are other minds it follows only that we don't know whether or not there are other minds. There may not be, but on the other hand there may. Perhaps the sceptic points out that we must accept our finitude, that while we may go on to develop sciences, theories, truth claims, instiutions of various kinds, etc., we must remember that it's possible that we might be wrong, that things might not be as they seem, that our claims may not be fully grounded. Perhaps our relationship with others and the world isn't best understood in terms of "knowledge." Perhaps that's just the human condition. Keeping this possiblity in the back of one's mind vaccinates against hubris.

This is an interesting claim. The tension, however, seems to rest on being able to "conceive" or "imagine" things that are impossible, such as breaking the stone paradox. But is it reallly possible to do that? Can one even conceive of forgiveness without things to forgive? If not, the "greatest being that can be conceived" is consistent with a being "limited" to being able to do only what is possible. Perhaps the misleading thing here is calling such a being "limited." Isn't being able to do everything logically possible just the same thing as being able to do everything?

Hey Glen, An interesting question, indeed. It reminds me, too, about why medical care is provided to people who've been sentenced to death. Look at it this way, though, all of us are going to die at some point. You might say that those with inoperable brain tumors just have a clearer picture than most about when and how they'll die. Knowing when and how one's going to die doesn't seem to be a good reason to deny that person medical care. And notice that even for those with inoperable tumors the picture isn't perfectly clear: Probability not necessity: Typically, people face some probability of death from the tumor, not certainty. Even one tenth of a percent chance of recovery is a chance and therefore a reason to administer rescusitation. Time: even if it were certain, a tumor takes time to kill. That time to live is likely to provide grounds for rescusitation. One of my uncles died of a brain tumor. While it was killing him he spent his time visiting family and friends, getting his...

An interesting question on a number of levels. In answering the question much depends upon how one defines "pacifism," "good," "bad," etc. So, if we were to have an extended conversation about the question I'd explore with you some definitions. I also think we should look at a few of the specific words you choose. (Philosophers are picky, I know.) It seems a bit misplaced to say that the "crook" (I really like that word) would "rob" you of your girlfriend. Robbery it properly speaking involves the unlawful or morally wrong taking of property, not persons. We must all guard against the tendency to treat or conceive of women and girls in ways informed by the way we conceive of and treat property. Perhaps "kidnap" would be a better word. And take a look at the question itself. I find it interesting that typically questions like this are posed as men defending women from assault, not men defending men or women defending men. In fact, I'm not sure I can think of any case like this where I...

This is a compelling question. I remember encountering it in a powerful way reading Albert Camus’s essay, “Absurd Reasoning.” Recently, a student of mine broached it during a discussion we were having about the condition the universe seems to be heading towards. It seems, I’m told, that everything in the universe will ultimately degenerate into a vast, endless, more-or-less uniform, horribly cold and dark field of low-level radiation. Some call this condition, the final destination of the universe, “entropic hell.” In light of this apparent fact, the relevant question concerning the meaning of life is this: since everything we accomplish will ultimately be destroyed and degenerate into “entropic hell,” what meaning can anything have? I think there’s something misleading about his question, however, something that lurks in a hidden assumption that the question makes. The question and its force rely largely on the assumption that life has meaning only if it lasts forever. In my view, this is a...

What role? Not the role of my companion. What makes a role "important"? Note that much of the "role" bacteria plays is that of food for other organisms. Like that of Titus Andronicus, some important roles end in suffering and death. So, I don't think the concept of "important role" will explain laws prohibiting the killing and tormenting of various organisms. For my own part, I look to three features of some organisms that distinguish them from others and justify protections and cultivation: (1) the capacity for conscious suffering; (2) the capacity to engage in projects and practices of value (like writing philosophy, making art, building just societies, sustaining families, advanciing learning and wisdom); and (3) the capacity to contribute to the diminishment of conscious suffering and or the support of projects and practices of value. This set of criteria provides a hierarchy of organisms, but not a terribly clean one (I like that about it). Some bacteria are worthy of protction or cultivation...

Well, everyone murdered would have died anyway, had he or she not been murdered. After all, we're all going to die, whether we're murdered or not. It strikes me that the difference between death as a result of murder and death that resulsts from some other cause is that the former is in some sense a violation of law and moral principle, rights to liberty and life--not to mention a violation that occurs through some agency and might not have occured then. All deaths are deaths, but murders are illegitimate and wrongful deaths. Other deaths are perhaps unfortunate but in many cases not unlawful.