I guess I am a bit more skeptical about getting anything of value from arguments like Pascal's wager. What makes the wager go, at least as the argument is under discussion here, is the threat of eternal torment if you don't pick correctly. One problem with the wager may be seen if we imagine two dieties who are in complete and implacable conflict over what they want from us. One of these dieties mandates honoring mothers and fathers; one mandates dishonoring mothers and fathers...and so on. Each one is associated with the threat of eternal torment if we fail to live in accordance with their mandates (or, if we fail to believe in them). It may seem that choosing either one "is superior to atheism/agnosticism" if these are our only choices, since if we don't choose either, we're damned either way, but if we choose one, we have what appears to be a 50/50 chance. But to see why this is wrong, bring in a third diety, who mandates that you believe in no dieties, and who would comdemn you to eternal...

First of all, it is nonsense to try to assess the probability of intelligent human life occurring unless we first stipulate what the prior conditions are. According to evolutionary theory, human beings and other living things are the result of genetic mutations that occur within prior life forms, which are then selected as a result of added fitness within a certain environment. Given the nature of this process, it is all but senseless to assess the (prior) probability that some specific life form would emerge from a (random) mutation in the prior life form, given all of the variables that are pertinent to fitness within a given environment. So if someone thinks they can calculate this as a real probability, I expect they are simply making up the values on which their calculations are based. This is no way to do things! Now, there may be calculations we can apply to very specific conditions at very specific places and times, with respect the the likelihood that some very specific string of...

I confess I don't understand the notion of "metaphysical necessity," if it does not entail that that there is no possible world in which the "metaphysically necessary" being does not exist. But only a pencil exists in world W. So I really don't see what is gained (or why the very question of God's existence is not simply begged) by the claim that God is a (metaphysically) necessary being.

If "God exists" is necessary, then the probability that God exists is 1. Full stop. It is not either 1 or 0, it is simply 1. It is also not 0.2 or any other number. Nothing like begging the question big-time, eh? On the other hand, I can't see why anyone serious about the question of God's existence (even theists, who would like the answer to be affirmative, but presumably not on foolish grounds) would accept the claim that "God exists" is necessary. If that were true than the could be no possible world (=a world that can be described without contradiction) in which God did not exist. But it seems obvious that there can be such a world. Consider this description: World W = a world in which only a single pencil exists. It's hard to spot the contradiction in that simple world! It would be a pretty boring place to be...but wait! If anyone were to be there, it would be a different world! Whew!

Beware a certain inference that you seem very close to making (and which I do think people make all the time): Because I want such-and-such to be true (e.g. I want there to be a "final answer" to some question, Q), it must be true (e.g. there must be a "final answer" to Q) You are right, people want "final answers," and some people want them so badly that they are willing to accept as "final answers" all kinds of nonsense. I rather suspect that it is part of the human condition that the actual "final answers" we discover that are actually comprehensive and fully correct will be few to none. Success, for a human inquirer, is, rather, to continue to make progress--even if the "final answers" continue to recede before our inquiries.

I don't think you have a valid criticism of intelligent design here. I actually find the very idea of beings who did not see order in the universe as rather more difficult to imagine than you seem to think--after all, it seems to me that they would have to see some degree of such order just to survive. (Imagine not seeing enough order in the universe to support decisions about whether or not certain things you perceive are edible or drinkable). But more than this, I don't see why the relativity of perspecive in your case proves anything. Why do you think it follows that if A (one group of organisms) sees something one way (e.g. as orderly) and B (a different group of organisms) sees it otherwise (not orderly) that this proves the relevant judgment is (only) a subjective one? Some animals (e.g. dogs) are color-blind, but we don't take this to show that colors are purely subjective. Maybe your aliens are "order-blind"! Their loss!

Philosophers have debated this sort of question, but I think the consensus is that the question is not coherent. Being "all-powerful" obviously does not mean being able to do what is logically impossible. Think, instead, of the concept as making God into a being who can do anything that can (in principle) be done. Since lifting a rock of any size can in principle be done, God can always lift the rock. But making a rock so big that it can't in principle be lifted makes no sense at all, hence God's not being able to do that is no indication of not being all powerful, it is just to recognize that the description" a rock so heavy that God can't lift it" is nonsense.

I agree with the scientists. Very crudely, science provides explanations of how the world works, and bases its theories on matters that are open to regular observation by anyone (using the appropriate equipment, of course). Unless and until God decided to provide us with regular and inter-subjectively available observations of him/her/it, God's existence will not be a matter for scientific discovery. Moreover, if God does not exist, science can certainly not establish that. It is not possible to prove non-existence on the basis of empirical evidence, because all empirical evidence can supply is that there are no scientifically reliable observations of God (yet). Science can establish things that are contrary to religious teachings in other ways, of course. Despite the nonsense that has been recently stirred up on the topic of "intelligent design," science has more than adequately shown that the creation myth in Genesis cannot be literally true. But as for the existence of God, I don't...

I think so. Just because one has unlimited ability to serve one's desires does not mean that one has no desires to serve. Moreover, omnipotence alone would not make one able to discern how best to go about what pursuing what one wants. Here's another way to think about it: Surely an omnipotent being can do whatever is logically possible, and that obviously includes at least what you or I can do. You and I can experience wanting, desire. Hence, an omnipotent being can also do this--and a great deal more in addition!

The list would be a very long one, I'm afraid! Nearly all of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers did; all of the early and medieval Christian philosophers, most of the early modern European philosophers, until perhaps the 20th Century. In the 20th and 21st centuries, probably most of the best-known philosophers have not believed in an afterlife. It is much easier to identify the best-known philosophers who have not believed in an afterlife. These would include: most or all of the Epicureans (among the Greek and Roman philosophers), and among the early moderns, Hobbes and Hume. I'm sure there are others, as well, some of which might also count as "major philosophers."

I guess I would like to know from someone who thought such things were indications of the workings of a deity what sorts of patterns would count to them as not being indications of a deity. I'm inclined to think that some sort of order is a simple requirement of there being a universe at all, and so it seems that some indications of such order--whether highly complex or simple--would inevitably be evident in that universe. As a result, it is difficult for me to see why some particular patterns would indicate anything religiously significant--after all, it is not as if the patterns themselves are divine signatures or fingerprints or the divine equivalent of DNA evidence. That one can have a religious response to such things, as Richard Heck proposes, I don't doubt; but that such a response is somehow rationally supportable, I do doubt.