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Language

Is philosophy of language and empirical study, since it discusses how humans actually communicate, as opposed to all the ways we hypothetically could communicate?

Thanks for your message. The philosophy of language is not exclusively interested in how humans actually communicate; it is also interested in the various ways in which we could communicate, where 'we' is not limited to members of our species. Nonetheless, the field is not entirely divorced from empirical considerations. For instance, theories concerned with what it is to *mean* something are sensitive to the cognitive requirements that have to be met for one to do so, and some such theories are at risk because they make empirically implausible predictions about what, for instance, a child would have to know in order to mean anything. By contrast, some areas of the philosophy of language, such as those that share a border with metaphysics (for instance, theories of propositions) are relatively un-empirical. Most theorizing in such areas can be done "in the armchair." The result is that some areas of the philosophy of language are relatively empirical, while others are not.
Language

Suppose I was born on March 17, 2010, which was a Wednesday. I was born on a Wednesday. My question is whether the fact that I was born on a Wednesday is a "conventional", "artificial" or "socially constructed" fact (I'm not sure about the right words to use, but I'm sure you got the idea). But I want you to make a distinction. It is obvious that we could have another word for Wednesdays. We could have called them "Sonntags", or "Fourthdays", or "Potatoes", or whatever. But the days would still be the same. As we could have called dogs "cats", and cats "dogs", but the animals would still be the same. In my view, the fact that I was born on a Wednesday is NOT a conventional or socially constructed fact, but rather a strictly objective, perhaps even "natural" or "logical" fact. Unfortunately I haven't found anybody who agrees with me until now.

Thank you for your message. Your instincts about this issue are correct. We could have called Wednesdays something else, and that would not have changed when it was you were born. Abe Lincoln saw this long ago when he remarked, “How many legs does a dog have, if you call his tail a leg? The answer is four, because calling a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg.” So more precisely: It is in part a conventional fact that you were born on a day we call 'Wednesday'. It is not a conventional, or even partly conventional, fact that you were born in the moment in time that you were.
Language

What is the difference between philology and linguistics?

Thanks for your question. Very roughly, philology is the study of words and their meanings, and the development of these two over time. This includes work deciphering "dead" languages such as Aramaic or Sumerian. By contrast, linguistics is a good deal more theoretical, aiming not just to describe, but also to explain such linguistic phenomena as morphology, phonetics, syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Unlike Philology, Linguistics also aims for generalizations that hold across all languages. For a fuller discussion, you may enjoy the highly readable _Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language_, edited by David Crystal.
Language

Is it possible to realize something which is not true? Or do all realizations point to a truth? For instance, if I realize that "life is short" does it really imply that life is really short? Or is that realization just a form of value-judgment and does not have anything to do with truth? Thanks for this very helpful site. Keep up the good work and the spread of wisdom.

Thank you for your question. I'd say it is not possible to realize something that is not true, and this is due simply to the meaning of the word 'realize'. This word is what semanticists fall "factive", meaning that the sentence following it must be true for the entire sentence in which it occurs to be true. So if 'John realizes that A' is true, then A must be true as well. In this respect 'realize' is like 'know': If John knows that A, then A must be true also. Of course, the fact that you can't realize what is not true, doesn't mean that your new view is without value. So suppose that life is really long and not short. Then you can't realize that life is short, but on the other hand, you can come to be convinced that life is short (because 'convinced' is not a factive), and that might prompt you to live each subsequent day to the fullest. If so, more power to you!
Knowledge

To what extent is it acceptable for someone to present an opinion on something of which they have no first hand knowledge? Specifically, if someone has an opinion about an author without having read any of their books and only having heard others speak about them, are they still entitled not only to an opinion about said author, but also for their opinion to be taken seriously? Alongside this, if we can have an opinion about something for which we cannot have first hand knowledge (e.g. the French Revolution) but only through information we have read in historical accounts, does this imply that we do not need first hand knowledge at all?

Thank you for your question. I would suggest that the "secondhand" opinions you are interested in might in some cases be justified; in others less so. Imagine for instance that I've read a good deal about environmental damage in China. I've never been there, and so have no firsthand experience of the situation, but I have read reputable sources of various kinds on the issue, and have done so at some length, making a point of seeking out different positions on the issue. In a case like this, I would suggest, it is acceptable for me to form an opinion on the issue in spite of having no firsthand knowledge. By contrast, and all too often, people form secondhand opinions about issues on which they have done inadequate research. One only needs to listen for a few minutes to talk radio shows of various kinds, for instance, or user comments on online news sources, to see how many people form confident opinions on important issues (terrorism, economics, war, etc.) about which they are woefully ill...
Language
Logic

Hi. Take the following syllogism : John believes that green people should be killed. Mushmush is a green person, a neighbour of John. ====================== Thus, John believes that Mushmush should be killed. Formally, the argument seems valid. However, in reality it doesn't work. A persona can believe that all people with quality X should be killed, but not think it about a specific person he knows. So is there a logical contradiction here? What happens? Thank you, Sam

Whoa! With all due respect to Professor Nahmias, he is mistaken. The syllogism is NOT valid and here is why. Propositions that are "in the scope" of words like belief can't be manipulated while preserving validity. So while, Green people should be killed. Mushmush is a green person. ergo, Mushmush should be killed is valid, embedding the first premise in the scope of belief ('John believes that green people should be killed') will destroy the argument's validity. Words like 'believes' (and related ones such as 'knows', 'wants', 'fears') create what is known as opaque contexts, in which inferences that would otherwise be valid are no longer valid. The reason is that what a person believes (knows, wants, fears) depends not only on what is implied by the propositions he believes, but also on whether he *realizes* that these things are implied. Alas, we are all too often unaware of what is implied by the things that we believe. The point here has been discussed in detail by...
Profession

Dear established philosophers, I would like to be an established, professional philosopher some day, by which I mean I want to teach philosophy in a university. I have studied history at degree level but realised in my last year that philosophy is for me. I have been accepted to study for an MA in History of Philosophy at King College London. I have heard that the road to being an academic philosopher can be a difficult one. This question may be unanswerable to any of you for any number of reasons, but what should my next step be? What should I being doing in the run up to, and during, my MA to improve my chances? Is a PhD the best, or only, thing to do after an MA? Any advice would be greatly appreciated!

Thanks for your question. KCL is an excellent program. If your aspiration is to become a professional philosopher in a relatively traditional sense, meaning teaching and doing research in a university, then I'd say the best things to do are the following: 1. Read voraciously, and *actively*, so that you are always thinking of ways in which one might challenge the author's position. Think of reading philosophy as a conversation, not as an activity in which you're at the receiving end of information. 2. Surround yourself with other students who are passionate about philosophy and spend lots of time discussing issues--before or after class, in pubs, on walks, etc. At least half of what you'll learn is in conversation with peers. 3. Make sure that at least six days/week, you have three or four hours of uninterrupted thinking time to read and/or write about philosophy. (Writing is a central part of your craft, and you should be doing it constantly. And then do it some more.) 4. Go...
Death
Punishment

Why do we consider the death penalty immoral in a situation where a sadist (a very immoral person) commits heinous crimes and is sentenced to life imprisonment where he is protected from lynch mobs, given access to education, therapy (which has proved not only to be non effective in rehabilitating sadists but frees them from responsibility for their actions), medical care, food, clothing, televison, gym, etc. all at the taxpayers expense and one of his victims (a child) who has survived the trauma and torture inflicted is sentenced to a life of physical and psychological disability, in later life unable to work or pay for his ailments and who lives in constant fear that the sadist will be released and come and get him again? Is it possible that our reluctance to inflict the death penalty is out of fear but that we simply rationalize this as morality as that is the more palatable excuse. Are we just moral cowards? Wouldn't we all be relieved if the sadist suddenly dropped dead of a heart attack? And if...

Thank you for your message. I'm not sure exactly what you have in mind when you presuppose, in your first sentence, that "we" consider the death penalty immoral in the situation you describe. So far as I can tell, at least in the U.S., a good many people consider the death penalty in such a situation moral. But to continue the line of thought you begin, let's see whether it might be possible to make sense of those people who consider it immoral in that situation. 1. You're right that the sadist might get a lot of benefits at taxpayer expense. On the other hand, it's well known that at least given the current difficulty of prosecuting a death penalty case, and all the hurdles that must be got over after that, lifelong incarceration is actually less expensive than the death penalty. As a result, if your argument rests on the financial considerations, a life sentence is clearly the best option for such a person. 2. You ask whether reluctance to inflict the death penalty is out of fear,...
Mind

When we deliberate, we often make note of pertinent constraints as we form our opinion. For instance, a jury member might arrive at a different recommendation than she would have otherwise if she observes a judge's instructions to ignore a particular piece of testimony. Does the ability to determine our beliefs by considering some factors and not others show we can in some sense control what we believe?

Nice question. I suggest that cases like the one you consider do show that in some sense we can control what we believe. The important thing is the 'in some sense' qualification. Many philosophers have argued that we can't "directly" change our beliefs at will. For instance, even if you threaten me with death, I won't be able immediately and just as a matter of will to make myself believe that the Earth is flat. I'd at least have to do something more roundabout, such as surround myself with a bunch of flat-earthers, ignore contrary evidence, and so on. Similarly, I might have to go to some efforts to ignore a piece of testimony, perhaps with the aid of hypnosis or of someone who could make that testimony look specious. More generally, then, I would suggest that we can indirectly control what we believe if we are determined to do so: If for instance I am convinced by Pascal's "Wager" argument that it's reasonable to believe in God, I won't be able to become a theist just by snapping my...
Ethics
Medicine
Mind

As someone who is clinically depressed, I have often wondered: philosophically speaking, is trying to treat depression wrong? People are depressed for a reason, possibly because life's pretty damned depressing once you get down to it. It seems to me that in plenty of cases, depression is a logical reaction to this planet, a rather depressing thought in and of itself. Despite the wars and the plagues and the genocides and the poverty and the seemingly countless other reasons for one to be depressed, people treat depression like a disease when it seems more like a perfectly acceptable reaction to the human condition. Treating depression like this appears to me as a rather unsubtle way of trying to trick people into believing everything is going to be okay when reality seems to contradict this. Any thoughts?

Thank you for your question. I think you're right to wonder whether treating depression is always justified. After all, sometimes being upset about something is an appropriate reaction. For instance, we wouldn't feel the need to "treat" someone's grief over the death of a loved one. On the other hand, while a certain amount of grief over such a situation seems justified and appropriate, one might also suggest that it is possible to take that grief too far. If I had a friend who was grieving intensely and for a very long time over the loss of a loved one, I might start to think of ways I might try to help. Similarly, while one can be entirely justified in being depressed over the state of the world, I am not sure that being clinically depressed is the *only* appropriate reaction to the world's state. This is for a number of reasons. First of all, there are a number of things to be absolutely thrilled about: a beautiful sunrise, the smell a pine forest, being able to fully trust another person,...

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